Daily Papers

In this paper, we contend that a natural objective of representation learning is to compress and transform the distribution of the data, say sets of tokens, towards a low-dimensional Gaussian mixture supported on incoherent subspaces. The goodness of such a representation can be evaluated by a principled measure, called sparse rate reduction, that simultaneously maximizes the intrinsic information gain and extrinsic sparsity of the learned representation. From this perspective, popular deep network architectures, including transformers, can be viewed as realizing iterative schemes to optimize this measure. Particularly, we derive a transformer block from alternating optimization on parts of this objective: the multi-head self-attention operator compresses the representation by implementing an approximate gradient descent step on the coding rate of the features, and the subsequent multi-layer perceptron sparsifies the features. This leads to a family of white-box transformer-like deep network architectures, named CRATE, which are mathematically fully interpretable. We show, by way of a novel connection between denoising and compression, that the inverse to the aforementioned compressive encoding can be realized by the same class of CRATE architectures. Thus, the so-derived white-box architectures are universal to both encoders and decoders. Experiments show that these networks, despite their simplicity, indeed learn to compress and sparsify representations of large-scale real-world image and text datasets, and achieve performance very close to highly engineered transformer-based models: ViT, MAE, DINO, BERT, and GPT2. We believe the proposed computational framework demonstrates great potential in bridging the gap between theory and practice of deep learning, from a unified perspective of data compression. Code is available at: https://ma-lab-berkeley.github.io/CRATE .

Modern learning frameworks often train deep neural networks with massive amounts of unlabeled data to learn representations by solving simple pretext tasks, then use the representations as foundations for downstream tasks. These networks are empirically designed; as such, they are usually not interpretable, their representations are not structured, and their designs are potentially redundant. White-box deep networks, in which each layer explicitly identifies and transforms structures in the data, present a promising alternative. However, existing white-box architectures have only been shown to work at scale in supervised settings with labeled data, such as classification. In this work, we provide the first instantiation of the white-box design paradigm that can be applied to large-scale unsupervised representation learning. We do this by exploiting a fundamental connection between diffusion, compression, and (masked) completion, deriving a deep transformer-like masked autoencoder architecture, called CRATE-MAE, in which the role of each layer is mathematically fully interpretable: they transform the data distribution to and from a structured representation. Extensive empirical evaluations confirm our analytical insights. CRATE-MAE demonstrates highly promising performance on large-scale imagery datasets while using only ~30% of the parameters compared to the standard masked autoencoder with the same model configuration. The representations learned by CRATE-MAE have explicit structure and also contain semantic meaning. Code is available at https://github.com/Ma-Lab-Berkeley/CRATE .

In this paper, we contend that the objective of representation learning is to compress and transform the distribution of the data, say sets of tokens, towards a mixture of low-dimensional Gaussian distributions supported on incoherent subspaces. The quality of the final representation can be measured by a unified objective function called sparse rate reduction. From this perspective, popular deep networks such as transformers can be naturally viewed as realizing iterative schemes to optimize this objective incrementally. Particularly, we show that the standard transformer block can be derived from alternating optimization on complementary parts of this objective: the multi-head self-attention operator can be viewed as a gradient descent step to compress the token sets by minimizing their lossy coding rate, and the subsequent multi-layer perceptron can be viewed as attempting to sparsify the representation of the tokens. This leads to a family of white-box transformer-like deep network architectures which are mathematically fully interpretable. Despite their simplicity, experiments show that these networks indeed learn to optimize the designed objective: they compress and sparsify representations of large-scale real-world vision datasets such as ImageNet, and achieve performance very close to thoroughly engineered transformers such as ViT. Code is at https://github.com/Ma-Lab-Berkeley/CRATE.

As a powerful tool for characterizing cellular subpopulations and cellular heterogeneity, single cell RNA sequencing (scRNA-seq) technology offers advantages of high throughput and multidimensional analysis. However, the process of data acquisition is often constrained by high cost and limited sample availability. To overcome these limitations, we propose a hybrid model based on Diffusion model and White-Box transformer that aims to generate synthetic and biologically plausible scRNA-seq data. Diffusion model progressively introduce noise into the data and then recover the original data through a denoising process, a forward and reverse process that is particularly suitable for generating complex data distributions. White-Box transformer is a deep learning architecture that emphasizes mathematical interpretability. By minimizing the encoding rate of the data and maximizing the sparsity of the representation, it not only reduces the computational burden, but also provides clear insight into underlying structure. Our White-Box Diffusion Transformer combines the generative capabilities of Diffusion model with the mathematical interpretability of White-Box transformer. Through experiments using six different single-cell RNA-Seq datasets, we visualize both generated and real data using t-SNE dimensionality reduction technique, as well as quantify similarity between generated and real data using various metrics to demonstrate comparable performance of White-Box Diffusion Transformer and Diffusion Transformer in generating scRNA-seq data alongside significant improvements in training efficiency and resource utilization. Our code is available at https://github.com/lingximamo/White-Box-Diffusion-Transformer

Deep neural networks learn fragile "shortcut" features, rendering them difficult to interpret (black box) and vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This paper proposes semantic features as a general architectural solution to this problem. The main idea is to make features locality-sensitive in the adequate semantic topology of the domain, thus introducing a strong regularization. The proof of concept network is lightweight, inherently interpretable and achieves almost human-level adversarial test metrics - with no adversarial training! These results and the general nature of the approach warrant further research on semantic features. The code is available at https://github.com/314-Foundation/white-box-nn

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has found wide application, but also poses risks due to unintentional or malicious tampering during deployment. Regular checks are therefore necessary to detect and prevent such risks. Fragile watermarking is a technique used to identify tampering in AI models. However, previous methods have faced challenges including risks of omission, additional information transmission, and inability to locate tampering precisely. In this paper, we propose a method for detecting tampered parameters and bits, which can be used to detect, locate, and restore parameters that have been tampered with. We also propose an adaptive embedding method that maximizes information capacity while maintaining model accuracy. Our approach was tested on multiple neural networks subjected to attacks that modified weight parameters, and our results demonstrate that our method achieved great recovery performance when the modification rate was below 20%. Furthermore, for models where watermarking significantly affected accuracy, we utilized an adaptive bit technique to recover more than 15% of the accuracy loss of the model.

Retouching images is an essential aspect of enhancing the visual appeal of photos. Although users often share common aesthetic preferences, their retouching methods may vary based on their individual preferences. Therefore, there is a need for white-box approaches that produce satisfying results and enable users to conveniently edit their images simultaneously. Recent white-box retouching methods rely on cascaded global filters that provide image-level filter arguments but cannot perform fine-grained retouching. In contrast, colorists typically employ a divide-and-conquer approach, performing a series of region-specific fine-grained enhancements when using traditional tools like Davinci Resolve. We draw on this insight to develop a white-box framework for photo retouching using parallel region-specific filters, called RSFNet. Our model generates filter arguments (e.g., saturation, contrast, hue) and attention maps of regions for each filter simultaneously. Instead of cascading filters, RSFNet employs linear summations of filters, allowing for a more diverse range of filter classes that can be trained more easily. Our experiments demonstrate that RSFNet achieves state-of-the-art results, offering satisfying aesthetic appeal and increased user convenience for editable white-box retouching.

Recently, LoRA and its variants have become the de facto strategy for training and sharing task-specific versions of large pretrained models, thanks to their efficiency and simplicity. However, the issue of copyright protection for LoRA weights, especially through watermark-based techniques, remains underexplored. To address this gap, we propose SEAL (SEcure wAtermarking on LoRA weights), the universal whitebox watermarking for LoRA. SEAL embeds a secret, non-trainable matrix between trainable LoRA weights, serving as a passport to claim ownership. SEAL then entangles the passport with the LoRA weights through training, without extra loss for entanglement, and distributes the finetuned weights after hiding the passport. When applying SEAL, we observed no performance degradation across commonsense reasoning, textual/visual instruction tuning, and text-to-image synthesis tasks. We demonstrate that SEAL is robust against a variety of known attacks: removal, obfuscation, and ambiguity attacks.

While neural networks allow highly accurate predictions in many tasks, their lack of robustness towards even slight input perturbations often hampers their deployment. Adversarial attacks such as the seminal projected gradient descent (PGD) offer an effective means to evaluate a model's robustness and dedicated solutions have been proposed for attacks on semantic segmentation or optical flow estimation. While they attempt to increase the attack's efficiency, a further objective is to balance its effect, so that it acts on the entire image domain instead of isolated point-wise predictions. This often comes at the cost of optimization stability and thus efficiency. Here, we propose CosPGD, an attack that encourages more balanced errors over the entire image domain while increasing the attack's overall efficiency. To this end, CosPGD leverages a simple alignment score computed from any pixel-wise prediction and its target to scale the loss in a smooth and fully differentiable way. It leads to efficient evaluations of a model's robustness for semantic segmentation as well as regression models (such as optical flow, disparity estimation, or image restoration), and it allows it to outperform the previous SotA attack on semantic segmentation. We provide code for the CosPGD algorithm and example usage at https://github.com/shashankskagnihotri/cospgd.

In this paper we undertake a systematic study of privacy attacks against open source Large Language Models (LLMs), where an adversary has access to either the model weights, gradients, or losses, and tries to exploit them to learn something about the underlying training data. Our headline results are the first membership inference attacks (MIAs) against pre-trained LLMs that are able to simultaneously achieve high TPRs and low FPRs, and a pipeline showing that over 50% (!) of the fine-tuning dataset can be extracted from a fine-tuned LLM in natural settings. We consider varying degrees of access to the underlying model, customization of the language model, and resources available to the attacker. In the pre-trained setting, we propose three new white-box MIAs: an attack based on the gradient norm, a supervised neural network classifier, and a single step loss ratio attack. All outperform existing black-box baselines, and our supervised attack closes the gap between MIA attack success against LLMs and other types of models. In fine-tuning, we find that given access to the loss of the fine-tuned and base models, a fine-tuned loss ratio attack FLoRA is able to achieve near perfect MIA peformance. We then leverage these MIAs to extract fine-tuning data from fine-tuned language models. We find that the pipeline of generating from fine-tuned models prompted with a small snippet of the prefix of each training example, followed by using FLoRa to select the most likely training sample, succeeds the majority of the fine-tuning dataset after only 3 epochs of fine-tuning. Taken together, these findings show that highly effective MIAs are available in almost all LLM training settings, and highlight that great care must be taken before LLMs are fine-tuned on highly sensitive data and then deployed.

Transformer-like models for vision tasks have recently proven effective for a wide range of downstream applications such as segmentation and detection. Previous works have shown that segmentation properties emerge in vision transformers (ViTs) trained using self-supervised methods such as DINO, but not in those trained on supervised classification tasks. In this study, we probe whether segmentation emerges in transformer-based models solely as a result of intricate self-supervised learning mechanisms, or if the same emergence can be achieved under much broader conditions through proper design of the model architecture. Through extensive experimental results, we demonstrate that when employing a white-box transformer-like architecture known as CRATE, whose design explicitly models and pursues low-dimensional structures in the data distribution, segmentation properties, at both the whole and parts levels, already emerge with a minimalistic supervised training recipe. Layer-wise finer-grained analysis reveals that the emergent properties strongly corroborate the designed mathematical functions of the white-box network. Our results suggest a path to design white-box foundation models that are simultaneously highly performant and mathematically fully interpretable. Code is at https://github.com/Ma-Lab-Berkeley/CRATE.

Language models trained on large-scale corpus often generate content that is harmful, toxic, or contrary to human preferences, making their alignment with human values a critical concern. Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) with algorithms like PPO is a prevalent approach for alignment but is often complex, unstable, and resource-intensive. Recently, ranking-based alignment methods have emerged, offering stability and effectiveness by replacing the RL framework with supervised fine-tuning, but they are costly due to the need for annotated data. Considering that existing large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT are already relatively well-aligned and cost-friendly, researchers have begun to align the language model with human preference from AI feedback. The common practices, which unidirectionally distill the instruction-following responses from LLMs, are constrained by their bottleneck. Thus we introduce CycleAlign to distill alignment capabilities from parameter-invisible LLMs (black-box) to a parameter-visible model (white-box) in an iterative manner. With in-context learning (ICL) as the core of the cycle, the black-box models are able to rank the model-generated responses guided by human-craft instruction and demonstrations about their preferences. During iterative interaction, the white-box models also have a judgment about responses generated by them. Consequently, the agreement ranking could be viewed as a pseudo label to dynamically update the in-context demonstrations and improve the preference ranking ability of black-box models. Through multiple interactions, the CycleAlign framework could align the white-box model with the black-box model effectively in a low-resource way. Empirical results illustrate that the model fine-tuned by CycleAlign remarkably exceeds existing methods, and achieves the state-of-the-art performance in alignment with human value.

