Daily Papers

Successful and effective communication between humans and AI relies on a shared experience of the world. By training solely on written text, current language models (LMs) miss the grounded experience of humans in the real-world -- their failure to relate language to the physical world causes knowledge to be misrepresented and obvious mistakes in their reasoning. We present Mind's Eye, a paradigm to ground language model reasoning in the physical world. Given a physical reasoning question, we use a computational physics engine (DeepMind's MuJoCo) to simulate the possible outcomes, and then use the simulation results as part of the input, which enables language models to perform reasoning. Experiments on 39 tasks in a physics alignment benchmark demonstrate that Mind's Eye can improve reasoning ability by a large margin (27.9% zero-shot, and 46.0% few-shot absolute accuracy improvement on average). Smaller language models armed with Mind's Eye can obtain similar performance to models that are 100x larger. Finally, we confirm the robustness of Mind's Eye through ablation studies.

Visual metaphor generation is a challenging task that aims to generate an image given an input text metaphor. Inherently, it needs language understanding to bind a source concept with a target concept, in a way that preserves meaning while ensuring visual coherence. We propose a self-evaluating visual metaphor generation framework that focuses on metaphor alignment. Our self-evaluation approach combines existing metrics with our newly proposed metaphor decomposition score and a meaning alignment (MA) metric. Within this setup, we explore two novel approaches: a training-free pipeline that explicitly decomposes prompts into source-target-meaning (S-T-M) mapping for image synthesis, and a complementary training-based pipeline that improves alignment using our proposed self-evaluation reward schema, without any large-scale retraining. On the held-out test set, the training-free approach surpasses strong closed baselines (GPT-4o, Imagen) on decomposition, CLIP, and MA scores, with the training-based approach close behind. We evaluate our framework output using a user-facing study, and observed that participants preferred GPT-4o overall, while our training-free pipeline led open-source methods and edged Imagen on abstract metaphors. Our analyses show S-T-M prompting helps longer or more abstract metaphors, with closed models excelling on short, concrete cases; we also observe sensitivity to sampler settings. Overall, structured prompting and lightweight RL perform metaphor alignment well under modest compute, and remaining gaps to human preference appear driven by aesthetics and sampling.

We present MindEye, a novel fMRI-to-image approach to retrieve and reconstruct viewed images from brain activity. Our model comprises two parallel submodules that are specialized for retrieval (using contrastive learning) and reconstruction (using a diffusion prior). MindEye can map fMRI brain activity to any high dimensional multimodal latent space, like CLIP image space, enabling image reconstruction using generative models that accept embeddings from this latent space. We comprehensively compare our approach with other existing methods, using both qualitative side-by-side comparisons and quantitative evaluations, and show that MindEye achieves state-of-the-art performance in both reconstruction and retrieval tasks. In particular, MindEye can retrieve the exact original image even among highly similar candidates indicating that its brain embeddings retain fine-grained image-specific information. This allows us to accurately retrieve images even from large-scale databases like LAION-5B. We demonstrate through ablations that MindEye's performance improvements over previous methods result from specialized submodules for retrieval and reconstruction, improved training techniques, and training models with orders of magnitude more parameters. Furthermore, we show that MindEye can better preserve low-level image features in the reconstructions by using img2img, with outputs from a separate autoencoder. All code is available on GitHub.

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive performance in language comprehension and various reasoning tasks. However, their abilities in spatial reasoning, a crucial aspect of human cognition, remain relatively unexplored. Human possess a remarkable ability to create mental images of unseen objects and actions through a process known as the Mind's Eye, enabling the imagination of the unseen world. Inspired by this cognitive capacity, we propose Visualization-of-Thought (VoT) prompting. VoT aims to elicit spatial reasoning of LLMs by visualizing their reasoning traces, thereby guiding subsequent reasoning steps. We employed VoT for multi-hop spatial reasoning tasks, including natural language navigation, visual navigation, and visual tiling in 2D grid worlds. Experimental results demonstrated that VoT significantly enhances the spatial reasoning abilities of LLMs. Notably, VoT outperformed existing multimodal large language models (MLLMs) in these tasks. While VoT works surprisingly well on LLMs, the ability to generate mental images to facilitate spatial reasoning resembles the mind's eye process, suggesting its potential viability in MLLMs.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

Gaze-referential inference--the ability to infer what others are looking at--is a critical component of a theory of mind that underpins natural human-AI interaction. In a controlled study, we evaluated this skill across 111 Vision Language Models (VLMs) using photos taken with manipulated difficulty and variability, comparing performance with that of human participants (N = 65), and analyzed behaviors using mixed-effects models. We found that 94 of the 111 VLMs failed to do better than random guessing, while humans achieved near-ceiling accuracy. VLMs even respond with each choice almost equally frequently. Are they randomly guessing? Although most VLMs struggle, when we zoom in on five of the top-tier VLMs with above-chance performance, we find that their performance declined with increasing task difficulty but varied only slightly across different prompts and scene objects. These behavioral features cannot be explained by considering them as random guessers. Instead, they likely use a combination of heuristics and guessing such that their performance is subject to the task difficulty but robust to perceptual variations. This suggests that VLMs, lacking gaze inference capability, have yet to become technologies that can naturally interact with humans, but the potential remains.