Daily Papers

Progress in genomic foundation models is difficult to assess due to fragmented benchmarks, incompatible evaluation protocols, and task-specific reporting. As a result, claims of superiority or generality across models are often not directly comparable. We introduce GENEB, a large-scale diagnostic benchmark that evaluates frozen representations from 40 genomic foundation models across 100 tasks spanning 13 functional categories under a unified probing-based protocol, including few-shot regimes. GENEB enables controlled comparison across model scale, architecture, tokenization, and pretraining data while explicitly exposing task-level trade-offs. Our analysis shows that aggregate leaderboards are unstable: model rankings vary sharply across task categories, scale provides only modest and inconsistent gains, and architectural and pretraining alignment frequently outweigh parameter count. These results highlight limitations of current evaluation practices and position GENEB as a reference framework for principled comparison and category-aware model selection in genomic machine learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can comply with harmful instructions, raising serious safety concerns despite their impressive capabilities. Recent work has leveraged probing-based approaches to study the separability of malicious and benign inputs in LLMs' internal representations, and researchers have proposed using such probing methods for safety detection. We systematically re-examine this paradigm. Motivated by poor out-of-distribution performance, we hypothesize that probes learn superficial patterns rather than semantic harmfulness. Through controlled experiments, we confirm this hypothesis and identify the specific patterns learned: instructional patterns and trigger words. Our investigation follows a systematic approach, progressing from demonstrating comparable performance of simple n-gram methods, to controlled experiments with semantically cleaned datasets, to detailed analysis of pattern dependencies. These results reveal a false sense of security around current probing-based approaches and highlight the need to redesign both models and evaluation protocols, for which we provide further discussions in the hope of suggesting responsible further research in this direction. We have open-sourced the project at https://github.com/WangCheng0116/Why-Probe-Fails.

Recent advances in video generation have enabled the synthesis of videos with strong temporal consistency and impressive visual quality, marking a crucial step toward vision foundation models. To evaluate these video generation models, existing benchmarks primarily focus on factors related to visual perception and understanding, like visual aesthetics, instruction adherence, and temporal coherence. However, the rule-based reasoning capabilities of video generation models remain largely unexplored. Although recent studies have carried out preliminary explorations into whether video models can serve as zero-shot learners, they still lack a fine-grained decomposition of reasoning capabilities and a comprehensive evaluation protocol. To address this gap, we introduce RULER-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning ability of video generation models from the perspective of cognitive rules. Built upon two fundamental paradigms: text-to-video and image-to-video, RULER-Bench covers 40 representative tasks spanning six rule categories with 622 high-quality annotated instances. For the evaluation of each generated video, we construct a checklist covering four metrics and leverage GPT-o3 to assign scores to each question, achieving 85% alignment with human judgements. Extensive experiments show that the state-of-the-art model achieves only 48.87% on the rule coherence metric, highlighting significant room for improvement in the reasoning capability of next-level video models. We expect that the insight obtained from RULER-Bench will facilitate further development of reasoning-aware video generation, advancing video generation models toward vision foundation intelligence.

Large vision language models (LVLMs) often suffer from object hallucination, producing objects not present in the given images. While current benchmarks for object hallucination primarily concentrate on the presence of a single object class rather than individual entities, this work systematically investigates multi-object hallucination, examining how models misperceive (e.g., invent nonexistent objects or become distracted) when tasked with focusing on multiple objects simultaneously. We introduce Recognition-based Object Probing Evaluation (ROPE), an automated evaluation protocol that considers the distribution of object classes within a single image during testing and uses visual referring prompts to eliminate ambiguity. With comprehensive empirical studies and analysis of potential factors leading to multi-object hallucination, we found that (1) LVLMs suffer more hallucinations when focusing on multiple objects compared to a single object. (2) The tested object class distribution affects hallucination behaviors, indicating that LVLMs may follow shortcuts and spurious correlations.(3) Hallucinatory behaviors are influenced by data-specific factors, salience and frequency, and model intrinsic behaviors. We hope to enable LVLMs to recognize and reason about multiple objects that often occur in realistic visual scenes, provide insights, and quantify our progress towards mitigating the issues.