Hallucinations are a persistent problem with Large Language Models (LLMs). As these models become increasingly used in high-stakes domains, such as healthcare and finance, the need for effective hallucination detection is crucial. To this end, we propose a versatile framework for zero-resource hallucination detection that practitioners can apply to real-world use cases. To achieve this, we adapt a variety of existing uncertainty quantification (UQ) techniques, including black-box UQ, white-box UQ, and LLM-as-a-Judge, transforming them as necessary into standardized response-level confidence scores ranging from 0 to 1. To enhance flexibility, we introduce a tunable ensemble approach that incorporates any combination of the individual confidence scores. This approach enables practitioners to optimize the ensemble for a specific use case for improved performance. To streamline implementation, the full suite of scorers is offered in this paper's companion Python toolkit, UQLM. To evaluate the performance of the various scorers, we conduct an extensive set of experiments using several LLM question-answering benchmarks. We find that our tunable ensemble typically surpasses its individual components and outperforms existing hallucination detection methods. Our results demonstrate the benefits of customized hallucination detection strategies for improving the accuracy and reliability of LLMs.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems often struggle to handle multi-hop question-answering tasks accurately due to irrelevant context retrieval and limited complex reasoning capabilities. We introduce Collab-RAG, a collaborative training framework that leverages mutual enhancement between a white-box small language model (SLM) and a blackbox large language model (LLM) for RAG. Specifically, the SLM decomposes complex queries into simpler sub-questions, thus enhancing the accuracy of the retrieval and facilitating more effective reasoning by the black-box LLM. Concurrently, the black-box LLM provides feedback signals to improve the SLM's decomposition capability. We observe that Collab-RAG relies solely on supervision from an affordable black-box LLM without additional distillation from frontier LLMs, yet demonstrates strong generalization across multiple black-box LLMs. Experimental evaluations across five multi-hop QA datasets demonstrate that Collab-RAG substantially outperforms existing black-box-only and SLM fine-tuning baselines by 1.8%-14.2% on average. In particular, our fine-tuned 3B SLM surpasses a frozen 32B LLM in question decomposition, highlighting the efficiency of Collab-RAG in improving reasoning and retrieval for complex questions. The code of Collab-RAG is available on https://github.com/ritaranx/Collab-RAG/.

Recently, methods for skeleton-based human activity recognition have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, these attack methods require either the full knowledge of the victim (i.e. white-box attacks), access to training data (i.e. transfer-based attacks) or frequent model queries (i.e. black-box attacks). All their requirements are highly restrictive, raising the question of how detrimental the vulnerability is. In this paper, we show that the vulnerability indeed exists. To this end, we consider a new attack task: the attacker has no access to the victim model or the training data or labels, where we coin the term hard no-box attack. Specifically, we first learn a motion manifold where we define an adversarial loss to compute a new gradient for the attack, named skeleton-motion-informed (SMI) gradient. Our gradient contains information of the motion dynamics, which is different from existing gradient-based attack methods that compute the loss gradient assuming each dimension in the data is independent. The SMI gradient can augment many gradient-based attack methods, leading to a new family of no-box attack methods. Extensive evaluation and comparison show that our method imposes a real threat to existing classifiers. They also show that the SMI gradient improves the transferability and imperceptibility of adversarial samples in both no-box and transfer-based black-box settings.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

Deep neural networks are being used increasingly to automate data analysis and decision making, yet their decision-making process is largely unclear and is difficult to explain to the end users. In this paper, we address the problem of Explainable AI for deep neural networks that take images as input and output a class probability. We propose an approach called RISE that generates an importance map indicating how salient each pixel is for the model's prediction. In contrast to white-box approaches that estimate pixel importance using gradients or other internal network state, RISE works on black-box models. It estimates importance empirically by probing the model with randomly masked versions of the input image and obtaining the corresponding outputs. We compare our approach to state-of-the-art importance extraction methods using both an automatic deletion/insertion metric and a pointing metric based on human-annotated object segments. Extensive experiments on several benchmark datasets show that our approach matches or exceeds the performance of other methods, including white-box approaches. Project page: http://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/rise/

Knowledge editing (KE) aims to efficiently and precisely modify the behavior of large language models (LLMs) to update specific knowledge without negatively influencing other knowledge. Current research primarily focuses on white-box LLMs editing, overlooking an important scenario: black-box LLMs editing, where LLMs are accessed through interfaces and only textual output is available. To address the limitations of existing evaluations that are not inapplicable to black-box LLM editing and lack comprehensiveness, we propose a multi-perspective evaluation framework, incorporating the assessment of style retention for the first time. To tackle privacy leaks of editing data and style over-editing in current methods, we introduce a novel postEdit framework, resolving privacy concerns through downstream post-processing and maintaining textual style consistency via fine-grained editing to original responses. Experiments and analysis on two benchmarks demonstrate that postEdit outperforms all baselines and achieves strong generalization, especially with huge improvements on style retention (average +20.82%uparrow).

Methods for adapting language models (LMs) to new tasks and domains have traditionally assumed white-box access to the model, and work by modifying its parameters. However, this is incompatible with a recent trend in the field, where the highest quality models are only available as black-boxes through inference APIs. Even when the model weights are available, the computational cost of fine-tuning large LMs can be prohibitive for most practitioners. In this work, we present a lightweight method for adapting large LMs to new domains and tasks, assuming no access to their weights or intermediate activations. Our approach fine-tunes a small white-box LM and combines it with the large black-box LM at the probability level through a small network, learned on a small validation set. We validate our approach by adapting a large LM (OPT-30B) to several domains and a downstream task (machine translation), observing improved performance in all cases, of up to 9%, while using a domain expert 23x smaller.

Despite the impressive generative abilities of black-box large language models (LLMs), their inherent opacity hinders further advancements in capabilities such as reasoning, planning, and personalization. Existing works aim to enhance LLM capabilities via domain-specific adaptation or in-context learning, which require additional training on accessible model parameters, an infeasible option for black-box LLMs. To address this challenge, we introduce Matryoshika, a lightweight white-box LLM controller that guides a large-scale black-box LLM generator by decomposing complex tasks into a series of intermediate outputs. Specifically, we consider the black-box LLM as an environment, with Matryoshika serving as a policy to provide intermediate guidance through prompts for driving the black-box LLM. Matryoshika is trained to pivot the outputs of the black-box LLM aligning with preferences during iterative interaction, which enables controllable multi-turn generation and self-improvement in optimizing intermediate guidance. Empirical evaluations on three diverse tasks demonstrate that Matryoshika effectively enhances the capabilities of black-box LLMs in complex, long-horizon tasks, including reasoning, planning, and personalization. By leveraging this pioneering controller-generator framework to mitigate dependence on model parameters, Matryoshika provides a transparent and practical solution for improving black-box LLMs through controllable multi-turn generation using white-box LLMs.

Deep learning models are susceptible to adversarial samples in white and black-box environments. Although previous studies have shown high attack success rates, coupling DNN models with interpretation models could offer a sense of security when a human expert is involved, who can identify whether a given sample is benign or malicious. However, in white-box environments, interpretable deep learning systems (IDLSes) have been shown to be vulnerable to malicious manipulations. In black-box settings, as access to the components of IDLSes is limited, it becomes more challenging for the adversary to fool the system. In this work, we propose a Query-efficient Score-based black-box attack against IDLSes, QuScore, which requires no knowledge of the target model and its coupled interpretation model. QuScore is based on transfer-based and score-based methods by employing an effective microbial genetic algorithm. Our method is designed to reduce the number of queries necessary to carry out successful attacks, resulting in a more efficient process. By continuously refining the adversarial samples created based on feedback scores from the IDLS, our approach effectively navigates the search space to identify perturbations that can fool the system. We evaluate the attack's effectiveness on four CNN models (Inception, ResNet, VGG, DenseNet) and two interpretation models (CAM, Grad), using both ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our results show that the proposed approach is query-efficient with a high attack success rate that can reach between 95% and 100% and transferability with an average success rate of 69% in the ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our attack method generates adversarial examples with attribution maps that resemble benign samples. We have also demonstrated that our attack is resilient against various preprocessing defense techniques and can easily be transferred to different DNN models.

With the rapidly increasing application of large language models (LLMs), their abuse has caused many undesirable societal problems such as fake news, academic dishonesty, and information pollution. This makes AI-generated text (AIGT) detection of great importance. Among existing methods, white-box methods are generally superior to black-box methods in terms of performance and generalizability, but they require access to LLMs' internal states and are not applicable to black-box settings. In this paper, we propose to estimate word generation probabilities as pseudo white-box features via multiple re-sampling to help improve AIGT detection under the black-box setting. Specifically, we design POGER, a proxy-guided efficient re-sampling method, which selects a small subset of representative words (e.g., 10 words) for performing multiple re-sampling in black-box AIGT detection. Experiments on datasets containing texts from humans and seven LLMs show that POGER outperforms all baselines in macro F1 under black-box, partial white-box, and out-of-distribution settings and maintains lower re-sampling costs than its existing counterparts.

Semantic segmentation is a fundamental visual task that finds extensive deployment in applications with security-sensitive considerations. Nonetheless, recent work illustrates the adversarial vulnerability of semantic segmentation models to white-box attacks. However, its adversarial robustness against black-box attacks has not been fully explored. In this paper, we present the first exploration of black-box decision-based attacks on semantic segmentation. First, we analyze the challenges that semantic segmentation brings to decision-based attacks through the case study. Then, to address these challenges, we first propose a decision-based attack on semantic segmentation, called Discrete Linear Attack (DLA). Based on random search and proxy index, we utilize the discrete linear noises for perturbation exploration and calibration to achieve efficient attack efficiency. We conduct adversarial robustness evaluation on 5 models from Cityscapes and ADE20K under 8 attacks. DLA shows its formidable power on Cityscapes by dramatically reducing PSPNet's mIoU from an impressive 77.83% to a mere 2.14% with just 50 queries.

Data-free meta-learning (DFML) aims to enable efficient learning of new tasks by meta-learning from a collection of pre-trained models without access to the training data. Existing DFML work can only meta-learn from (i) white-box and (ii) small-scale pre-trained models (iii) with the same architecture, neglecting the more practical setting where the users only have inference access to the APIs with arbitrary model architectures and model scale inside. To solve this issue, we propose a Bi-level Data-free Meta Knowledge Distillation (BiDf-MKD) framework to transfer more general meta knowledge from a collection of black-box APIs to one single meta model. Specifically, by just querying APIs, we inverse each API to recover its training data via a zero-order gradient estimator and then perform meta-learning via a novel bi-level meta knowledge distillation structure, in which we design a boundary query set recovery technique to recover a more informative query set near the decision boundary. In addition, to encourage better generalization within the setting of limited API budgets, we propose task memory replay to diversify the underlying task distribution by covering more interpolated tasks. Extensive experiments in various real-world scenarios show the superior performance of our BiDf-MKD framework.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

Vision-language models (VLMs) pre-trained on web-scale datasets have demonstrated remarkable capabilities on downstream tasks when fine-tuned with minimal data. However, many VLMs rely on proprietary data and are not open-source, which restricts the use of white-box approaches for fine-tuning. As such, we aim to develop a black-box approach to optimize VLMs through natural language prompts, thereby avoiding the need to access model parameters, feature embeddings, or even output logits. We propose employing chat-based LLMs to search for the best text prompt for VLMs. Specifically, we adopt an automatic hill-climbing procedure that converges to an effective prompt by evaluating the performance of current prompts and asking LLMs to refine them based on textual feedback, all within a conversational process without human-in-the-loop. In a challenging 1-shot image classification setup, our simple approach surpasses the white-box continuous prompting method (CoOp) by an average of 1.5% across 11 datasets including ImageNet. Our approach also outperforms both human-engineered and LLM-generated prompts. We highlight the advantage of conversational feedback that incorporates both positive and negative prompts, suggesting that LLMs can utilize the implicit gradient direction in textual feedback for a more efficient search. In addition, we find that the text prompts generated through our strategy are not only more interpretable but also transfer well across different VLM architectures in a black-box manner. Lastly, we demonstrate our framework on a state-of-the-art black-box VLM (DALL-E 3) for text-to-image optimization.

Large language models (LLMs) specializing in natural language generation (NLG) have recently started exhibiting promising capabilities across a variety of domains. However, gauging the trustworthiness of responses generated by LLMs remains an open challenge, with limited research on uncertainty quantification (UQ) for NLG. Furthermore, existing literature typically assumes white-box access to language models, which is becoming unrealistic either due to the closed-source nature of the latest LLMs or computational constraints. In this work, we investigate UQ in NLG for black-box LLMs. We first differentiate uncertainty vs confidence: the former refers to the "dispersion" of the potential predictions for a fixed input, and the latter refers to the confidence on a particular prediction/generation. We then propose and compare several confidence/uncertainty metrics, applying them to selective NLG where unreliable results could either be ignored or yielded for further assessment. Experiments were carried out with several popular LLMs on question-answering datasets (for evaluation purposes). Results reveal that a simple metric for the semantic dispersion can be a reliable predictor of the quality of LLM responses, providing valuable insights for practitioners on uncertainty management when adopting LLMs. The code to replicate our experiments is available at https://github.com/zlin7/UQ-NLG.

Deep neural networks can be exploited using natural adversarial samples, which do not impact human perception. Current approaches often rely on deep neural networks' white-box nature to generate these adversarial samples or synthetically alter the distribution of adversarial samples compared to the training distribution. In contrast, we propose EvoSeed, a novel evolutionary strategy-based algorithmic framework for generating photo-realistic natural adversarial samples. Our EvoSeed framework uses auxiliary Conditional Diffusion and Classifier models to operate in a black-box setting. We employ CMA-ES to optimize the search for an initial seed vector, which, when processed by the Conditional Diffusion Model, results in the natural adversarial sample misclassified by the Classifier Model. Experiments show that generated adversarial images are of high image quality, raising concerns about generating harmful content bypassing safety classifiers. Our research opens new avenues to understanding the limitations of current safety mechanisms and the risk of plausible attacks against classifier systems using image generation. Project Website can be accessed at: https://shashankkotyan.github.io/EvoSeed.

