input stringlengths 205 73.3k | output stringlengths 64 73.2k | instruction stringclasses 1
value |
|---|---|---|
#vulnerable code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResource... | #fixed code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStre... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
protected void outerHtml(StringBuilder accum) {
new NodeTraversor(new OuterHtmlVisitor(accum, ownerDocument().outputSettings())).traverse(this);
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
protected void outerHtml(StringBuilder accum) {
new NodeTraversor(new OuterHtmlVisitor(accum, getOutputSettings())).traverse(this);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public boolean matchesWord() {
return !isEmpty() && Character.isLetterOrDigit(peek());
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
public boolean matchesWord() {
return !isEmpty() && Character.isLetterOrDigit(queue.charAt(pos));
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>");
Element element = doc.getElementById("a");
List<Element> elementSiblings = elem... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<ul id='ul'>" +
"<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>" +
"</ul>" +
"<div id='div'>" +
"<li id... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Document normalise() {
if (select("html").isEmpty())
appendElement("html");
if (head() == null)
select("html").first().prependElement("head");
if (body() == null)
select("html").first().appendElement("bo... | #fixed code
public Document normalise() {
Element htmlEl = findFirstElementByTagName("html", this);
if (htmlEl == null)
htmlEl = appendElement("html");
if (head() == null)
htmlEl.prependElement("head");
if (body() == null)
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
protected void removeChild(Node out) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
int index = indexInList(out, childNodes);
childNodes.remove(index);
out.parentNode = null;
}
#location 3
... | #fixed code
protected void removeChild(Node out) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
int index = out.siblingIndex();
childNodes.remove(index);
reindexChildren();
out.parentNode = null;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>");
Element element = doc.getElementById("a");
List<Element> elementSiblings = elem... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testNextElementSiblings() {
Document doc = Jsoup.parse("<ul id='ul'>" +
"<li id='a'>a</li>" +
"<li id='b'>b</li>" +
"<li id='c'>c</li>" +
"</ul>" +
"<div id='div'>" +
"<li id... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResource... | #fixed code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStre... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
void insert(Token.Character characterToken) {
final Node node;
final Element el = currentElement();
final String tagName = el.normalName();
final String data = characterToken.getData();
if (characterToken.isCData())
n... | #fixed code
ParseSettings defaultSettings() {
return ParseSettings.htmlDefault;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
void outerHtml(StringBuilder accum) {
String html = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml(getWholeText());
if (parent() instanceof Element && !((Element) parent()).preserveWhitespace()) {
html = normaliseWhitespace(html);
}
if (siblin... | #fixed code
void outerHtmlHead(StringBuilder accum, int depth) {
String html = StringEscapeUtils.escapeHtml(getWholeText());
if (parent() instanceof Element && !((Element) parent()).preserveWhitespace()) {
html = normaliseWhitespace(html);
}
i... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static Document load(File in, String charsetName, String baseUri) throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = new FileInputStream(in);
ByteBuffer byteData = readToByteBuffer(inStream);
Document doc = parseByteData(byteData, charsetName, ba... | #fixed code
public static Document load(File in, String charsetName, String baseUri) throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = null;
try {
inStream = new FileInputStream(in);
ByteBuffer byteData = readToByteBuffer(inStream);
return pa... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public String consumeCssIdentifier() {
StringBuilder accum = new StringBuilder();
Character c = peek();
while (!isEmpty() && (Character.isLetterOrDigit(c) || c.equals('-') || c.equals('_'))) {
accum.append(consume());
c = ... | #fixed code
public String consumeCssIdentifier() {
int start = pos;
while (!isEmpty() && (matchesWord() || matchesAny('-', '_')))
pos++;
return queue.substring(start, pos);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
protected void replaceChild(Node out, Node in) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
Validate.notNull(in);
if (in.parentNode != null)
in.parentNode.removeChild(in);
Integer index = indexInList(out, childNodes);
... | #fixed code
protected void replaceChild(Node out, Node in) {
Validate.isTrue(out.parentNode == this);
Validate.notNull(in);
if (in.parentNode != null)
in.parentNode.removeChild(in);
Integer index = out.siblingIndex();
childNode... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
protected void addChildren(int index, Node... children) {
Validate.noNullElements(children);
final List<Node> nodes = ensureChildNodes();
for (Node child : children) {
reparentChild(child);
}
nodes.addAll(index, Array... | #fixed code
protected void addChildren(int index, Node... children) {
Validate.notNull(children);
if (children.length == 0) {
return;
}
final List<Node> nodes = ensureChildNodes();
// fast path - if used as a wrap (index=0, children = ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
static String unescape(String string) {
if (!string.contains("&"))
return string;
Matcher m = unescapePattern.matcher(string); // &(#(x|X)?([0-9a-fA-F]+)|[a-zA-Z]+);?