Diagnosing 802.11 packet captures requires expert protocol knowledge, is slow, inconsistent across engineers, and unscalable. LLM-based approaches sound plausible but fabricate protocol events absent from captures (especially truncated traces), produce uncalibrated confidence scores, and suffer evaluation bias when golden references are co-produced by the model under test. We introduce PROBE (Protocol Reasoning Over evidence-Based Ensembles), a multi-stage pipeline addressing all three failures. It integrates (i) deterministic PCAP-to-text normalization with frame-level verifiability, (ii) multi-run, multi-candidate ensembles with optional cross-model second opinion and progressive obfuscation, (iii) a verdict-aware evidence framework treating absence of failure evidence as contributing evidence, and (iv) a fully deterministic composite reliability score from evidence validity, run-to-run stability, and cross-model agreement without LLM self-assessment. On 87 enterprise Wi-Fi captures (104 capture-reviewer pairs), single-pass LLM analysis raises weighted evidence F1 from 0.871 (expert baseline) to 0.912 but misses critical frames in 35% of cases. Naive ensemble voting drops below baseline (0.842) as majority voting amplifies conservative verdicts: 50% of confirmed failures are misclassified as 'no issue' or 'insufficient evidence.' Adding evidence-grounded reconciliation achieves 0.957 F1, a 96% auto-accept rate, and a worst-case floor above 0.70. LLM self-reported confidence clusters at 0.95 regardless of difficulty (71% report exactly 0.95), confirming it is uninformative. We also introduce a model-agnostic evaluation framework using per-field assertion matching, eliminating circular bias from model-co-produced golden references.

As fine-tuning (FT) becomes increasingly impractical at scale, probing is emerging as the preferred evaluation protocol for self-supervised learning (SSL). Yet, the standard linear probing (LP) fails to adequately reflect the potential of models trained with Masked Image Modeling (MIM), due to the distributed nature of patch tokens. This motivates the need for attentive probing, an alternative that uses attention to selectively aggregate patch-level features. Despite its growing adoption, attentive probing remains under-explored, with existing methods suffering from excessive parameterization and poor computational efficiency. In this work, we revisit attentive probing through the lens of the accuracy-efficiency trade-off. We conduct a systematic study of existing methods, analyzing their mechanisms and benchmarking their performance. We introduce efficient probing (EP), a multi-query cross-attention mechanism that eliminates redundant projections, reduces the number of trainable parameters, and achieves up to a 10times speed-up over conventional multi-head attention. Despite its simplicity, EP outperforms LP and prior attentive probing approaches across seven benchmarks, generalizes well beyond MIM to diverse pre-training paradigms, produces interpretable attention maps, and achieves strong gains in low-shot and layer-wise settings. Code available at https://github.com/billpsomas/efficient-probing.

Frontier language model capabilities are improving rapidly. We thus need stronger mitigations against bad actors misusing increasingly powerful systems. Prior work has shown that activation probes may be a promising misuse mitigation technique, but we identify a key remaining challenge: probes fail to generalize under important production distribution shifts. In particular, we find that the shift from short-context to long-context inputs is difficult for existing probe architectures. We propose several new probe architecture that handle this long-context distribution shift. We evaluate these probes in the cyber-offensive domain, testing their robustness against various production-relevant shifts, including multi-turn conversations, static jailbreaks, and adaptive red teaming. Our results demonstrate that while multimax addresses context length, a combination of architecture choice and training on diverse distributions is required for broad generalization. Additionally, we show that pairing probes with prompted classifiers achieves optimal accuracy at a low cost due to the computational efficiency of probes. These findings have informed the successful deployment of misuse mitigation probes in user-facing instances of Gemini, Google's frontier language model. Finally, we find early positive results using AlphaEvolve to automate improvements in both probe architecture search and adaptive red teaming, showing that automating some AI safety research is already possible.