LLMs now exhibit human-like skills in various fields, leading to worries about misuse. Thus, detecting generated text is crucial. However, passive detection methods are stuck in domain specificity and limited adversarial robustness. To achieve reliable detection, a watermark-based method was proposed for white-box LLMs, allowing them to embed watermarks during text generation. The method involves randomly dividing the model vocabulary to obtain a special list and adjusting the probability distribution to promote the selection of words in the list. A detection algorithm aware of the list can identify the watermarked text. However, this method is not applicable in many real-world scenarios where only black-box language models are available. For instance, third-parties that develop API-based vertical applications cannot watermark text themselves because API providers only supply generated text and withhold probability distributions to shield their commercial interests. To allow third-parties to autonomously inject watermarks into generated text, we develop a watermarking framework for black-box language model usage scenarios. Specifically, we first define a binary encoding function to compute a random binary encoding corresponding to a word. The encodings computed for non-watermarked text conform to a Bernoulli distribution, wherein the probability of a word representing bit-1 being approximately 0.5. To inject a watermark, we alter the distribution by selectively replacing words representing bit-0 with context-based synonyms that represent bit-1. A statistical test is then used to identify the watermark. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on both Chinese and English datasets. Furthermore, results under re-translation, polishing, word deletion, and synonym substitution attacks reveal that it is arduous to remove the watermark without compromising the original semantics.

Despite the improved accuracy of deep neural networks, the discovery of adversarial examples has raised serious safety concerns. Most existing approaches for crafting adversarial examples necessitate some knowledge (architecture, parameters, etc.) of the network at hand. In this paper, we focus on image classifiers and propose a feature-guided black-box approach to test the safety of deep neural networks that requires no such knowledge. Our algorithm employs object detection techniques such as SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform) to extract features from an image. These features are converted into a mutable saliency distribution, where high probability is assigned to pixels that affect the composition of the image with respect to the human visual system. We formulate the crafting of adversarial examples as a two-player turn-based stochastic game, where the first player's objective is to minimise the distance to an adversarial example by manipulating the features, and the second player can be cooperative, adversarial, or random. We show that, theoretically, the two-player game can con- verge to the optimal strategy, and that the optimal strategy represents a globally minimal adversarial image. For Lipschitz networks, we also identify conditions that provide safety guarantees that no adversarial examples exist. Using Monte Carlo tree search we gradually explore the game state space to search for adversarial examples. Our experiments show that, despite the black-box setting, manipulations guided by a perception-based saliency distribution are competitive with state-of-the-art methods that rely on white-box saliency matrices or sophisticated optimization procedures. Finally, we show how our method can be used to evaluate robustness of neural networks in safety-critical applications such as traffic sign recognition in self-driving cars.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved widespread adoption, yet our understanding of their behavior remains limited, particularly in detecting data contamination and hallucinations. While recently proposed probing techniques provide insights through activation analysis, they require "white-box" access to model internals, often unavailable. Current "gray-box" approaches typically analyze only the probability of the actual tokens in the sequence with simple task-specific heuristics. Importantly, these methods overlook the rich information contained in the full token distribution at each processing step. To address these limitations, we propose that gray-box analysis should leverage the complete observable output of LLMs, consisting of both the previously used token probabilities as well as the complete token distribution sequences - a unified data type we term LOS (LLM Output Signature). To this end, we develop a transformer-based approach to process LOS that theoretically guarantees approximation of existing techniques while enabling more nuanced analysis. Our approach achieves superior performance on hallucination and data contamination detection in gray-box settings, significantly outperforming existing baselines. Furthermore, it demonstrates strong transfer capabilities across datasets and LLMs, suggesting that LOS captures fundamental patterns in LLM behavior. Our code is available at: https://github.com/BarSGuy/LLM-Output-Signatures-Network.

The lack of adversarial robustness has been recognized as an important issue for state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs). Thereby, robustifying ML models against adversarial attacks is now a major focus of research. However, nearly all existing defense methods, particularly for robust training, made the white-box assumption that the defender has the access to the details of an ML model (or its surrogate alternatives if available), e.g., its architectures and parameters. Beyond existing works, in this paper we aim to address the problem of black-box defense: How to robustify a black-box model using just input queries and output feedback? Such a problem arises in practical scenarios, where the owner of the predictive model is reluctant to share model information in order to preserve privacy. To this end, we propose a general notion of defensive operation that can be applied to black-box models, and design it through the lens of denoised smoothing (DS), a first-order (FO) certified defense technique. To allow the design of merely using model queries, we further integrate DS with the zeroth-order (gradient-free) optimization. However, a direct implementation of zeroth-order (ZO) optimization suffers a high variance of gradient estimates, and thus leads to ineffective defense. To tackle this problem, we next propose to prepend an autoencoder (AE) to a given (black-box) model so that DS can be trained using variance-reduced ZO optimization. We term the eventual defense as ZO-AE-DS. In practice, we empirically show that ZO-AE- DS can achieve improved accuracy, certified robustness, and query complexity over existing baselines. And the effectiveness of our approach is justified under both image classification and image reconstruction tasks. Codes are available at https://github.com/damon-demon/Black-Box-Defense.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

We describe a novel attribution method which is grounded in Sensitivity Analysis and uses Sobol indices. Beyond modeling the individual contributions of image regions, Sobol indices provide an efficient way to capture higher-order interactions between image regions and their contributions to a neural network's prediction through the lens of variance. We describe an approach that makes the computation of these indices efficient for high-dimensional problems by using perturbation masks coupled with efficient estimators to handle the high dimensionality of images. Importantly, we show that the proposed method leads to favorable scores on standard benchmarks for vision (and language models) while drastically reducing the computing time compared to other black-box methods -- even surpassing the accuracy of state-of-the-art white-box methods which require access to internal representations. Our code is freely available: https://github.com/fel-thomas/Sobol-Attribution-Method

Membership inference attacks aim to infer whether an individual record was used to train a model, serving as a key tool for disclosure auditing. While such evaluations are useful to demonstrate risk, they are computationally expensive and often make strong assumptions about potential adversaries' access to models and training environments, and thus do not provide very tight bounds on leakage from potential attacks. We show how prior claims around black-box access being sufficient for optimal membership inference do not hold for most useful settings such as stochastic gradient descent, and that optimal membership inference indeed requires white-box access. We validate our findings with a new white-box inference attack IHA (Inverse Hessian Attack) that explicitly uses model parameters by taking advantage of computing inverse-Hessian vector products. Our results show that both audits and adversaries may be able to benefit from access to model parameters, and we advocate for further research into white-box methods for membership privacy auditing.

The efficacy of an large language model (LLM) generated text detector depends substantially on the availability of sizable training data. White-box zero-shot detectors, which require no such data, are nonetheless limited by the accessibility of the source model of the LLM-generated text. In this paper, we propose an simple but effective black-box zero-shot detection approach, predicated on the observation that human-written texts typically contain more grammatical errors than LLM-generated texts. This approach entails computing the Grammar Error Correction Score (GECScore) for the given text to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated text. Extensive experimental results show that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art (SOTA) zero-shot and supervised methods, achieving an average AUROC of 98.7% and showing strong robustness against paraphrase and adversarial perturbation attacks.

Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure. Conversely, interpretability studies that analyze these internal mechanisms lack practical applications beyond runtime interventions. We bridge this gap by introducing a novel white-box approach that leverages mechanistic interpretability techniques to craft practical adversarial inputs. Specifically, we first identify acceptance subspaces - sets of feature vectors that do not trigger the model's refusal mechanisms - then use gradient-based optimization to reroute embeddings from refusal subspaces to acceptance subspaces, effectively achieving jailbreaks. This targeted approach significantly reduces computation cost, achieving attack success rates of 80-95\% on state-of-the-art models including Gemma2, Llama3.2, and Qwen2.5 within minutes or even seconds, compared to existing techniques that often fail or require hours of computation. We believe this approach opens a new direction for both attack research and defense development. Furthermore, it showcases a practical application of mechanistic interpretability where other methods are less efficient, which highlights its utility. The code and generated datasets are available at https://github.com/Sckathach/subspace-rerouting.

Current Chain-of-Thought (CoT) verification methods predict reasoning correctness based on outputs (black-box) or activations (gray-box), but offer limited insight into why a computation fails. We introduce a white-box method: Circuit-based Reasoning Verification (CRV). We hypothesize that attribution graphs of correct CoT steps, viewed as execution traces of the model's latent reasoning circuits, possess distinct structural fingerprints from those of incorrect steps. By training a classifier on structural features of these graphs, we show that these traces contain a powerful signal of reasoning errors. Our white-box approach yields novel scientific insights unattainable by other methods. (1) We demonstrate that structural signatures of error are highly predictive, establishing the viability of verifying reasoning directly via its computational graph. (2) We find these signatures to be highly domain-specific, revealing that failures in different reasoning tasks manifest as distinct computational patterns. (3) We provide evidence that these signatures are not merely correlational; by using our analysis to guide targeted interventions on individual transcoder features, we successfully correct the model's faulty reasoning. Our work shows that, by scrutinizing a model's computational process, we can move from simple error detection to a deeper, causal understanding of LLM reasoning.

Despite remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), a fundamental question remains: are MLLMs robust to contradicting modalities? To rigorously study this, we introduce MMA-Bench comprising videos and tasks that probe a model's reliance on specific modalities. Using black-box and white-box interpretability techniques, we provide a critical analysis of the brittleness of both open- and closed-sourced MLLMs. We show that current MLLMs struggle under misaligned audio-visual pairs and simple misleading text, thereby lacking robust multi-modal reasoning. Building on these findings, we propose a modality alignment tuning strategy to teach the model when to prioritize, leverage, or ignore specific modality cues. Through extensive experiments and analysis, we show that our alignment tuning yields demonstrably stronger multimodal grounding. This work provides both interpretability tools and a clear path toward developing MLLMs with intrinsically reliable cross-modal reasoning. Code and dataset will be publicly available.

We study secret elicitation: discovering knowledge that an AI possesses but does not explicitly verbalize. As a testbed, we train three families of large language models (LLMs) to possess specific knowledge that they apply downstream but deny knowing when asked directly. For example, in one setting, we train an LLM to generate replies that are consistent with knowing the user is female, while denying this knowledge when asked directly. We then design various black-box and white-box secret elicitation techniques and evaluate them based on whether they can help an LLM auditor successfully guess the secret knowledge. Many of our techniques improve on simple baselines. Our most effective techniques (performing best in 2/3 settings) are based on prefill attacks, a black-box technique where the LLM reveals secret knowledge when generating a completion from a predefined prefix. In our remaining setting, white-box techniques based on logit lens and sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are most effective. We release our models and code, establishing a public benchmark for evaluating secret elicitation methods.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

We introduce the Adversarial Confusion Attack, a new class of threats against multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Unlike jailbreaks or targeted misclassification, the goal is to induce systematic disruption that makes the model generate incoherent or confidently incorrect outputs. Practical applications include embedding such adversarial images into websites to prevent MLLM-powered AI Agents from operating reliably. The proposed attack maximizes next-token entropy using a small ensemble of open-source MLLMs. In the white-box setting, we show that a single adversarial image can disrupt all models in the ensemble, both in the full-image and Adversarial CAPTCHA settings. Despite relying on a basic adversarial technique (PGD), the attack generates perturbations that transfer to both unseen open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) and proprietary (e.g., GPT-5.1) models.

Prior work has introduced techniques for detecting when large language models (LLMs) lie, that is, generating statements they believe are false. However, these techniques are typically validated in narrow settings that do not capture the diverse lies LLMs can generate. We introduce LIARS' BENCH, a testbed consisting of 72,863 examples of lies and honest responses generated by four open-weight models across seven datasets. Our settings capture qualitatively different types of lies and vary along two dimensions: the model's reason for lying and the object of belief targeted by the lie. Evaluating three black- and white-box lie detection techniques on LIARS' BENCH, we find that existing techniques systematically fail to identify certain types of lies, especially in settings where it's not possible to determine whether the model lied from the transcript alone. Overall, LIARS' BENCH reveals limitations in prior techniques and provides a practical testbed for guiding progress in lie detection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) with safe-alignment training are powerful instruments with robust language comprehension capabilities. These models typically undergo meticulous alignment procedures involving human feedback to ensure the acceptance of safe inputs while rejecting harmful or unsafe ones. However, despite their massive scale and alignment efforts, LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where malicious users manipulate the model to produce harmful outputs that it was explicitly trained to avoid. In this study, we find that the safety mechanisms in LLMs are predominantly embedded in the middle-to-late layers. Building on this insight, we introduce a novel white-box jailbreak method, SABER (Safety Alignment Bypass via Extra Residuals), which connects two intermediate layers s and e such that s < e, through a residual connection. Our approach achieves a 51% improvement over the best-performing baseline on the HarmBench test set. Furthermore, SABER induces only a marginal shift in perplexity when evaluated on the HarmBench validation set. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/PalGitts/SABER.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance Large Language Models (LLMs) by retrieving relevant documents from external corpora before generating responses. This approach significantly expands LLM capabilities by leveraging vast, up-to-date external knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge makes RAG systems vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks that manipulate generated outputs via poisoned document injection. Existing poisoning attack strategies typically treat the retrieval and generation stages as disjointed, limiting their effectiveness. We propose Joint-GCG, the first framework to unify gradient-based attacks across both retriever and generator models through three innovations: (1) Cross-Vocabulary Projection for aligning embedding spaces, (2) Gradient Tokenization Alignment for synchronizing token-level gradient signals, and (3) Adaptive Weighted Fusion for dynamically balancing attacking objectives. Evaluations demonstrate that Joint-GCG achieves at most 25% and an average of 5% higher attack success rate than previous methods across multiple retrievers and generators. While optimized under a white-box assumption, the generated poisons show unprecedented transferability to unseen models. Joint-GCG's innovative unification of gradient-based attacks across retrieval and generation stages fundamentally reshapes our understanding of vulnerabilities within RAG systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/Joint-GCG.