StringBuffer accum = new StringBuffer(string.length()); // pity ma... | #fixed code
static String unescape(String string) {
if (!string.contains("&"))
return string;
Matcher m = unescapePattern.matcher(string); // &(#(x|X)?([0-9a-fA-F]+)|[a-zA-Z]+);?
StringBuffer accum = new StringBuffer(string.length()); // pity matcher ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResource... | #fixed code
private static void load(EscapeMode e, String file, int size) {
e.nameKeys = new String[size];
e.codeVals = new int[size];
e.codeKeys = new int[size];
e.nameVals = new String[size];
InputStream stream = Entities.class.getResourceAsStre... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void parseStartTag() {
tq.consume("<");
Attributes attributes = new Attributes();
String tagName = tq.consumeWord();
while (!tq.matches("<") && !tq.matches("/>") && !tq.matches(">") && !tq.isEmpty()) {
Attribute attri... | #fixed code
private void parseStartTag() {
tq.consume("<");
Attributes attributes = new Attributes();
String tagName = tq.consumeWord();
while (!tq.matchesAny("<", "/>", ">") && !tq.isEmpty()) {
Attribute attribute = parseAttribute();
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private static String ihVal(String key, Document doc) {
return doc.select("th:contains(" + key + ") + td").first().text();
}
#location 2
#vulnerability type NULL_DEREFERENCE | #fixed code
private static String ihVal(String key, Document doc) {
final Element first = doc.select("th:contains(" + key + ") + td").first();
return first != null ? first.text() : null;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
void outerHtmlHead(Appendable accum, int depth, Document.OutputSettings out) throws IOException {
if (out.prettyPrint() && ((siblingIndex() == 0 && parentNode instanceof Element && ((Element) parentNode).tag().formatAsBlock() && !isBlank()) || (out.outline() && sib... | #fixed code
void outerHtmlHead(Appendable accum, int depth, Document.OutputSettings out) throws IOException {
final boolean prettyPrint = out.prettyPrint();
if (prettyPrint && ((siblingIndex() == 0 && parentNode instanceof Element && ((Element) parentNode).tag().formatAsBloc... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNamespace() throws Exception
{
final String namespace = "TestNamespace";
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testNamespace() throws Exception
{
final String namespace = "TestNamespace";
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNamespaceInBackground() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPo... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testNamespaceInBackground() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPolicy(n... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testNamespaceWithWatcher() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPol... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testNamespaceWithWatcher() throws Exception
{
CuratorFrameworkFactory.Builder builder = CuratorFrameworkFactory.builder();
CuratorFramework client = builder.connectString(server.getConnectString()).namespace("aisa").retryPolicy(ne... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i... | #fixed code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i++) {
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
start = start != null ? 0 : start;
end = end == null ? null : end;
... | #fixed code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
// validate & if needed pad seed
if ( (seed = InputValidator.validateSeed(se... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i... | #fixed code
public void transactionObject(final String trytes) {
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(trytes)) {
log.warn("Warning: empty trytes in input for transactionObject");
return;
}
// validity check
for (int i = 2279; i < 2295; i++) {
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
start = start != null ? 0 : start;
end = end == null ? null : end;
... | #fixed code
public GetTransferResponse getTransfers(String seed, Integer start, Integer end, Boolean inclusionStates) throws ArgumentException, InvalidBundleException, InvalidSignatureException {
// validate & if needed pad seed
if ( (seed = InputValidator.validateSeed(se... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(by... | #fixed code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(bytes);