Probing is widely adopted in computer vision to faithfully evaluate self-supervised learning (SSL) embeddings, as finetuning may misrepresent their inherent quality. In contrast, audio SSL models still rely on finetuning because simple probing fails to unlock their full potential and alters their rankings when competing on AudioSet. Hence, a robust and efficient probing mechanism is required to guide the trajectory of audio SSL towards reliable and reproducible methods. We introduce Convex Gated Probing (CGP), a prototype-based method that significantly closes the gap between finetuning and probing in audio. CGP efficiently utilizes all frozen layers via a gating mechanism and exposes the location of latent task-relevant information. Guided by CGP as a reliable post-hoc evaluation probe, we rework the entire SSL pipeline of current best performing audio models that use legacy implementations of prior SSL methods. By refining data preprocessing, model architecture, and pretraining recipe, we introduce Better Audio Transformer (BAT), and establish new SOTA on audio benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved success, but cost and privacy constraints necessitate deploying smaller models locally while offloading complex queries to cloud-based models. Existing router evaluations are unsystematic, overlooking scenario-specific requirements and out-of-distribution robustness. We propose RouterXBench, a principled evaluation framework with three dimensions: router ability, scenario alignment, and cross-domain robustness. Unlike prior work that relies on output probabilities or external embeddings, we utilize internal hidden states that capture model uncertainty before answer generation. We introduce ProbeDirichlet, a lightweight router that aggregates cross-layer hidden states via learnable Dirichlet distributions with probabilistic training. Trained on multi-domain data, it generalizes robustly across in-domain and out-of-distribution scenarios. Our results show ProbeDirichlet achieves 16.68% and 18.86% relative improvements over the best baselines in router ability and high-accuracy scenarios, with consistent performance across model families, model scales, heterogeneous tasks, and agentic workflows.

Monitoring is an important aspect of safely deploying Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper examines activation probes for detecting ``high-stakes'' interactions -- where the text indicates that the interaction might lead to significant harm -- as a critical, yet underexplored, target for such monitoring. We evaluate several probe architectures trained on synthetic data, and find them to exhibit robust generalization to diverse, out-of-distribution, real-world data. Probes' performance is comparable to that of prompted or finetuned medium-sized LLM monitors, while offering computational savings of six orders-of-magnitude. These savings are enabled by reusing activations of the model that is being monitored. Our experiments also highlight the potential of building resource-aware hierarchical monitoring systems, where probes serve as an efficient initial filter and flag cases for more expensive downstream analysis. We release our novel synthetic dataset and the codebase at https://github.com/arrrlex/models-under-pressure.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

Agent communication protocols are becoming critical infrastructure for large language model (LLM) systems that must use tools, coordinate with other agents, and operate across heterogeneous environments. This work presents a human-inspired perspective on this emerging landscape by organizing agent communication into three layers: communication, syntactic, and semantic. Under this framework, we systematically analyze 18 representative protocols and compare how they support reliable transport, structured interaction, and meaning-level coordination. Our analysis shows a clear imbalance in current protocol design. Most protocols provide increasingly mature support for transport, streaming, schema definition, and lifecycle management, but offer limited protocol-level mechanisms for clarification, context alignment, and verification. As a result, semantic responsibilities are often pushed into prompts, wrappers, or application-specific orchestration logic, creating hidden interoperability and maintenance costs. To make this gap actionable, we further identify major forms of technical debt in today's protocol ecosystem and distill practical guidance for selecting protocols under different deployment settings. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for interoperable, secure, and semantically robust agent ecosystems that move beyond message passing toward shared understanding.

In this article, we use probing to investigate phenomena that occur during fine-tuning and knowledge distillation of a BERT-based natural language understanding (NLU) model. Our ultimate purpose was to use probing to better understand practical production problems and consequently to build better NLU models. We designed experiments to see how fine-tuning changes the linguistic capabilities of BERT, what the optimal size of the fine-tuning dataset is, and what amount of information is contained in a distilled NLU based on a tiny Transformer. The results of the experiments show that the probing paradigm in its current form is not well suited to answer such questions. Structural, Edge and Conditional probes do not take into account how easy it is to decode probed information. Consequently, we conclude that quantification of information decodability is critical for many practical applications of the probing paradigm.