Adversarial attacks on image models threaten system robustness by introducing imperceptible perturbations that cause incorrect predictions. We investigate human-aligned learned lossy compression as a defense mechanism, comparing two learned models (HiFiC and ELIC) against traditional JPEG across various quality levels. Our experiments on ImageNet subsets demonstrate that learned compression methods outperform JPEG, particularly for Vision Transformer architectures, by preserving semantically meaningful content while removing adversarial noise. Even in white-box settings where attackers can access the defense, these methods maintain substantial effectiveness. We also show that sequential compression--applying rounds of compression/decompression--significantly enhances defense efficacy while maintaining classification performance. Our findings reveal that human-aligned compression provides an effective, computationally efficient defense that protects the image features most relevant to human and machine understanding. It offers a practical approach to improving model robustness against adversarial threats.

Speculative decoding is an effective method for accelerating inference of large language models (LLMs) by employing a small draft model to predict the output of a target model. However, when adapting speculative decoding to domain-specific target models, the acceptance rate of the generic draft model drops significantly due to domain shift. In this work, we systematically investigate knowledge distillation techniques for training domain draft models to improve their speculation accuracy. We compare white-box and black-box distillation approaches and explore their effectiveness in various data accessibility scenarios, including historical user queries, curated domain data, and synthetically generated alignment data. Our experiments across Function Calling, Biology, and Chinese domains show that offline distillation consistently outperforms online distillation by 11% to 25%, white-box distillation surpasses black-box distillation by 2% to 10%, and data scaling trends hold across domains. Additionally, we find that synthetic data can effectively align draft models and achieve 80% to 93% of the performance of training on historical user queries. These findings provide practical guidelines for training domain-specific draft models to improve speculative decoding efficiency.

Ensuring the correctness of code generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) presents a significant challenge in AI-driven software development. Existing approaches predominantly rely on black-box (closed-box) approaches that evaluate correctness post-generation, failing to utilize the rich insights embedded in the LLMs' internal states during code generation. In this paper, we introduce OPENIA, a novel white-box (open-box) framework that leverages these internal representations to assess the correctness of LLM-generated code. OPENIA systematically analyzes the intermediate states of representative open-source LLMs specialized for code, including DeepSeek-Coder, CodeLlama, and MagicCoder, across diverse code generation benchmarks. Our empirical analysis reveals that these internal representations encode latent information, which strongly correlates with the correctness of the generated code. Building on these insights, OPENIA uses a white-box/open-box approach to make informed predictions about code correctness, offering significant advantages in adaptability and robustness over traditional classification-based methods and zero-shot approaches. Experimental results demonstrate that OPENIA consistently outperforms baseline models, achieving higher accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-Scores with up to a 2X improvement in standalone code generation and a 46% enhancement in repository-specific scenarios. By unlocking the potential of in-process signals, OPENIA paves the way for more proactive and efficient quality assurance mechanisms in LLM-assisted code generation.

The common toxicity and societal bias in contents generated by large language models (LLMs) necessitate strategies to reduce harm. Present solutions often demand white-box access to the model or substantial training, which is impractical for cutting-edge commercial LLMs. Moreover, prevailing prompting methods depend on external tool feedback and fail to simultaneously lessen toxicity and bias. Motivated by social psychology principles, we propose a novel strategy named perspective-taking prompting (\textsc{PeT)} that inspires LLMs to integrate diverse human perspectives and self-regulate their responses. This self-correction mechanism can significantly diminish toxicity (up to 89%) and bias (up to 73%) in LLMs' responses. Rigorous evaluations and ablation studies are conducted on two commercial LLMs (ChatGPT and GLM) and three open-source LLMs, revealing PeT's superiority in producing less harmful responses, outperforming five strong baselines.

Empowering large language models to accurately express confidence in their answers is essential for trustworthy decision-making. Previous confidence elicitation methods, which primarily rely on white-box access to internal model information or model fine-tuning, have become less suitable for LLMs, especially closed-source commercial APIs. This leads to a growing need to explore the untapped area of black-box approaches for LLM uncertainty estimation. To better break down the problem, we define a systematic framework with three components: prompting strategies for eliciting verbalized confidence, sampling methods for generating multiple responses, and aggregation techniques for computing consistency. We then benchmark these methods on two key tasks-confidence calibration and failure prediction-across five types of datasets (e.g., commonsense and arithmetic reasoning) and five widely-used LLMs including GPT-4 and LLaMA 2 Chat. Our analysis uncovers several key insights: 1) LLMs, when verbalizing their confidence, tend to be overconfident, potentially imitating human patterns of expressing confidence. 2) As model capability scales up, both calibration and failure prediction performance improve. 3) Employing our proposed strategies, such as human-inspired prompts, consistency among multiple responses, and better aggregation strategies can help mitigate this overconfidence from various perspectives. 4) Comparisons with white-box methods indicate that while white-box methods perform better, the gap is narrow, e.g., 0.522 to 0.605 in AUROC. Despite these advancements, none of these techniques consistently outperform others, and all investigated methods struggle in challenging tasks, such as those requiring professional knowledge, indicating significant scope for improvement. We believe this study can serve as a strong baseline and provide insights for eliciting confidence in black-box LLMs.

In this paper, we propose LEURN: a neural network architecture that learns univariate decision rules. LEURN is a white-box algorithm that results into univariate trees and makes explainable decisions in every stage. In each layer, LEURN finds a set of univariate rules based on an embedding of the previously checked rules and their corresponding responses. Both rule finding and final decision mechanisms are weighted linear combinations of these embeddings, hence contribution of all rules are clearly formulated and explainable. LEURN can select features, extract feature importance, provide semantic similarity between a pair of samples, be used in a generative manner and can give a confidence score. Thanks to a smoothness parameter, LEURN can also controllably behave like decision trees or vanilla neural networks. Besides these advantages, LEURN achieves comparable performance to state-of-the-art methods across 30 tabular datasets for classification and regression problems.

We question the current evaluation practice on diffusion-based purification methods. Diffusion-based purification methods aim to remove adversarial effects from an input data point at test time. The approach gains increasing attention as an alternative to adversarial training due to the disentangling between training and testing. Well-known white-box attacks are often employed to measure the robustness of the purification. However, it is unknown whether these attacks are the most effective for the diffusion-based purification since the attacks are often tailored for adversarial training. We analyze the current practices and provide a new guideline for measuring the robustness of purification methods against adversarial attacks. Based on our analysis, we further propose a new purification strategy improving robustness compared to the current diffusion-based purification methods.

We propose a new defense mechanism against adversarial attacks inspired by an optical co-processor, providing robustness without compromising natural accuracy in both white-box and black-box settings. This hardware co-processor performs a nonlinear fixed random transformation, where the parameters are unknown and impossible to retrieve with sufficient precision for large enough dimensions. In the white-box setting, our defense works by obfuscating the parameters of the random projection. Unlike other defenses relying on obfuscated gradients, we find we are unable to build a reliable backward differentiable approximation for obfuscated parameters. Moreover, while our model reaches a good natural accuracy with a hybrid backpropagation - synthetic gradient method, the same approach is suboptimal if employed to generate adversarial examples. We find the combination of a random projection and binarization in the optical system also improves robustness against various types of black-box attacks. Finally, our hybrid training method builds robust features against transfer attacks. We demonstrate our approach on a VGG-like architecture, placing the defense on top of the convolutional features, on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Code is available at https://github.com/lightonai/adversarial-robustness-by-design.

Deep learning offers state of the art solutions for image recognition. However, deep models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in images that are subtle but significantly change the model's prediction. In a white-box attack, these perturbations are generally learned for deep models that operate on RGB images and, hence, the perturbations are equally distributed in the RGB color space. In this paper, we show that the adversarial perturbations prevail in the Y-channel of the YCbCr space. Our finding is motivated from the fact that the human vision and deep models are more responsive to shape and texture rather than color. Based on our finding, we propose a defense against adversarial images. Our defence, coined ResUpNet, removes perturbations only from the Y-channel by exploiting ResNet features in an upsampling framework without the need for a bottleneck. At the final stage, the untouched CbCr-channels are combined with the refined Y-channel to restore the clean image. Note that ResUpNet is model agnostic as it does not modify the DNN structure. ResUpNet is trained end-to-end in Pytorch and the results are compared to existing defence techniques in the input transformation category. Our results show that our approach achieves the best balance between defence against adversarial attacks such as FGSM, PGD and DDN and maintaining the original accuracies of VGG-16, ResNet50 and DenseNet121 on clean images. We perform another experiment to show that learning adversarial perturbations only for the Y-channel results in higher fooling rates for the same perturbation magnitude.

Despite progress in video understanding, current MLLMs struggle with counting tasks. Existing benchmarks are limited by short videos, close-set queries, lack of clue annotations, and weak multimodal coverage. In this paper, we introduce CG-AV-Counting, a manually-annotated clue-grounded counting benchmark with 1,027 multimodal questions and 5,845 annotated clues over 497 long videos. It supports both black-box and white-box evaluation, serving as a comprehensive testbed for both end-to-end and reasoning-based counting. To explore ways to improve model's counting capability, we propose AV-Reasoner, a model trained with GRPO and curriculum learning to generalize counting ability from related tasks. AV-Reasoner achieves state-of-the-art results across multiple benchmarks, demonstrating the effectiveness of reinforcement learning. However, experiments show that on out-of-domain benchmarks, reasoning in the language space fails to bring performance gains. The code and benchmark have been realeased on https://av-reasoner.github.io.

Music mastering style transfer aims to model and apply the mastering characteristics of a reference track to a target track, simulating the professional mastering process. However, existing methods apply fixed processing based on a reference track, limiting users' ability to fine-tune the results to match their artistic intent. In this paper, we introduce the ITO-Master framework, a reference-based mastering style transfer system that integrates Inference-Time Optimization (ITO) to enable finer user control over the mastering process. By optimizing the reference embedding during inference, our approach allows users to refine the output dynamically, making micro-level adjustments to achieve more precise mastering results. We explore both black-box and white-box methods for modeling mastering processors and demonstrate that ITO improves mastering performance across different styles. Through objective evaluation, subjective listening tests, and qualitative analysis using text-based conditioning with CLAP embeddings, we validate that ITO enhances mastering style similarity while offering increased adaptability. Our framework provides an effective and user-controllable solution for mastering style transfer, allowing users to refine their results beyond the initial style transfer.

A distribution inference attack aims to infer statistical properties of data used to train machine learning models. These attacks are sometimes surprisingly potent, but the factors that impact distribution inference risk are not well understood and demonstrated attacks often rely on strong and unrealistic assumptions such as full knowledge of training environments even in supposedly black-box threat scenarios. To improve understanding of distribution inference risks, we develop a new black-box attack that even outperforms the best known white-box attack in most settings. Using this new attack, we evaluate distribution inference risk while relaxing a variety of assumptions about the adversary's knowledge under black-box access, like known model architectures and label-only access. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of previously proposed defenses and introduce new defenses. We find that although noise-based defenses appear to be ineffective, a simple re-sampling defense can be highly effective. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/dissecting_distribution_inference

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is a promising technique for reducing the high computational demand of large language models (LLMs). However, previous KD methods are primarily applied to white-box classification models or training small models to imitate black-box model APIs like ChatGPT. How to effectively distill the knowledge from white-box generative LLMs is still under-explored, which becomes more and more important with the prosperity of LLMs. In this work, we propose MiniLLM that distills smaller language models from generative larger language models. We first replace the forward Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) objective in the standard KD approaches with reverse KLD, which is more suitable for KD on generative language models, to prevent the student model from overestimating the low-probability regions of the teacher distribution. Then, we derive an effective optimization approach to learn this objective. Extensive experiments in the instruction-following setting show that the MiniLLM models generate more precise responses with the higher overall quality, lower exposure bias, better calibration, and higher long-text generation performance. Our method is also scalable for different model families with 120M to 13B parameters. We will release our code and model checkpoints at https://aka.ms/MiniLLM.

Autoregressive (AR) image generation models have gained increasing attention for their breakthroughs in synthesis quality, highlighting the need for robust watermarking to prevent misuse. However, existing in-generation watermarking techniques are primarily designed for diffusion models, where watermarks are embedded within diffusion latent states. This design poses significant challenges for direct adaptation to AR models, which generate images sequentially through token prediction. Moreover, diffusion-based regeneration attacks can effectively erase such watermarks by perturbing diffusion latent states. To address these challenges, we propose Lexical Bias Watermarking (LBW), a novel framework designed for AR models that resists regeneration attacks. LBW embeds watermarks directly into token maps by biasing token selection toward a predefined green list during generation. This approach ensures seamless integration with existing AR models and extends naturally to post-hoc watermarking. To increase the security against white-box attacks, instead of using a single green list, the green list for each image is randomly sampled from a pool of green lists. Watermark detection is performed via quantization and statistical analysis of the token distribution. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LBW achieves superior watermark robustness, particularly in resisting regeneration attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced natural language processing (NLP) with their impressive language understanding and generation capabilities. However, their performance may be suboptimal for domain-specific tasks that require specialized knowledge due to limited exposure to the related data. Additionally, the lack of transparency of most state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, which can only be accessed via APIs, impedes further fine-tuning with domain custom data. Moreover, providing private data to the LLMs' owner leads to data privacy problems. To address these challenges, we propose the novel Parametric Knowledge Guiding (PKG) framework, which equips LLMs with a knowledge-guiding module to access relevant knowledge without altering the LLMs' parameters. Our PKG is based on open-source "white-box" language models, allowing offline memory of any knowledge that LLMs require. We demonstrate that our PKG framework can enhance the performance of "black-box" LLMs on a range of domain knowledge-intensive tasks that require factual (+7.9%), tabular (+11.9%), medical (+3.0%), and multimodal (+8.1%) knowledge.