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.ge... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogge... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void run() throws IOException {
Socket socket = serverSock.accept();
BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(socket.getInputStream());
// TODO
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEA... | #fixed code
public void run() {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
Thread th = new Thread() {
public void run() {
try {
process.process(msgpack, socket);
} catch (IOException e) { // ignore
}
}
};
th.start();
} catch (IOExcep... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.ge... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogge... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(by... | #fixed code
private synchronized boolean send(byte[] bytes) {
// buffering
if (pendings.position() + bytes.length > pendings.capacity()) {
LOG.severe("Cannot send logs to " + server.toString());
return false;
}
pendings.put(bytes);
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.ge... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testClose() throws Exception {
// use NullSender
Properties props = System.getProperties();
props.setProperty(Config.FLUENT_SENDER_CLASS, NullSender.class.getName());
// create logger objects
FluentLogger.getLogge... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void run() {
while (!finished.get()) {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
Runnable r = new Runnable() {
public void run() {
try {
... | #fixed code
public void run() {
while (!finished.get()) {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
socket.setSoLinger(true, 0);
clientSockets.add(socket);
Runnable r = new Runnable() {
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void run() throws IOException {
Socket socket = serverSock.accept();
BufferedInputStream in = new BufferedInputStream(socket.getInputStream());
// TODO
}
#location 3
#vulnerability type RESOURCE_LEA... | #fixed code
public void run() {
try {
final Socket socket = serverSocket.accept();
Thread th = new Thread() {
public void run() {
try {
process.process(msgpack, socket);
} catch (IOException e) { // ignore
}
}
};
th.start();
} catch (IOExcep... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRenderMultipleObjects() {
TestObject testObject = new TestObject();
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render(testObject);
assertEqual... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testRenderMultipleObjects() {
TestObject testObject = new TestObject();
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render(testObject);
assertEquals(test... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRenderingOfStringObjectPairsWorks() {
String object1 = new String("stringy1");
String object2 = new String("stringy2");
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testRenderingOfStringObjectPairsWorks() {
String object1 = new String("stringy1");
String object2 = new String("stringy2");
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render("obje... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static String makeJsonRequest(String url) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
try {
DefaultHttpClient httpClient = new DefaultHttpClient();
HttpGet getRequest = new HttpGet(url);
getRequest.addHeader("accept", "application/json");
HttpResponse... | #fixed code
public static String makeJsonRequest(String url) {
Map<String, String> headers = Maps.newHashMap();
headers.put("accept", "application/json");
return makeRequest(url, headers);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void parse() {
Map<String,RouteParameter> params;
RouteParameter param;
// no named parameters is null
params = RouteParameter.parse("/user");
assertThat(params, is(nullValue()));
params ... | #fixed code
@Test
public void parse() {
Map<String,RouteParameter> params;
RouteParameter param;
// no named parameters is null
params = RouteParameter.parse("/user");
assertThat(params, aMapWithSize(0));
params = Rout... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRenderEntryAndMakeSureMapIsCreated() {
String stringy = new String("stringy");
Entry<String, Object> entry
= new SimpleImmutableEntry("stringy", stringy);
// step 1: add one object.
... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testRenderEntryAndMakeSureMapIsCreated() {
String stringy = new String("stringy");
// step 1: add one object.