Despite the emergence of diffusion large language models (D-LLMs) as an alternative to autoregressive large language models (AR-LLMs), safety monitoring for D-LLMs remains largely unexplored. Unlike AR-LLMs, D-LLMs generate text through a multi-step denoising process, exposing intermediate hidden representations that may contain safety-relevant information unavailable in standard single-step monitoring setups. Motivated by the suitability of lightweight probes for always-on monitoring, we analyze which trajectory-level signals best indicate when such probes are likely to struggle. We find that the most informative signal is safety hesitation: intermediate hidden states repeatedly falling within a small margin of the probe's decision boundary. The number of such hesitation steps in D-LLM's trajectory predicts probe failure effectively, providing a proxy of sample difficulty. Building on this analysis, we propose D^2-Monitor, a bi-level safety monitor for D-LLMs. D^2-Monitor adopts a lightweight probe as an always-on monitor to jointly estimate hesitation and perform base classification. When the hesitation level exceeds a threshold, a more expressive but computationally heavier probe is activated. This dynamic routing mechanism allocates monitoring resources efficiently at test time. Evaluated on 3 datasets (WildguardMix, ToxicChat, OpenAI-Moderation) across 4 D-LLMs, D^2-Monitor achieves state-of-the-art performance with a compact parameter footprint (leq 0.85M parameters), and exhibits the best trade-off between effectiveness and efficiency relative to 8 baselines.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

Parallel thinking has emerged as a promising paradigm for reasoning, yet it imposes significant computational burdens. Existing efficiency methods primarily rely on local, per-trajectory signals and lack principled mechanisms to exploit global dynamics across parallel branches. We introduce 2D probing, an interface that exposes the width-depth dynamics of parallel thinking by periodically eliciting intermediate answers from all branches. Our analysis reveals three key insights: non-monotonic scaling across width-depth allocations, heterogeneous reasoning branch lengths, and early stabilization of global consensus. Guided by these insights, we introduce Parallel-Probe, a training-free controller designed to optimize online parallel thinking. Parallel-Probe employs consensus-based early stopping to regulate reasoning depth and deviation-based branch pruning to dynamically adjust width. Extensive experiments across three benchmarks and multiple models demonstrate that Parallel-Probe establishes a superior Pareto frontier for test-time scaling. Compared to standard majority voting, it reduces sequential tokens by up to 35.8% and total token cost by over 25.8% while maintaining competitive accuracy.

This position paper argues that the field of LLM agents requires a unified, telecom-inspired communication protocol to ensure safety, interoperability, and scalability, especially within the context of Next Generation (NextG) networks. Current ad-hoc communication methods are creating a fragmented ecosystem, reminiscent of the early "protocol wars" in networking, which stifles innovation and poses significant risks. Drawing inspiration from the layered, standardized protocols that underpin modern telecommunications, we propose the LLM-Agent Communication Protocol (LACP). LACP establishes a three-layer architecture designed to ensure semantic clarity in communication, transactional integrity for complex tasks, and robust, built-in security. In this position paper, we argue that adopting a principled, universal protocol is not merely beneficial but essential for realizing the potential of distributed AI. Such a standard is critical for ensuring that multi-agent systems can operate safely and reliably in the complex, real-time applications envisioned for 6G and beyond.

Knowledge probing assesses to which degree a language model (LM) has successfully learned relational knowledge during pre-training. Probing is an inexpensive way to compare LMs of different sizes and training configurations. However, previous approaches rely on the objective function used in pre-training LMs and are thus applicable only to masked or causal LMs. As a result, comparing different types of LMs becomes impossible. To address this, we propose an approach that uses an LM's inherent ability to estimate the log-likelihood of any given textual statement. We carefully design an evaluation dataset of 7,731 instances (40,916 in a larger variant) from which we produce alternative statements for each relational fact, one of which is correct. We then evaluate whether an LM correctly assigns the highest log-likelihood to the correct statement. Our experimental evaluation of 22 common LMs shows that our proposed framework, BEAR, can effectively probe for knowledge across different LM types. We release the BEAR datasets and an open-source framework that implements the probing approach to the research community to facilitate the evaluation and development of LMs.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