Safety alignment is critical for the ethical deployment of large language models (LLMs), guiding them to avoid generating harmful or unethical content. Current alignment techniques, such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback, remain fragile and can be bypassed by carefully crafted adversarial prompts. Unfortunately, such attacks rely on trial and error, lack generalizability across models, and are constrained by scalability and reliability. This paper presents NeuroStrike, a novel and generalizable attack framework that exploits a fundamental vulnerability introduced by alignment techniques: the reliance on sparse, specialized safety neurons responsible for detecting and suppressing harmful inputs. We apply NeuroStrike to both white-box and black-box settings: In the white-box setting, NeuroStrike identifies safety neurons through feedforward activation analysis and prunes them during inference to disable safety mechanisms. In the black-box setting, we propose the first LLM profiling attack, which leverages safety neuron transferability by training adversarial prompt generators on open-weight surrogate models and then deploying them against black-box and proprietary targets. We evaluate NeuroStrike on over 20 open-weight LLMs from major LLM developers. By removing less than 0.6% of neurons in targeted layers, NeuroStrike achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 76.9% using only vanilla malicious prompts. Moreover, Neurostrike generalizes to four multimodal LLMs with 100% ASR on unsafe image inputs. Safety neurons transfer effectively across architectures, raising ASR to 78.5% on 11 fine-tuned models and 77.7% on five distilled models. The black-box LLM profiling attack achieves an average ASR of 63.7% across five black-box models, including the Google Gemini family.

With the maturity of depth sensors, the vulnerability of 3D point cloud models has received increasing attention in various applications such as autonomous driving and robot navigation. Previous 3D adversarial attackers either follow the white-box setting to iteratively update the coordinate perturbations based on gradients, or utilize the output model logits to estimate noisy gradients in the black-box setting. However, these attack methods are hard to be deployed in real-world scenarios since realistic 3D applications will not share any model details to users. Therefore, we explore a more challenging yet practical 3D attack setting, i.e., attacking point clouds with black-box hard labels, in which the attacker can only have access to the prediction label of the input. To tackle this setting, we propose a novel 3D attack method, termed 3D Hard-label attacker (3DHacker), based on the developed decision boundary algorithm to generate adversarial samples solely with the knowledge of class labels. Specifically, to construct the class-aware model decision boundary, 3DHacker first randomly fuses two point clouds of different classes in the spectral domain to craft their intermediate sample with high imperceptibility, then projects it onto the decision boundary via binary search. To restrict the final perturbation size, 3DHacker further introduces an iterative optimization strategy to move the intermediate sample along the decision boundary for generating adversarial point clouds with smallest trivial perturbations. Extensive evaluations show that, even in the challenging hard-label setting, 3DHacker still competitively outperforms existing 3D attacks regarding the attack performance as well as adversary quality.

Recent advances in vision-language-action (VLA) models have greatly improved embodied AI, enabling robots to follow natural language instructions and perform diverse tasks. However, their reliance on uncurated training datasets raises serious security concerns. Existing backdoor attacks on VLAs mostly assume white-box access and result in task failures instead of enforcing specific actions. In this work, we reveal a more practical threat: attackers can manipulate VLAs by simply injecting physical objects as triggers into the training dataset. We propose goal-oriented backdoor attacks (GoBA), where the VLA behaves normally in the absence of physical triggers but executes predefined and goal-oriented actions in the presence of physical triggers. Specifically, based on a popular VLA benchmark LIBERO, we introduce BadLIBERO that incorporates diverse physical triggers and goal-oriented backdoor actions. In addition, we propose a three-level evaluation that categorizes the victim VLA's actions under GoBA into three states: nothing to do, try to do, and success to do. Experiments show that GoBA enables the victim VLA to successfully achieve the backdoor goal in 97 percentage of inputs when the physical trigger is present, while causing zero performance degradation on clean inputs. Finally, by investigating factors related to GoBA, we find that the action trajectory and trigger color significantly influence attack performance, while trigger size has surprisingly little effect. The code and BadLIBERO dataset are accessible via the project page at https://goba-attack.github.io/.

Continual learning under adversarial conditions remains an open problem, as existing methods often compromise either robustness, scalability, or both. We propose a novel framework that integrates Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) with a hypernetwork-based architecture to enable certifiably robust continual learning across sequential tasks. Our method, SHIELD, generates task-specific model parameters via a shared hypernetwork conditioned solely on compact task embeddings, eliminating the need for replay buffers or full model copies and enabling efficient over time. To further enhance robustness, we introduce Interval MixUp, a novel training strategy that blends virtual examples represented as ell_{infty} balls centered around MixUp points. Leveraging interval arithmetic, this technique guarantees certified robustness while mitigating the wrapping effect, resulting in smoother decision boundaries. We evaluate SHIELD under strong white-box adversarial attacks, including PGD and AutoAttack, across multiple benchmarks. It consistently outperforms existing robust continual learning methods, achieving state-of-the-art average accuracy while maintaining both scalability and certification. These results represent a significant step toward practical and theoretically grounded continual learning in adversarial settings.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

In a model inversion (MI) attack, an adversary abuses access to a machine learning (ML) model to infer and reconstruct private training data. Remarkable progress has been made in the white-box and black-box setups, where the adversary has access to the complete model or the model's soft output respectively. However, there is very limited study in the most challenging but practically important setup: Label-only MI attacks, where the adversary only has access to the model's predicted label (hard label) without confidence scores nor any other model information. In this work, we propose LOKT, a novel approach for label-only MI attacks. Our idea is based on transfer of knowledge from the opaque target model to surrogate models. Subsequently, using these surrogate models, our approach can harness advanced white-box attacks. We propose knowledge transfer based on generative modelling, and introduce a new model, Target model-assisted ACGAN (T-ACGAN), for effective knowledge transfer. Our method casts the challenging label-only MI into the more tractable white-box setup. We provide analysis to support that surrogate models based on our approach serve as effective proxies for the target model for MI. Our experiments show that our method significantly outperforms existing SOTA Label-only MI attack by more than 15% across all MI benchmarks. Furthermore, our method compares favorably in terms of query budget. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our study highlights rising privacy threats for ML models even when minimal information (i.e., hard labels) is exposed. Our code, demo, models and reconstructed data are available at our project page: https://ngoc-nguyen-0.github.io/lokt/

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the latest research on multilingual large language models (MLLMs). MLLMs not only are able to understand and generate language across linguistic boundaries, but also represent an important advancement in artificial intelligence. We first discuss the architecture and pre-training objectives of MLLMs, highlighting the key components and methodologies that contribute to their multilingual capabilities. We then discuss the construction of multilingual pre-training and alignment datasets, underscoring the importance of data quality and diversity in enhancing MLLM performance. An important focus of this survey is on the evaluation of MLLMs. We present a detailed taxonomy and roadmap covering the assessment of MLLMs' cross-lingual knowledge, reasoning, alignment with human values, safety, interpretability and specialized applications. Specifically, we extensively discuss multilingual evaluation benchmarks and datasets, and explore the use of LLMs themselves as multilingual evaluators. To enhance MLLMs from black to white boxes, we also address the interpretability of multilingual capabilities, cross-lingual transfer and language bias within these models. Finally, we provide a comprehensive review of real-world applications of MLLMs across diverse domains, including biology, medicine, computer science, mathematics and law. We showcase how these models have driven innovation and improvements in these specialized fields while also highlighting the challenges and opportunities in deploying MLLMs within diverse language communities and application scenarios. We listed the paper related in this survey and publicly available at https://github.com/tjunlp-lab/Awesome-Multilingual-LLMs-Papers.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) reliably improves the reasoning performance of large language models, yet it appears to modify only a small fraction of parameters. We revisit this paradox and show that sparsity is a surface artifact of a model-conditioned optimization bias: for a fixed pretrained model, updates consistently localize to preferred parameter regions, highly consistent across runs and largely invariant to datasets and RL recipes. We mechanistically explain these dynamics with a Three-Gate Theory: Gate I (KL Anchor) imposes a KL-constrained update; Gate II (Model Geometry) steers the step off principal directions into low-curvature, spectrum-preserving subspaces; and Gate III (Precision) hides micro-updates in non-preferred regions, making the off-principal bias appear as sparsity. We then validate this theory and, for the first time, provide a parameter-level characterization of RLVR's learning dynamics: RLVR learns off principal directions in weight space, achieving gains via minimal spectral drift, reduced principal-subspace rotation, and off-principal update alignment. In contrast, SFT targets principal weights, distorts the spectrum, and even lags RLVR. Together, these results provide the first parameter-space account of RLVR's training dynamics, revealing clear regularities in how parameters evolve. Crucially, we show that RL operates in a distinct optimization regime from SFT, so directly adapting SFT-era parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods can be flawed, as evidenced by our case studies on advanced sparse fine-tuning and LoRA variants. We hope this work charts a path toward a white-box understanding of RLVR and the design of geometry-aware, RLVR-native learning algorithms, rather than repurposed SFT-era heuristics.

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has enabled understanding of both speech and non-speech audio, but exposing new safety risks emerging from complex audio inputs that are inadequately handled by current safeguards. We introduce SACRED-Bench (Speech-Audio Composition for RED-teaming) to evaluate the robustness of LLMs under complex audio-based attacks. Unlike existing perturbation-based methods that rely on noise optimization or white-box access, SACRED-Bench exploits speech-audio composition mechanisms. SACRED-Bench adopts three mechanisms: (a) speech overlap and multi-speaker dialogue, which embeds harmful prompts beneath or alongside benign speech; (b) speech-audio mixture, which imply unsafe intent via non-speech audio alongside benign speech or audio; and (c) diverse spoken instruction formats (open-ended QA, yes/no) that evade text-only filters. Experiments show that, even Gemini 2.5 Pro, the state-of-the-art proprietary LLM, still exhibits 66% attack success rate in SACRED-Bench test set, exposing vulnerabilities under cross-modal, speech-audio composition attacks. To bridge this gap, we propose SALMONN-Guard, a safeguard LLM that jointly inspects speech, audio, and text for safety judgments, reducing attack success down to 20%. Our results highlight the need for audio-aware defenses for the safety of multimodal LLMs. The benchmark and SALMONN-Guard checkpoints can be found at https://huggingface.co/datasets/tsinghua-ee/SACRED-Bench. Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful.

Uncertainty quantification (UQ) for open-ended language generation remains a critical yet underexplored challenge, especially under black-box constraints where internal model signals are inaccessible. In this paper, we introduce Token-Entropy Conformal Prediction (TECP), a novel framework that leverages token-level entropy as a logit-free, reference-free uncertainty measure and integrates it into a split conformal prediction (CP) pipeline to construct prediction sets with formal coverage guarantees. Unlike existing approaches that rely on semantic consistency heuristics or white-box features, TECP directly estimates epistemic uncertainty from the token entropy structure of sampled generations and calibrates uncertainty thresholds via CP quantiles to ensure provable error control. Empirical evaluations across six large language models and two benchmarks (CoQA and TriviaQA) demonstrate that TECP consistently achieves reliable coverage and compact prediction sets, outperforming prior self-consistency-based UQ methods. Our method provides a principled and efficient solution for trustworthy generation in black-box LLM settings.

Hallucination in large language models (LLMs) can be detected by assessing the uncertainty of model outputs, typically measured using entropy. Semantic entropy (SE) enhances traditional entropy estimation by quantifying uncertainty at the semantic cluster level. However, as modern LLMs generate longer one-sentence responses, SE becomes less effective because it overlooks two crucial factors: intra-cluster similarity (the spread within a cluster) and inter-cluster similarity (the distance between clusters). To address these limitations, we propose a simple black-box uncertainty quantification method inspired by nearest neighbor estimates of entropy. Our approach can also be easily extended to white-box settings by incorporating token probabilities. Additionally, we provide theoretical results showing that our method generalizes semantic entropy. Extensive empirical results demonstrate its effectiveness compared to semantic entropy across two recent LLMs (Phi3 and Llama3) and three common text generation tasks: question answering, text summarization, and machine translation. Our code is available at https://github.com/BigML-CS-UCLA/SNNE.

Recently, large pre-trained foundation models have become widely adopted by machine learning practitioners for a multitude of tasks. Given that such models are publicly available, relying on their use as backbone models for downstream tasks might result in high vulnerability to adversarial attacks crafted with the same public model. In this work, we propose Robustness Tokens, a novel approach specific to the transformer architecture that fine-tunes a few additional private tokens with low computational requirements instead of tuning model parameters as done in traditional adversarial training. We show that Robustness Tokens make Vision Transformer models significantly more robust to white-box adversarial attacks while also retaining the original downstream performances.