Result result = new Result(200);
result.render("stringy", stringy);
Map<String, Object> resul... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
static private SourceSnippet readFromInputStream(InputStream is,
URI source,
int lineFrom,
int lineTo)... | #fixed code
static private SourceSnippet readFromInputStream(InputStream is,
URI source,
int lineFrom,
int lineTo) throw... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public String makeRequest(String url, Map<String, String> headers) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
try {
HttpGet getRequest = new HttpGet(url);
if (headers != null) {
// add all headers
f... | #fixed code
public String makeRequest(String url, Map<String, String> headers) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer();
BufferedReader br = null;
try {
HttpGet getRequest = new HttpGet(url);
if (headers != null) {
// add a... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public void handleTemplateException(TemplateException te,
Environment env,
Writer out) {
if (ninjaProperties.isProd()) {
PrintWriter pw = (out instanceof Pr... | #fixed code
public void handleTemplateException(TemplateException te,
Environment env,
Writer out) throws TemplateException {
if (!ninjaProperties.isProd()) {
// print out full stacktrace... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public Object invoke(MethodInvocation invocation) throws Throwable {
final UnitOfWork unitOfWork;
// Only start a new unit of work if the entitymanager is empty
// otherwise someone else has started the unit of wor... | #fixed code
@Override
public Object invoke(MethodInvocation invocation) throws Throwable {
if (null == didWeStartWork.get()) {
unitOfWork.begin();
didWeStartWork.set(Boolean.TRUE);
} else {
// If u... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public String makePostRequestWithFormParameters(String url,
Map<String, String> headers,
Map<String, String> formParameters) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBu... | #fixed code
public String makePostRequestWithFormParameters(String url,
Map<String, String> headers,
Map<String, String> formParameters) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer()... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testAllConstants() {
Configuration configuration =
SwissKnife.loadConfigurationFromClasspathInUtf8("conf/all_constants.conf", this
.getClass());
assertEquals("LANGUAGES", configurat... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testAllConstants() {
Configuration configuration =
SwissKnife.loadConfigurationInUtf8("conf/all_constants.conf");
assertEquals("LANGUAGES", configuration.getString(NinjaConstant.applicationLanguages));
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean runSteps(FlowSpec scenario, FlowStepStatusNotifier flowStepStatusNotifier) {
ScenarioExecutionState scenarioExecutionState = new ScenarioExecutionState();
for(Step thisStep : scenario.getSteps()){
// Another way... | #fixed code
@Override
public boolean runSteps(FlowSpec scenario, FlowStepStatusNotifier flowStepStatusNotifier) {
LOGGER.info("\n-------------------------- Scenario:{} -------------------------\n", scenario.getFlowName());
ScenarioExecutionState scenarioExecutionSta... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Test
public void testRawRecordingSpeed() throws Exception {
Histogram histogram = new Histogram(highestTrackableValue, numberOfSignificantValueDigits);
// Warm up:
long startTime = System.nanoTime();
recordLoop(histogram, warmupLoopL... | #fixed code
@Test
public void testRawRecordingSpeed() throws Exception {
testRawRecordingSpeedAtExpectedInterval(1000000000);
testRawRecordingSpeedAtExpectedInterval(10000);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private static synchronized List<Menu> loadJson() throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = MenuJsonUtils.class.getResourceAsStream(config);
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inStream, Charset.forName("UTF-8")));
... | #fixed code
private static synchronized List<Menu> loadJson() throws IOException {
InputStream inStream = MenuJsonUtils.class.getResourceAsStream(config);
BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(inStream, Charset.forName("UTF-8")));
Strin... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void postHandle(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, HandlerMethod handler, ModelAndView modelAndView) throws Exception {
PostVO ret = (PostVO) modelAndView.getModelMap().get("view");
Object editing = modelAndVie... | #fixed code
@Override
public void postHandle(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, HandlerMethod handler, ModelAndView modelAndView) throws Exception {
PostVO ret = (PostVO) modelAndView.getModelMap().get("view");
Object editing = modelAndView.getM... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// STEP-1: read input parameters and validate them
if (args.length < 2) {
System.err.println("Usage: SecondarySortUsingGroupByKey <input> <output>");
System.exit(1);
}
String inpu... | #fixed code
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
// STEP-1: read input parameters and validate them
if (args.length < 2) {
System.err.println("Usage: SecondarySortUsingGroupByKey <input> <output>");
System.exit(1);
}
String inputPath ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static Map<String, String> readService(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path));
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line = "";
Map<String, String> result... | #fixed code