The rapid development in large language models (LLMs) has transformed the landscape of natural language processing and understanding (NLP/NLU), offering significant benefits across various domains. However, when applied to scientific research, these powerful models exhibit critical failure modes related to scientific integrity and trustworthiness. Existing general-purpose LLM guardrails are insufficient to address these unique challenges in the scientific domain. We provide comprehensive guidelines for deploying LLM guardrails in the scientific domain. We identify specific challenges -- including time sensitivity, knowledge contextualization, conflict resolution, and intellectual property concerns -- and propose a guideline framework for the guardrails that can align with scientific needs. These guardrail dimensions include trustworthiness, ethics & bias, safety, and legal aspects. We also outline in detail the implementation strategies that employ white-box, black-box, and gray-box methodologies that can be enforced within scientific contexts.

Although large language models (LLMs) are capable of performing various tasks, they still suffer from producing plausible but incorrect responses. To improve the reliability of LLMs, recent research has focused on uncertainty quantification to predict whether a response is correct or not. However, most uncertainty quantification methods have been evaluated on questions requiring a single clear answer, ignoring the existence of data uncertainty that arises from irreducible randomness. Instead, these methods only consider model uncertainty, which arises from a lack of knowledge. In this paper, we investigate previous uncertainty quantification methods under the presence of data uncertainty. Our contributions are two-fold: 1) proposing a new Multi-Answer Question Answering dataset, MAQA, consisting of world knowledge, mathematical reasoning, and commonsense reasoning tasks to evaluate uncertainty quantification regarding data uncertainty, and 2) assessing 5 uncertainty quantification methods of diverse white- and black-box LLMs. Our findings show that entropy and consistency-based methods estimate the model uncertainty well even under data uncertainty, while other methods for white- and black-box LLMs struggle depending on the tasks. Additionally, methods designed for white-box LLMs suffer from overconfidence in reasoning tasks compared to simple knowledge queries. We believe our observations will pave the way for future work on uncertainty quantification in realistic setting.

In the evolving landscape of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, the remarkable capability to generate high-quality images from textual descriptions faces challenges with the potential misuse of reproducing sensitive content. To address this critical issue, we introduce Robust Adversarial Concept Erase (RACE), a novel approach designed to mitigate these risks by enhancing the robustness of concept erasure method for T2I models. RACE utilizes a sophisticated adversarial training framework to identify and mitigate adversarial text embeddings, significantly reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Impressively, RACE achieves a 30 percentage point reduction in ASR for the ``nudity'' concept against the leading white-box attack method. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate RACE's effectiveness in defending against both white-box and black-box attacks, marking a significant advancement in protecting T2I diffusion models from generating inappropriate or misleading imagery. This work underlines the essential need for proactive defense measures in adapting to the rapidly advancing field of adversarial challenges. Our code is publicly available: https://github.com/chkimmmmm/R.A.C.E.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Vision-language pre-training (VLP) models have shown vulnerability to adversarial examples in multimodal tasks. Furthermore, malicious adversaries can be deliberately transferred to attack other black-box models. However, existing work has mainly focused on investigating white-box attacks. In this paper, we present the first study to investigate the adversarial transferability of recent VLP models. We observe that existing methods exhibit much lower transferability, compared to the strong attack performance in white-box settings. The transferability degradation is partly caused by the under-utilization of cross-modal interactions. Particularly, unlike unimodal learning, VLP models rely heavily on cross-modal interactions and the multimodal alignments are many-to-many, e.g., an image can be described in various natural languages. To this end, we propose a highly transferable Set-level Guidance Attack (SGA) that thoroughly leverages modality interactions and incorporates alignment-preserving augmentation with cross-modal guidance. Experimental results demonstrate that SGA could generate adversarial examples that can strongly transfer across different VLP models on multiple downstream vision-language tasks. On image-text retrieval, SGA significantly enhances the attack success rate for transfer attacks from ALBEF to TCL by a large margin (at least 9.78% and up to 30.21%), compared to the state-of-the-art.

Deep Neural Networks have created a paradigm shift in our ability to comprehend raw data in various important fields ranging from computer vision and natural language processing to intelligence warfare and healthcare. While DNNs are increasingly deployed either in a white-box setting where the model internal is publicly known, or a black-box setting where only the model outputs are known, a practical concern is protecting the models against Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. We propose BlackMarks, the first end-to-end multi-bit watermarking framework that is applicable in the black-box scenario. BlackMarks takes the pre-trained unmarked model and the owner's binary signature as inputs and outputs the corresponding marked model with a set of watermark keys. To do so, BlackMarks first designs a model-dependent encoding scheme that maps all possible classes in the task to bit '0' and bit '1' by clustering the output activations into two groups. Given the owner's watermark signature (a binary string), a set of key image and label pairs are designed using targeted adversarial attacks. The watermark (WM) is then embedded in the prediction behavior of the target DNN by fine-tuning the model with generated WM key set. To extract the WM, the remote model is queried by the WM key images and the owner's signature is decoded from the corresponding predictions according to the designed encoding scheme. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of BlackMarks's performance on MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet datasets and corroborate its effectiveness and robustness. BlackMarks preserves the functionality of the original DNN and incurs negligible WM embedding runtime overhead as low as 2.054%.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Membership inference attacks serves as useful tool for fair use of language models, such as detecting potential copyright infringement and auditing data leakage. However, many current state-of-the-art attacks require access to models' hidden states or probability distribution, which prevents investigation into more widely-used, API-access only models like GPT-4. In this work, we introduce N-Gram Coverage Attack, a membership inference attack that relies solely on text outputs from the target model, enabling attacks on completely black-box models. We leverage the observation that models are more likely to memorize and subsequently generate text patterns that were commonly observed in their training data. Specifically, to make a prediction on a candidate member, N-Gram Coverage Attack first obtains multiple model generations conditioned on a prefix of the candidate. It then uses n-gram overlap metrics to compute and aggregate the similarities of these outputs with the ground truth suffix; high similarities indicate likely membership. We first demonstrate on a diverse set of existing benchmarks that N-Gram Coverage Attack outperforms other black-box methods while also impressively achieving comparable or even better performance to state-of-the-art white-box attacks - despite having access to only text outputs. Interestingly, we find that the success rate of our method scales with the attack compute budget - as we increase the number of sequences generated from the target model conditioned on the prefix, attack performance tends to improve. Having verified the accuracy of our method, we use it to investigate previously unstudied closed OpenAI models on multiple domains. We find that more recent models, such as GPT-4o, exhibit increased robustness to membership inference, suggesting an evolving trend toward improved privacy protections.

Previous work has suggested that preprocessing images through lossy compression can defend against adversarial perturbations, but comprehensive attack evaluations have been lacking. In this paper, we construct strong white-box and adaptive attacks against various compression models and identify a critical challenge for attackers: high realism in reconstructed images significantly increases attack difficulty. Through rigorous evaluation across multiple attack scenarios, we demonstrate that compression models capable of producing realistic, high-fidelity reconstructions are substantially more resistant to our attacks. In contrast, low-realism compression models can be broken. Our analysis reveals that this is not due to gradient masking. Rather, realistic reconstructions maintaining distributional alignment with natural images seem to offer inherent robustness. This work highlights a significant obstacle for future adversarial attacks and suggests that developing more effective techniques to overcome realism represents an essential challenge for comprehensive security evaluation.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in user-facing applications, building trust and maintaining safety by accurately quantifying a model's confidence in its prediction becomes even more important. However, finding effective ways to calibrate LLMs - especially when the only interface to the models is their generated text - remains a challenge. We propose APRICOT (auxiliary prediction of confidence targets): A method to set confidence targets and train an additional model that predicts an LLM's confidence based on its textual input and output alone. This approach has several advantages: It is conceptually simple, does not require access to the target model beyond its output, does not interfere with the language generation, and has a multitude of potential usages, for instance by verbalizing the predicted confidence or adjusting the given answer based on the confidence. We show how our approach performs competitively in terms of calibration error for white-box and black-box LLMs on closed-book question-answering to detect incorrect LLM answers.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across diverse tasks by encoding vast amounts of factual knowledge. However, they are still prone to hallucinations, generating incorrect or misleading information, often accompanied by high uncertainty. Existing methods for hallucination detection primarily focus on quantifying internal uncertainty, which arises from missing or conflicting knowledge within the model. However, hallucinations can also stem from external uncertainty, where ambiguous user queries lead to multiple possible interpretations. In this work, we introduce Semantic Volume, a novel mathematical measure for quantifying both external and internal uncertainty in LLMs. Our approach perturbs queries and responses, embeds them in a semantic space, and computes the determinant of the Gram matrix of the embedding vectors, capturing their dispersion as a measure of uncertainty. Our framework provides a generalizable and unsupervised uncertainty detection method without requiring white-box access to LLMs. We conduct extensive experiments on both external and internal uncertainty detection, demonstrating that our Semantic Volume method consistently outperforms existing baselines in both tasks. Additionally, we provide theoretical insights linking our measure to differential entropy, unifying and extending previous sampling-based uncertainty measures such as the semantic entropy. Semantic Volume is shown to be a robust and interpretable approach to improving the reliability of LLMs by systematically detecting uncertainty in both user queries and model responses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased exceptional capabilities in various domains, attracting significant interest from both academia and industry. Despite their impressive performance, the substantial size and computational demands of LLMs pose considerable challenges for practical deployment, particularly in environments with limited resources. The endeavor to compress language models while maintaining their accuracy has become a focal point of research. Among the various methods, knowledge distillation has emerged as an effective technique to enhance inference speed without greatly compromising performance. This paper presents a thorough survey from three aspects: method, evaluation, and application, exploring knowledge distillation techniques tailored specifically for LLMs. Specifically, we divide the methods into white-box KD and black-box KD to better illustrate their differences. Furthermore, we also explored the evaluation tasks and distillation effects between different distillation methods, and proposed directions for future research. Through in-depth understanding of the latest advancements and practical applications, this survey provides valuable resources for researchers, paving the way for sustained progress in this field.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

We present ProtoTEx, a novel white-box NLP classification architecture based on prototype networks. ProtoTEx faithfully explains model decisions based on prototype tensors that encode latent clusters of training examples. At inference time, classification decisions are based on the distances between the input text and the prototype tensors, explained via the training examples most similar to the most influential prototypes. We also describe a novel interleaved training algorithm that effectively handles classes characterized by the absence of indicative features. On a propaganda detection task, ProtoTEx accuracy matches BART-large and exceeds BERT-large with the added benefit of providing faithful explanations. A user study also shows that prototype-based explanations help non-experts to better recognize propaganda in online news.

Adversarial attacks optimize against models to defeat defenses. Existing defenses are static, and stay the same once trained, even while attacks change. We argue that models should fight back, and optimize their defenses against attacks at test time. We propose dynamic defenses, to adapt the model and input during testing, by defensive entropy minimization (dent). Dent alters testing, but not training, for compatibility with existing models and train-time defenses. Dent improves the robustness of adversarially-trained defenses and nominally-trained models against white-box, black-box, and adaptive attacks on CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet. In particular, dent boosts state-of-the-art defenses by 20+ points absolute against AutoAttack on CIFAR-10 at ε_infty = 8/255.

As an essential processing step in computer vision applications, image resizing or scaling, more specifically downsampling, has to be applied before feeding a normally large image into a convolutional neural network (CNN) model because CNN models typically take small fixed-size images as inputs. However, image scaling functions could be adversarially abused to perform a newly revealed attack called image-scaling attack, which can affect a wide range of computer vision applications building upon image-scaling functions. This work presents an image-scaling attack detection framework, termed as Decamouflage. Decamouflage consists of three independent detection methods: (1) rescaling, (2) filtering/pooling, and (3) steganalysis. While each of these three methods is efficient standalone, they can work in an ensemble manner not only to improve the detection accuracy but also to harden potential adaptive attacks. Decamouflage has a pre-determined detection threshold that is generic. More precisely, as we have validated, the threshold determined from one dataset is also applicable to other different datasets. Extensive experiments show that Decamouflage achieves detection accuracy of 99.9\% and 99.8\% in the white-box (with the knowledge of attack algorithms) and the black-box (without the knowledge of attack algorithms) settings, respectively. To corroborate the efficiency of Decamouflage, we have also measured its run-time overhead on a personal PC with an i5 CPU and found that Decamouflage can detect image-scaling attacks in milliseconds. Overall, Decamouflage can accurately detect image scaling attacks in both white-box and black-box settings with acceptable run-time overhead.

Despite the advanced intelligence abilities of large language models (LLMs) in various applications, they still face significant computational and storage demands. Knowledge Distillation (KD) has emerged as an effective strategy to improve the performance of a smaller LLM (i.e., the student model) by transferring knowledge from a high-performing LLM (i.e., the teacher model). Prevailing techniques in LLM distillation typically use a black-box model API to generate high-quality pretrained and aligned datasets, or utilize white-box distillation by altering the loss function to better transfer knowledge from the teacher LLM. However, these methods ignore the knowledge differences between the student and teacher LLMs across domains. This results in excessive focus on domains with minimal performance gaps and insufficient attention to domains with large gaps, reducing overall performance. In this paper, we introduce a new LLM distillation framework called DDK, which dynamically adjusts the composition of the distillation dataset in a smooth manner according to the domain performance differences between the teacher and student models, making the distillation process more stable and effective. Extensive evaluations show that DDK significantly improves the performance of student models, outperforming both continuously pretrained baselines and existing knowledge distillation methods by a large margin.