public static Map<String, String> readService(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path),Constant.ENCODING_UTF_8);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line;
Map<String, S... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static CacheManager get() {
if (instance == null) {
synchronized (log) {
if (instance == null) {
instance = new CacheManager();
}
}
}
return instance;
}
#location 9
... | #fixed code
public static CacheManager get() {
return get(defaultCacheManager);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
public void onReceive(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage fm = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync() && !syncActors.containsKey(serviceContext.getId())) {
syncAct... | #fixed code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
public void onReceive(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage fm = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync() && !syncActors.containsKey(serviceContext.getId())) {
syncActors.pu... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public String toString() {
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
builder.append("ServiceFlow [\r\n\tflowName = ");
builder.append(flowName);
builder.append("\r\n\t");
Set<ServiceConfig> nextServices = servicesOfFlow.get(getHeadServic... | #fixed code
@Override
public String toString() {
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
builder.append("ServiceFlow [ flowName = ");
builder.append(flowName);
builder.append("\r\n\t");
ServiceConfig hh = header;
buildString(hh, builder);
builder.append(... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
@Override
public void onServiceContextReceived(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage flowMessage = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync()) {
CacheManager.get(servi... | #fixed code
@SuppressWarnings({"unchecked", "rawtypes"})
@Override
public void onServiceContextReceived(ServiceContext serviceContext) throws Throwable {
FlowMessage flowMessage = serviceContext.getFlowMessage();
if (serviceContext.isSync()) {
CacheManager.get(serviceActo... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void doStartup(String configLocation) {
ClassPathXmlApplicationContext applicationContext = null;
try {
applicationContext = new ClassPathXmlApplicationContext(configLocation);
applicationContext.start();
} catch (Exception e) {... | #fixed code
@Override
public void doStartup(String configLocation) throws Throwable {
Class<?> applicationContextClazz =
Class.forName("org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext", true, getClassLoader());
Object flowerFactory = applicationContextC... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static List<Pair<String, String>> readFlow(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path));
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line = "";
List<Pair<String, Stri... | #fixed code
public static List<Pair<String, String>> readFlow(String path) throws IOException {
InputStreamReader fr = new InputStreamReader(FileUtil.class.getResourceAsStream(path),Constant.ENCODING_UTF_8);
BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr);
String line;
List<Pair... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
if (!(otherType instanceof FunctionType)) {
return false;
}
FunctionType that = (FunctionType) otherType;
if (!that.isFunctionType()) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor... | #fixed code
@Override
public boolean isEquivalentTo(JSType otherType) {
FunctionType that =
JSType.toMaybeFunctionType(otherType.toMaybeFunctionType());
if (that == null) {
return false;
}
if (this.isConstructor()) {
if (that.isConstructor()) {
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferThisType(JSDocInfo info,
@Nullable Node owner) {
ObjectType maybeThisType = null;
if (info != null && info.hasThisType()) {
maybeThisType = ObjectType.cast(
info.getThisType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry));
}
... | #fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private EnvTypePair analyzeLooseCallNodeBwd(
Node callNode, TypeEnv outEnv, JSType retType) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(callNode.isCall());
Preconditions.checkNotNull(retType);
Node callee = callNode.getFirstChild();
TypeEnv tmpEnv = outEnv;
Fu... | #fixed code
private EnvTypePair analyzeLooseCallNodeBwd(
Node callNode, TypeEnv outEnv, JSType retType) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(callNode.isCall());
Preconditions.checkNotNull(retType);
Node callee = callNode.getFirstChild();
TypeEnv tmpEnv = outEnv;
Function... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
InputStream input = Compiler.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
List<JSSourceFile> externs = Lists.newLinkedList();
for (... | #fixed code
private List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() {
try {
return CommandLineRunner.getDefaultExterns();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new BuildException(e);
}
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node tryOptimizeSwitch(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkState(n.getType() == Token.SWITCH);
Node defaultCase = findDefaultCase(n);
if (defaultCase != null && isUselessCase(defaultCase)) {
NodeUtil.redeclareVarsInsideBranch(defaultCase);
n.remo... | #fixed code
private Node tryOptimizeSwitch(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkState(n.getType() == Token.SWITCH);
Node defaultCase = tryOptimizeDefaultCase(n);
// Removing cases when there exists a default case is not safe.
if (defaultCase == null) {
Node next = null;
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void writeResult(String source) {
if (this.outputFile.getParentFile().mkdirs()) {
log("Created missing parent directory " +
this.outputFile.getParentFile(), Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
try {
FileWriter out = new FileWriter(this.outputF... | #fixed code
private void writeResult(String source) {
if (this.outputFile.getParentFile().mkdirs()) {
log("Created missing parent directory " +
this.outputFile.getParentFile(), Project.MSG_DEBUG);
}
try {
OutputStreamWriter out = new OutputStreamWriter(
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Writer fileNameToOutputWriter(String fileName) throws IOException {
if (fileName == null) {
return null;
}
if (testMode) {
return new StringWriter();
}
return streamToOutputWriter(new FileOutputStream(fileName));
}
... | #fixed code
private Writer fileNameToOutputWriter(String fileName) throws IOException {
if (fileName == null) {
return null;
}
if (testMode) {
return new StringWriter();
}
return streamToOutputWriter(filenameToOutputStream(fileName));
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public List<INPUT> getSortedDependenciesOf(List<INPUT> roots) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(inputs.containsAll(roots));
Set<INPUT> included = Sets.newHashSet();
Deque<INPUT> worklist = new ArrayDeque<INPUT>(roots);
while (!worklist.isEmpty()) {
INPUT... | #fixed code
public List<INPUT> getSortedDependenciesOf(List<INPUT> roots) {
return getDependenciesOf(roots, true);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
... | #fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public boolean shouldTraverse(NodeTraversal t, Node n, Node parent) {
if (n.isScript()) {
this.inExterns = n.getStaticSourceFile().isExtern();
}
return true;
}
#location 4
#vulnerabi... | #fixed code
@Override
public boolean shouldTraverse(NodeTraversal t, Node n, Node parent) {
return true;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Set<String> getOwnPropertyNames() {
return ImmutableSet.of();
}
#location 1
#vulnerability type CHECKERS_IMMUTABLE_CAST | #fixed code
public Set<String> getOwnPropertyNames() {
return getPropertyMap().getOwnPropertyNames();
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
new GraphReachability<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>(
t.getControlFlowGraph(), new ReachablePredicate()).compute(
t.getControlFlowGraph().getEntry().getValue());
}
... | #fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
scopeNeedsInit = true;
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void initEdgeEnvsFwd() {
// TODO(user): Revisit what we throw away after the bwd analysis
DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entry = cfg.getEntry();
DiGraphEdge<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entryOutEdge =
cfg.getOutEdges(entry.getValu... | #fixed code
private void initEdgeEnvsFwd() {
// TODO(user): Revisit what we throw away after the bwd analysis
DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entry = cfg.getEntry();
DiGraphEdge<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> entryOutEdge =
cfg.getOutEdges(entry.getValue()).g... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Regardless of what happens to the original declarati... | #fixed code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = codingConvention;
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Remove calls to inheritance-defining functions where the unreferenced
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
... | #fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void outputTracerReport() {
OutputStreamWriter output = new OutputStreamWriter(this.err);
try {
int runtime = 0;
int runs = 0;
int changes = 0;
int diff = 0;
int gzDiff = 0;
// header
output.write("Summary:\n");
... | #fixed code
private void outputTracerReport() {
JvmMetrics.maybeWriteJvmMetrics(this.err, "verbose:pretty:all");
OutputStreamWriter output = new OutputStreamWriter(this.err);
try {
int runtime = 0;
int runs = 0;
int changes = 0;
int diff = 0;
int ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void escapeParameters(MustDef output) {
for (Iterator<Var> i = jsScope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (v.getParentNode().getType() == Token.LP) {
// Assume we no longer know where the parameter comes from
// anymore... | #fixed code
private void escapeParameters(MustDef output) {
for (Iterator<Var> i = jsScope.getVars(); i.hasNext();) {
Var v = i.next();
if (isParameter(v)) {
// Assume we no longer know where the parameter comes from
// anymore.
output.reachingDef.pu... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// Computes the control flow graph.