Reasoning large language models have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance in many fields. However, their long-form chain-of-thought reasoning creates interpretability challenges as each generated token depends on all previous ones, making the computation harder to decompose. We argue that analyzing reasoning traces at the sentence level is a promising approach to understanding reasoning processes. We present three complementary attribution methods: (1) a black-box method measuring each sentence's counterfactual importance by comparing final answers across 100 rollouts conditioned on the model generating that sentence or one with a different meaning; (2) a white-box method of aggregating attention patterns between pairs of sentences, which identified ``broadcasting'' sentences that receive disproportionate attention from all future sentences via ``receiver'' attention heads; (3) a causal attribution method measuring logical connections between sentences by suppressing attention toward one sentence and measuring the effect on each future sentence's tokens. Each method provides evidence for the existence of thought anchors, reasoning steps that have outsized importance and that disproportionately influence the subsequent reasoning process. These thought anchors are typically planning or backtracking sentences. We provide an open-source tool (www.thought-anchors.com) for visualizing the outputs of our methods, and present a case study showing converging patterns across methods that map how a model performs multi-step reasoning. The consistency across methods demonstrates the potential of sentence-level analysis for a deeper understanding of reasoning models.

It is now a common business practice to buy access to large language model (LLM) inference rather than self-host, because of significant upfront hardware infrastructure and energy costs. However, as a buyer, there is no mechanism to verify the authenticity of the advertised service including the serving hardware platform, e.g. that it is actually being served using an NVIDIA H100. Furthermore, there are reports suggesting that model providers may deliver models that differ slightly from the advertised ones, often to make them run on less expensive hardware. That way, a client pays premium for a capable model access on more expensive hardware, yet ends up being served by a (potentially less capable) cheaper model on cheaper hardware. In this paper we introduce \textbf{hardware and software platform inference (HSPI)} -- a method for identifying the underlying architecture and software stack of a (black-box) machine learning model solely based on its input-output behavior. Our method leverages the inherent differences of various architectures and compilers to distinguish between different types and software stacks. By analyzing the numerical patterns in the model's outputs, we propose a classification framework capable of accurately identifying the used for model inference as well as the underlying software configuration. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of inferring type from black-box models. We evaluate HSPI against models served on different real hardware and find that in a white-box setting we can distinguish between different s with between 83.9% and 100% accuracy. Even in a black-box setting we are able to achieve results that are up to three times higher than random guess accuracy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) benefit from training on ever larger amounts of textual data, but as a result, they increasingly incur the risk of leaking private information. The ability to selectively remove knowledge from LLMs is, therefore, a highly desirable capability. In this paper, we propose LUNAR, a novel unlearning methodology grounded in the Linear Representation Hypothesis. LUNAR operates by redirecting the representations of unlearned data to regions that trigger the model's inherent ability to express its inability to answer. LUNAR achieves state-of-the-art unlearning performance while significantly enhancing the controllability of the unlearned model during inference. Specifically, LUNAR achieves between 2.9x to 11.7x improvements on combined "unlearning efficacy" and "model utility" score ("Deviation Score") on the PISTOL dataset across various base models. We also demonstrate, through quantitative analysis and qualitative examples, LUNAR's superior controllability in generating coherent and contextually aware responses, mitigating undesired side effects of existing methods. Moreover, we demonstrate that LUNAR is robust against white-box adversarial attacks and versatile in handling real-world scenarios, such as processing sequential unlearning requests.

As deep learning models are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, evaluating their vulnerabilities to adversarial perturbations is essential for ensuring their reliability and trustworthiness. Over the past decade, a large number of white-box adversarial robustness evaluation methods (i.e., attacks) have been proposed, ranging from single-step to multi-step methods and from individual to ensemble methods. Despite these advances, challenges remain in conducting meaningful and comprehensive robustness evaluations, particularly when it comes to large-scale testing and ensuring evaluations reflect real-world adversarial risks. In this work, we focus on image classification models and propose a novel individual attack method, Probability Margin Attack (PMA), which defines the adversarial margin in the probability space rather than the logits space. We analyze the relationship between PMA and existing cross-entropy or logits-margin-based attacks, and show that PMA can outperform the current state-of-the-art individual methods. Building on PMA, we propose two types of ensemble attacks that balance effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, we create a million-scale dataset, CC1M, derived from the existing CC3M dataset, and use it to conduct the first million-scale white-box adversarial robustness evaluation of adversarially-trained ImageNet models. Our findings provide valuable insights into the robustness gaps between individual versus ensemble attacks and small-scale versus million-scale evaluations.

What should a malicious user write next to fool a detection model? Identifying malicious users is critical to ensure the safety and integrity of internet platforms. Several deep learning-based detection models have been created. However, malicious users can evade deep detection models by manipulating their behavior, rendering these models of little use. The vulnerability of such deep detection models against adversarial attacks is unknown. Here we create a novel adversarial attack model against deep user sequence embedding based classification models, which use the sequence of user posts to generate user embeddings and detect malicious users. In the attack, the adversary generates a new post to fool the classifier. We propose a novel end-to-end Personalized Text Generation Attack model, called PETGEN, that simultaneously reduces the efficacy of the detection model and generates posts that have several key desirable properties. Specifically, PETGEN generates posts that are personalized to the user's writing style, have knowledge about a given target context, are aware of the user's historical posts on the target context, and encapsulate the user's recent topical interests. We conduct extensive experiments on two real-world datasets (Yelp and Wikipedia, both with ground-truth of malicious users) to show that PETGEN significantly reduces the performance of popular deep user sequence embedding-based classification models. PETGEN outperforms five attack baselines in terms of text quality and attack efficacy in both white-box and black-box classifier settings. Overall, this work paves the path towards the next generation of adversary-aware sequence classification models.

Preference mechanisms, such as human preference, LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ), and reward models, are central to aligning and evaluating large language models (LLMs). Yet, the underlying concepts that drive these preferences remain poorly understood. In this work, we propose a fully automated method for generating local and global concept-based explanations of preferences across multiple domains. Our method utilizes an LLM to identify concepts that distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, and to represent them with concept-based vectors. To model the relationships between concepts and preferences, we propose a white-box Hierarchical Multi-Domain Regression model that captures both domain-general and domain-specific effects. To evaluate our method, we curate a dataset spanning eight challenging and diverse domains and explain twelve mechanisms. Our method achieves strong preference prediction performance, outperforming baselines while also being explainable. Additionally, we assess explanations in two application-driven settings. First, guiding LLM outputs with concepts from LaaJ explanations yields responses that those judges consistently prefer. Second, prompting LaaJs with concepts explaining humans improves their preference predictions. Together, our work establishes a new paradigm for explainability in the era of LLMs.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.

Integrated Speech and Large Language Models (SLMs) that can follow speech instructions and generate relevant text responses have gained popularity lately. However, the safety and robustness of these models remains largely unclear. In this work, we investigate the potential vulnerabilities of such instruction-following speech-language models to adversarial attacks and jailbreaking. Specifically, we design algorithms that can generate adversarial examples to jailbreak SLMs in both white-box and black-box attack settings without human involvement. Additionally, we propose countermeasures to thwart such jailbreaking attacks. Our models, trained on dialog data with speech instructions, achieve state-of-the-art performance on spoken question-answering task, scoring over 80% on both safety and helpfulness metrics. Despite safety guardrails, experiments on jailbreaking demonstrate the vulnerability of SLMs to adversarial perturbations and transfer attacks, with average attack success rates of 90% and 10% respectively when evaluated on a dataset of carefully designed harmful questions spanning 12 different toxic categories. However, we demonstrate that our proposed countermeasures reduce the attack success significantly.

Time series forecasting is central to decision-making in domains as diverse as energy, finance, climate, and public health. In practice, forecasters face thousands of short, noisy series that vary in frequency, quality, and horizon, where the dominant cost lies not in model fitting, but in the labor-intensive preprocessing, validation, and ensembling required to obtain reliable predictions. Prevailing statistical and deep learning models are tailored to specific datasets or domains and generalize poorly. A general, domain-agnostic framework that minimizes human intervention is urgently in demand. In this paper, we introduce TimeSeriesScientist (TSci), the first LLM-driven agentic framework for general time series forecasting. The framework comprises four specialized agents: Curator performs LLM-guided diagnostics augmented by external tools that reason over data statistics to choose targeted preprocessing; Planner narrows the hypothesis space of model choice by leveraging multi-modal diagnostics and self-planning over the input; Forecaster performs model fitting and validation and, based on the results, adaptively selects the best model configuration as well as ensemble strategy to make final predictions; and Reporter synthesizes the whole process into a comprehensive, transparent report. With transparent natural-language rationales and comprehensive reports, TSci transforms the forecasting workflow into a white-box system that is both interpretable and extensible across tasks. Empirical results on eight established benchmarks demonstrate that TSci consistently outperforms both statistical and LLM-based baselines, reducing forecast error by an average of 10.4% and 38.2%, respectively. Moreover, TSci produces a clear and rigorous report that makes the forecasting workflow more transparent and interpretable.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) excel in vision-language tasks but also pose significant risks of generating harmful content, particularly through jailbreak attacks. Jailbreak attacks refer to intentional manipulations that bypass safety mechanisms in models, leading to the generation of inappropriate or unsafe content. Detecting such attacks is critical to ensuring the responsible deployment of MLLMs. Existing jailbreak detection methods face three primary challenges: (1) Many rely on model hidden states or gradients, limiting their applicability to white-box models, where the internal workings of the model are accessible; (2) They involve high computational overhead from uncertainty-based analysis, which limits real-time detection, and (3) They require fully labeled harmful datasets, which are often scarce in real-world settings. To address these issues, we introduce a test-time adaptive framework called JAILDAM. Our method leverages a memory-based approach guided by policy-driven unsafe knowledge representations, eliminating the need for explicit exposure to harmful data. By dynamically updating unsafe knowledge during test-time, our framework improves generalization to unseen jailbreak strategies while maintaining efficiency. Experiments on multiple VLM jailbreak benchmarks demonstrate that JAILDAM delivers state-of-the-art performance in harmful content detection, improving both accuracy and speed.

Understanding sources of a model's uncertainty regarding its predictions is crucial for effective human-AI collaboration. Prior work proposes using numerical uncertainty or hedges ("I'm not sure, but ..."), which do not explain uncertainty that arises from conflicting evidence, leaving users unable to resolve disagreements or rely on the output. We introduce CLUE (Conflict-and-Agreement-aware Language-model Uncertainty Explanations), the first framework to generate natural language explanations of model uncertainty by (i) identifying relationships between spans of text that expose claim-evidence or inter-evidence conflicts and agreements that drive the model's predictive uncertainty in an unsupervised way, and (ii) generating explanations via prompting and attention steering that verbalize these critical interactions. Across three language models and two fact-checking datasets, we show that CLUE produces explanations that are more faithful to the model's uncertainty and more consistent with fact-checking decisions than prompting for uncertainty explanations without span-interaction guidance. Human evaluators judge our explanations to be more helpful, more informative, less redundant, and more logically consistent with the input than this baseline. CLUE requires no fine-tuning or architectural changes, making it plug-and-play for any white-box language model. By explicitly linking uncertainty to evidence conflicts, it offers practical support for fact-checking and generalises readily to other tasks that require reasoning over complex information.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, are designed to provide useful and safe responses. However, adversarial prompts known as 'jailbreaks' can circumvent safeguards, leading LLMs to generate potentially harmful content. Exploring jailbreak prompts can help to better reveal the weaknesses of LLMs and further steer us to secure them. Unfortunately, existing jailbreak methods either suffer from intricate manual design or require optimization on other white-box models, which compromises either generalization or efficiency. In this paper, we generalize jailbreak prompt attacks into two aspects: (1) Prompt Rewriting and (2) Scenario Nesting. Based on this, we propose ReNeLLM, an automatic framework that leverages LLMs themselves to generate effective jailbreak prompts. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ReNeLLM significantly improves the attack success rate while greatly reducing the time cost compared to existing baselines. Our study also reveals the inadequacy of current defense methods in safeguarding LLMs. Finally, we analyze the failure of LLMs defense from the perspective of prompt execution priority, and propose corresponding defense strategies. We hope that our research can catalyze both the academic community and LLMs developers towards the provision of safer and more regulated LLMs. The code is available at https://github.com/NJUNLP/ReNeLLM.

Large language models (LLMs) have notably enhanced the fluency and diversity of machine-generated text. However, this progress also presents a significant challenge in detecting the origin of a given text, and current research on detection methods lags behind the rapid evolution of LLMs. Conventional training-based methods have limitations in flexibility, particularly when adapting to new domains, and they often lack explanatory power. To address this gap, we propose a novel training-free detection strategy called Divergent N-Gram Analysis (DNA-GPT). Given a text, we first truncate it in the middle and then use only the preceding portion as input to the LLMs to regenerate the new remaining parts. By analyzing the differences between the original and new remaining parts through N-gram analysis in black-box or probability divergence in white-box, we can clearly illustrate significant discrepancies between machine-generated and human-written text. We conducted extensive experiments on the most advanced LLMs from OpenAI, including text-davinci-003, GPT-3.5-turbo, and GPT-4, as well as open-source models such as GPT-NeoX-20B and LLaMa-13B. Results show that our zero-shot approach exhibits state-of-the-art performance in distinguishing between human and GPT-generated text on four English and one German dataset, outperforming OpenAI's own classifier, which is trained on millions of text. Additionally, our methods provide reasonable explanations and evidence to support our claim, which is a unique feature of explainable detection. Our method is also robust under the revised text attack and can additionally solve model sourcing. Codes are available at https://github.com/Xianjun-Yang/DNA-GPT.