ControlFlowAnalysis cfa = new ControlFlowAnalysis(compiler, false, false);
cfa.process(null, scope.getRootNode());
cfgStack.push(curC... | #fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
// TODO(user): We CAN do this in the global scope, just need to be
// careful when something is exported. Liveness uses bit-vector for live
// sets so I don't see compilation time will be a problem for runn... | #fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
if (!shouldOptimizeScope(scope)) {
return;
}
ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg = t.getControlFlowGraph();
LiveVariablesAnalysis liveness =
new LiveVariablesAnalysis(cfg... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private String getFunctionAnnotation(Node fnNode) {
Preconditions.checkState(fnNode.getType() == Token.FUNCTION);
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder("/**\n");
JSType type = fnNode.getJSType();
if (type == null || type.isUnknownType()) {
return ""... | #fixed code
private String getFunctionAnnotation(Node fnNode) {
Preconditions.checkState(fnNode.getType() == Token.FUNCTION);
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder("/**\n");
JSType type = fnNode.getJSType();
if (type == null || type.isUnknownType()) {
return "";
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new n... | #fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferThisType(JSDocInfo info,
@Nullable Node owner) {
ObjectType maybeThisType = null;
if (info != null && info.hasThisType()) {
maybeThisType = ObjectType.cast(
info.getThisType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry));
}
... | #fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void createPropertyScopeFor(Symbol s) {
// In order to build a property scope for s, we will need to build
// a property scope for all its implicit prototypes first. This means
// that sometimes we will already have built its property scope
// for ... | #fixed code
private void createPropertyScopeFor(Symbol s) {
// In order to build a property scope for s, we will need to build
// a property scope for all its implicit prototypes first. This means
// that sometimes we will already have built its property scope
// for a prev... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private FlowScope traverse(Node n, FlowScope scope) {
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.ASSIGN:
scope = traverseAssign(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NAME:
scope = traverseName(n, scope);
break;
case Token.GETPROP:
... | #fixed code
private FlowScope traverse(Node n, FlowScope scope) {
switch (n.getType()) {
case Token.ASSIGN:
scope = traverseAssign(n, scope);
break;
case Token.NAME:
scope = traverseName(n, scope);
break;
case Token.GETPROP:
s... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new n... | #fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private UndiGraph<Var, Void> computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
NodeTraversal t, ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg, Set<Var> escaped) {
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
LinkedUndirectedGraph.create();
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// First cr... | #fixed code
private UndiGraph<Var, Void> computeVariableNamesInterferenceGraph(
NodeTraversal t, ControlFlowGraph<Node> cfg, Set<Var> escaped) {
UndiGraph<Var, Void> interferenceGraph =
LinkedUndirectedGraph.create();
// For all variables V not in unsafeCrossRange,
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public Symbol getSymbolForInstancesOf(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType pType = fn.getPrototype();
String name = pType.getReferenceName();
if (name == null || globalScope == null) {
return... | #fixed code
public Symbol getSymbolForInstancesOf(FunctionType fn) {
Preconditions.checkState(fn.isConstructor() || fn.isInterface());
ObjectType pType = fn.getPrototype();
return getSymbolForName(fn.getSource(), pType.getReferenceName());
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {
Scope scope = t.getScope();
// Computes the control flow graph.
ControlFlowAnalysis cfa = new ControlFlowAnalysis(compiler, false, false);
cfa.process(null, scope.getRootNode());
cfgStack.push(curC... | #fixed code
@Override
public void enterScope(NodeTraversal t) {} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
... | #fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Regardless of what happens to the original declarati... | #fixed code
private void removeUnreferencedVars() {
CodingConvention convention = codingConvention;
for (Iterator<Var> it = maybeUnreferenced.iterator(); it.hasNext(); ) {
Var var = it.next();
// Remove calls to inheritance-defining functions where the unreferenced
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
... | #fixed code
private Node aliasAndInlineArguments(
Node fnTemplateRoot, LinkedHashMap<String, Node> argMap,
Set<String> namesToAlias) {
if (namesToAlias == null || namesToAlias.isEmpty()) {
// There are no names to alias, just inline the arguments directly.