Despite tremendous success in many application scenarios, the training and inference costs of using deep learning are also rapidly increasing over time. The lottery ticket hypothesis (LTH) emerges as a promising framework to leverage a special sparse subnetwork (i.e., winning ticket) instead of a full model for both training and inference, that can lower both costs without sacrificing the performance. The main resource bottleneck of LTH is however the extraordinary cost to find the sparse mask of the winning ticket. That makes the found winning ticket become a valuable asset to the owners, highlighting the necessity of protecting its copyright. Our setting adds a new dimension to the recently soaring interest in protecting against the intellectual property (IP) infringement of deep models and verifying their ownerships, since they take owners' massive/unique resources to develop or train. While existing methods explored encrypted weights or predictions, we investigate a unique way to leverage sparse topological information to perform lottery verification, by developing several graph-based signatures that can be embedded as credentials. By further combining trigger set-based methods, our proposal can work in both white-box and black-box verification scenarios. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of lottery verification in diverse models (ResNet-20, ResNet-18, ResNet-50) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Specifically, our verification is shown to be robust to removal attacks such as model fine-tuning and pruning, as well as several ambiguity attacks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/NO-stealing-LTH.

Despite their tremendous success in modelling high-dimensional data manifolds, deep neural networks suffer from the threat of adversarial attacks - Existence of perceptually valid input-like samples obtained through careful perturbation that lead to degradation in the performance of the underlying model. Major concerns with existing defense mechanisms include non-generalizability across different attacks, models and large inference time. In this paper, we propose a generalized defense mechanism capitalizing on the expressive power of regularized latent space based generative models. We design an adversarial filter, devoid of access to classifier and adversaries, which makes it usable in tandem with any classifier. The basic idea is to learn a Lipschitz constrained mapping from the data manifold, incorporating adversarial perturbations, to a quantized latent space and re-map it to the true data manifold. Specifically, we simultaneously auto-encode the data manifold and its perturbations implicitly through the perturbations of the regularized and quantized generative latent space, realized using variational inference. We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed formulation in providing resilience against multiple attack types (black and white box) and methods, while being almost real-time. Our experiments show that the proposed method surpasses the state-of-the-art techniques in several cases.

Adversarial patch attacks pose a severe threat to deep neural networks, yet most existing approaches rely on unrealistic white-box assumptions, untargeted objectives, or produce visually conspicuous patches that limit real-world applicability. In this work, we introduce a novel framework for fully controllable adversarial patch generation, where the attacker can freely choose both the input image x and the target class y target, thereby dictating the exact misclassification outcome. Our method combines a generative U-Net design with Grad-CAM-guided patch placement, enabling semantic-aware localization that maximizes attack effectiveness while preserving visual realism. Extensive experiments across convolutional networks (DenseNet-121, ResNet-50) and vision transformers (ViT-B/16, Swin-B/16, among others) demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art performance across all settings, with attack success rates (ASR) and target-class success (TCS) consistently exceeding 99%. Importantly, we show that our method not only outperforms prior white-box attacks and untargeted baselines, but also surpasses existing non-realistic approaches that produce detectable artifacts. By simultaneously ensuring realism, targeted control, and black-box applicability-the three most challenging dimensions of patch-based attacks-our framework establishes a new benchmark for adversarial robustness research, bridging the gap between theoretical attack strength and practical stealthiness.

Reasoning methods that adaptively allocate test-time compute have advanced LLM performance on easy to verify domains such as math and code. In this work, we study how to utilize this approach to train models that exhibit a degree of robustness to safety vulnerabilities, and show that doing so can provide benefits. We build a recipe called TARS (Training Adaptive Reasoners for Safety), a reinforcement learning (RL) approach that trains models to reason about safety using chain-of-thought traces and a reward signal that balances safety with task completion. To build TARS, we identify three critical design choices: (1) a "lightweight" warmstart SFT stage, (2) a mix of harmful, harmless, and ambiguous prompts to prevent shortcut behaviors such as too many refusals, and (3) a reward function to prevent degeneration of reasoning capabilities during training. Models trained with TARS exhibit adaptive behaviors by spending more compute on ambiguous queries, leading to better safety-refusal trade-offs. They also internally learn to better distinguish between safe and unsafe prompts and attain greater robustness to both white-box (e.g., GCG) and black-box attacks (e.g., PAIR). Overall, our work provides an effective, open recipe for training LLMs against jailbreaks and harmful requests by reasoning per prompt.

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is increasingly compromised by jailbreak attacks, which can manipulate these models to generate harmful or unintended content. Investigating these attacks is crucial for uncovering model vulnerabilities. However, many existing jailbreak strategies fail to keep pace with the rapid development of defense mechanisms, such as defensive suffixes, rendering them ineffective against defended models. To tackle this issue, we introduce a novel attack method called ArrAttack, specifically designed to target defended LLMs. ArrAttack automatically generates robust jailbreak prompts capable of bypassing various defense measures. This capability is supported by a universal robustness judgment model that, once trained, can perform robustness evaluation for any target model with a wide variety of defenses. By leveraging this model, we can rapidly develop a robust jailbreak prompt generator that efficiently converts malicious input prompts into effective attacks. Extensive evaluations reveal that ArrAttack significantly outperforms existing attack strategies, demonstrating strong transferability across both white-box and black-box models, including GPT-4 and Claude-3. Our work bridges the gap between jailbreak attacks and defenses, providing a fresh perspective on generating robust jailbreak prompts. We make the codebase available at https://github.com/LLBao/ArrAttack.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

Security concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain insufficiently studied. This paper delves into the underexplored security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, especially when deployed in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are critically tested against complex medical challenges. By combining existing clinical medical data with atypical natural phenomena, we redefine two types of attacks: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack). Using our own constructed voluminous 3MAD dataset, which covers a wide range of medical image modalities and harmful medical scenarios, we conduct a comprehensive analysis and propose the MCM optimization method, which significantly enhances the attack success rate on MedMLLMs. Evaluations with this dataset and novel attack methods, including white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer attacks on four other state-of-the-art models, indicate that even MedMLLMs designed with enhanced security features are vulnerable to security breaches. Our work underscores the urgent need for a concerted effort to implement robust security measures and enhance the safety and efficacy of open-source MedMLLMs, particularly given the potential severity of jailbreak attacks and other malicious or clinically significant exploits in medical settings. For further research and replication, anonymous access to our code is available at https://github.com/dirtycomputer/O2M_attack. Warning: Medical large model jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice.

The research in the field of adversarial attacks and models' vulnerability is one of the fundamental directions in modern machine learning. Recent studies reveal the vulnerability phenomenon, and understanding the mechanisms behind this is essential for improving neural network characteristics and interpretability. In this paper, we propose a novel sparse universal white-box adversarial attack. Our approach is based on truncated power iteration providing sparsity to (p,q)-singular vectors of the hidden layers of Jacobian matrices. Using the ImageNet benchmark validation subset, we analyze the proposed method in various settings, achieving results comparable to dense baselines with more than a 50% fooling rate while damaging only 5% of pixels and utilizing 256 samples for perturbation fitting. We also show that our algorithm admits higher attack magnitude without affecting the human ability to solve the task. Furthermore, we investigate that the constructed perturbations are highly transferable among different models without significantly decreasing the fooling rate. Our findings demonstrate the vulnerability of state-of-the-art models to sparse attacks and highlight the importance of developing robust machine learning systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as powerful tools for a plethora of natural language processing (NLP) applications. A recent innovation, in-context learning (ICL), enables LLMs to learn new tasks by supplying a few examples in the prompt during inference time, thereby eliminating the need for model fine-tuning. While LLMs have been utilized in several applications, their applicability in explaining the behavior of other models remains relatively unexplored. Despite the growing number of new explanation techniques, many require white-box access to the model and/or are computationally expensive, highlighting a need for next-generation post hoc explainers. In this work, we present the first framework to study the effectiveness of LLMs in explaining other predictive models. More specifically, we propose a novel framework encompassing multiple prompting strategies: i) Perturbation-based ICL, ii) Prediction-based ICL, iii) Instruction-based ICL, and iv) Explanation-based ICL, with varying levels of information about the underlying ML model and the local neighborhood of the test sample. We conduct extensive experiments with real-world benchmark datasets to demonstrate that LLM-generated explanations perform on par with state-of-the-art post hoc explainers using their ability to leverage ICL examples and their internal knowledge in generating model explanations. On average, across four datasets and two ML models, we observe that LLMs identify the most important feature with 72.19% accuracy, opening up new frontiers in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) to explore LLM-based explanation frameworks.

Numerous companies have started offering services based on large language models (LLM), such as ChatGPT, which inevitably raises privacy concerns as users' prompts are exposed to the model provider. Previous research on secure reasoning using multi-party computation (MPC) has proven to be impractical for LLM applications due to its time-consuming and communication-intensive nature. While lightweight anonymization techniques can protect private information in prompts through substitution or masking, they fail to recover sensitive data replaced in the LLM-generated results. In this paper, we expand the application scenarios of anonymization techniques by training a small local model to de-anonymize the LLM's returned results with minimal computational overhead. We introduce the HaS framework, where "H(ide)" and "S(eek)" represent its two core processes: hiding private entities for anonymization and seeking private entities for de-anonymization, respectively. To quantitatively assess HaS's privacy protection performance, we propose both black-box and white-box adversarial models. Furthermore, we conduct experiments to evaluate HaS's usability in translation and classification tasks. The experimental findings demonstrate that the HaS framework achieves an optimal balance between privacy protection and utility.

Vision-enabled language models (VLMs) are now used to build autonomous multimodal agents capable of taking actions in real environments. In this paper, we show that multimodal agents raise new safety risks, even though attacking agents is more challenging than prior attacks due to limited access to and knowledge about the environment. Our attacks use adversarial text strings to guide gradient-based perturbation over one trigger image in the environment: (1) our captioner attack attacks white-box captioners if they are used to process images into captions as additional inputs to the VLM; (2) our CLIP attack attacks a set of CLIP models jointly, which can transfer to proprietary VLMs. To evaluate the attacks, we curated VisualWebArena-Adv, a set of adversarial tasks based on VisualWebArena, an environment for web-based multimodal agent tasks. Within an L-infinity norm of 16/256 on a single image, the captioner attack can make a captioner-augmented GPT-4V agent execute the adversarial goals with a 75% success rate. When we remove the captioner or use GPT-4V to generate its own captions, the CLIP attack can achieve success rates of 21% and 43%, respectively. Experiments on agents based on other VLMs, such as Gemini-1.5, Claude-3, and GPT-4o, show interesting differences in their robustness. Further analysis reveals several key factors contributing to the attack's success, and we also discuss the implications for defenses as well. Project page: https://chenwu.io/attack-agent Code and data: https://github.com/ChenWu98/agent-attack

Large Language Models (LLMs) guardrail systems are designed to protect against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. However, they remain vulnerable to evasion techniques. We demonstrate two approaches for bypassing LLM prompt injection and jailbreak detection systems via traditional character injection methods and algorithmic Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) evasion techniques. Through testing against six prominent protection systems, including Microsoft's Azure Prompt Shield and Meta's Prompt Guard, we show that both methods can be used to evade detection while maintaining adversarial utility achieving in some instances up to 100% evasion success. Furthermore, we demonstrate that adversaries can enhance Attack Success Rates (ASR) against black-box targets by leveraging word importance ranking computed by offline white-box models. Our findings reveal vulnerabilities within current LLM protection mechanisms and highlight the need for more robust guardrail systems.

The widespread application of large VLMs makes ensuring their secure deployment critical. While recent studies have demonstrated jailbreak attacks on VLMs, existing approaches are limited: they require either white-box access, restricting practicality, or rely on manually crafted patterns, leading to poor sample diversity and scalability. To address these gaps, we propose JPRO, a novel multi-agent collaborative framework designed for automated VLM jailbreaking. It effectively overcomes the shortcomings of prior methods in attack diversity and scalability. Through the coordinated action of four specialized agents and its two core modules: Tactic-Driven Seed Generation and Adaptive Optimization Loop, JPRO generates effective and diverse attack samples. Experimental results show that JPRO achieves over a 60\% attack success rate on multiple advanced VLMs, including GPT-4o, significantly outperforming existing methods. As a black-box attack approach, JPRO not only uncovers critical security vulnerabilities in multimodal models but also offers valuable insights for evaluating and enhancing VLM robustness.

Distribution inference, sometimes called property inference, infers statistical properties about a training set from access to a model trained on that data. Distribution inference attacks can pose serious risks when models are trained on private data, but are difficult to distinguish from the intrinsic purpose of statistical machine learning -- namely, to produce models that capture statistical properties about a distribution. Motivated by Yeom et al.'s membership inference framework, we propose a formal definition of distribution inference attacks that is general enough to describe a broad class of attacks distinguishing between possible training distributions. We show how our definition captures previous ratio-based property inference attacks as well as new kinds of attack including revealing the average node degree or clustering coefficient of a training graph. To understand distribution inference risks, we introduce a metric that quantifies observed leakage by relating it to the leakage that would occur if samples from the training distribution were provided directly to the adversary. We report on a series of experiments across a range of different distributions using both novel black-box attacks and improved versions of the state-of-the-art white-box attacks. Our results show that inexpensive attacks are often as effective as expensive meta-classifier attacks, and that there are surprising asymmetries in the effectiveness of attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/FormEstDistRisks