Node... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
public static List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() throws IOException {
InputStream input = CommandLineRunner.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
Map<String, JSSourceFile> externsMap = Maps.newH... | #fixed code
public static List<JSSourceFile> getDefaultExterns() throws IOException {
InputStream input = CommandLineRunner.class.getResourceAsStream(
"/externs.zip");
ZipInputStream zip = new ZipInputStream(input);
Map<String, JSSourceFile> externsMap = Maps.newHashMap... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
int processResults(Result result, List<JSModule> modules, B options)
throws FlagUsageException, IOException {
if (config.computePhaseOrdering) {
return 0;
}
if (config.printPassGraph) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
... | #fixed code
AbstractCommandLineRunner() {
this(System.out, System.err);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
Node tryFoldFor(Node n) {
Preconditions.checkArgument(n.getType() == Token.FOR);
// This is not a FOR-IN loop
if (n.getChildCount() != 4) {
return n;
}
// There isn't an initializer
if (n.getFirstChild().getType() != Token.EMPTY) {
retu... | #fixed code
Node tryOptimizeBlock(Node n) {
// Remove any useless children
for (Node c = n.getFirstChild(); c != null; ) {
Node next = c.getNext(); // save c.next, since 'c' may be removed
if (!mayHaveSideEffects(c)) {
// TODO(johnlenz): determine what this is ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
String outputManifest = config.outputManifest;
if (Strings.isEmpty(outputManifest)) {
return;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule()) {
//... | #fixed code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
List<String> outputManifests = config.outputManifests;
if (outputManifests.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
for (String outputManifest : outputManifests) {
if (outputManifest.isEmpty()) {
continue;
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new n... | #fixed code
private Node inlineReturnValue(Node callNode, Node fnNode) {
Node block = fnNode.getLastChild();
Node callParentNode = callNode.getParent();
// NOTE: As the normalize pass guarantees globals aren't being
// shadowed and an expression can't introduce new names, ... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
@Override
public void process(Node externs, Node root) {
Map<String, TweakInfo> tweakInfos = collectTweaks(root);
applyCompilerDefaultValueOverrides(tweakInfos);
boolean changed = false;
if (stripTweaks) {
changed = stripAllCalls(tweakInfos);
... | #fixed code
@Override
public void process(Node externs, Node root) {
CollectTweaksResult result = collectTweaks(root);
applyCompilerDefaultValueOverrides(result.tweakInfos);
boolean changed = false;
if (stripTweaks) {
changed = stripAllCalls(result.tweakInfos);
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private Node fuseIntoOneStatement(Node parent, Node first, Node last) {
// Nothing to fuse if there is only one statement.
if (first == last) {
return first;
}
// Step one: Create a comma tree that contains all the statements.
Node commaTree = f... | #fixed code
private Node fuseIntoOneStatement(Node parent, Node first, Node last) {
// Nothing to fuse if there is only one statement.
if (first.getNext() == last) {
return first;
}
// Step one: Create a comma tree that contains all the statements.
Node commaTree... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
FunctionTypeBuilder inferReturnType(@Nullable JSDocInfo info) {
if (info != null && info.hasReturnType()) {
returnType = info.getReturnType().evaluate(scope, typeRegistry);
returnTypeInferred = false;
}
return this;
}
... | #fixed code
FunctionTypeBuilder(String fnName, AbstractCompiler compiler,
Node errorRoot, String sourceName, Scope scope) {
Preconditions.checkNotNull(errorRoot);
this.fnName = fnName == null ? "" : fnName;
this.codingConvention = compiler.getCodingConvention();
this... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void analyzeFunctionBwd(
List<DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>> workset) {
for (DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> dn : workset) {
Node n = dn.getValue();
TypeEnv outEnv = getOutEnv(n);
TypeEnv inEnv;
System.out.... | #fixed code
private void analyzeFunctionBwd(
List<DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch>> workset) {
for (DiGraphNode<Node, ControlFlowGraph.Branch> dn : workset) {
Node n = dn.getValue();
if (n.isThrow()) { // Throw statements have no out edges.
// TODO(b... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
int processResults(Result result, List<JSModule> modules, B options)
throws FlagUsageException, IOException {
if (config.computePhaseOrdering) {
return 0;
}
if (config.printPassGraph) {
if (compiler.getRoot() == null) {
return 1;
... | #fixed code
AbstractCommandLineRunner() {
this(System.out, System.err);
} | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void ensureTyped(NodeTraversal t, Node n, JSType type) {
// Make sure FUNCTION nodes always get function type.
Preconditions.checkState(!n.isFunction() ||
type.isFunctionType() ||
type.isUnknownType());
JSDocInfo info = n.getJSD... | #fixed code
private void ensureTyped(NodeTraversal t, Node n, JSType type) {
// Make sure FUNCTION nodes always get function type.
Preconditions.checkState(!n.isFunction() ||
type.isFunctionType() ||
type.isUnknownType());
// TODO(johnlenz): this seems l... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
#vulnerable code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
String outputManifest = config.outputManifest;
if (Strings.isEmpty(outputManifest)) {
return;
}
JSModuleGraph graph = compiler.getModuleGraph();
if (shouldGenerateManifestPerModule()) {
//... | #fixed code
private void outputManifest() throws IOException {
List<String> outputManifests = config.outputManifests;
if (outputManifests.isEmpty()) {
return;
}
for (String outputManifest : outputManifests) {
if (outputManifest.isEmpty()) {
continue;
... | Below is the vulnerable code, please generate the patch based on the following information. |
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