An important function of collaborative network intrusion detection is to analyze the network logs of the collaborators for joint IP addresses. However, sharing IP addresses in plain is sensitive and may be even subject to privacy legislation as it is personally identifiable information. In this paper, we present the privacy-preserving collection of IP addresses. We propose a single collector, over-threshold private set intersection protocol. In this protocol N participants identify the IP addresses that appear in at least t participant's sets without revealing any information about other IP addresses. Using a novel hashing scheme, we reduce the computational complexity of the previous state-of-the-art solution from O(M(N M/t)^{2t}) to O(t^2MN{t}), where M denotes the dataset size. This reduction makes it practically feasible to apply our protocol to real network logs. We test our protocol using joint networks logs of multiple institutions. Additionally, we present two deployment options: a collusion-safe deployment, which provides stronger security guarantees at the cost of increased communication overhead, and a non-interactive deployment, which assumes a non-colluding collector but offers significantly lower communication costs and applicable to many use cases of collaborative network intrusion detection similar to ours.

Despite their strong performance on reasoning tasks, large reasoning models (LRMs) often suffer from overthinking, producing unnecessarily long outputs and incurring high end-to-end latency, a significant limitation to their real-world deployment. To address overthinking, early-exit mechanisms have been proposed to terminate reasoning before typical completion, showing that this approach can effectively shorten generation length with minimal impact on accuracy. However, their reliance on probing mechanisms introduces a detection overhead that limits their end-to-end latency gains and compromises their generalizability across diverse problems. Inspired by the use of hidden states in speculative decoding, we propose SpecExit, a novel framework that predicts both future tokens and an early-exit signal directly from a lightweight draft model without probing overhead. Our method offers significant improvements, reducing average generation length by 66\% and achieving a 2.5x speedup in end-to-end latency compared to the speculative decoding baseline, without compromising accuracy. Our method leverages the inherent signals from hidden states to provide effective early-exit signals, suggesting broader use of hidden states for efficient reasoning. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AngelSlim.

With the increasing numbers of publicly available models, there are probably pretrained, online models for most tasks users require. However, current model search methods are rudimentary, essentially a text-based search in the documentation, thus users cannot find the relevant models. This paper presents ProbeLog, a method for retrieving classification models that can recognize a target concept, such as "Dog", without access to model metadata or training data. Differently from previous probing methods, ProbeLog computes a descriptor for each output dimension (logit) of each model, by observing its responses on a fixed set of inputs (probes). Our method supports both logit-based retrieval ("find more logits like this") and zero-shot, text-based retrieval ("find all logits corresponding to dogs"). As probing-based representations require multiple costly feedforward passes through the model, we develop a method, based on collaborative filtering, that reduces the cost of encoding repositories by 3x. We demonstrate that ProbeLog achieves high retrieval accuracy, both in real-world and fine-grained search tasks and is scalable to full-size repositories.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Pingmark defines a universal textual protocol for expressing spatial context through a minimal symbol: !@. Rather than embedding coordinates or using proprietary map links, Pingmark introduces a semantic trigger that compliant client applications interpret to generate a standardized resolver link of the form https://pingmark.me/lat/lon/[timestamp]. This allows location expression to function like existing textual conventions - @ for identity or # for topics - but for physical space. The protocol requires no user registration, relies on open mapping technologies, and protects privacy by generating location data ephemerally and locally. This paper presents the motivation, syntax, and design of the Pingmark Protocol Specification (PPS v0.1), its reference resolver implementation, and the long-term goal of establishing Pingmark as an open Internet standard for spatial mentions.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

Computing distances and finding shortest paths in massive real-world networks is a fundamental algorithmic task in network analysis. There are two main approaches to solving this task. On one hand are traversal-based algorithms like bidirectional breadth-first search (BiBFS) with no preprocessing step and slow individual distance inquiries. On the other hand are indexing-based approaches, which maintain a large index. This allows for answering individual inquiries very fast; however, index creation is prohibitively expensive. We seek to bridge these two extremes: quickly answer distance inquiries without the need for costly preprocessing. In this work, we propose a new algorithm and data structure, WormHole, for approximate shortest path computations. WormHole leverages structural properties of social networks to build a sublinearly sized index, drawing upon the explicit core-periphery decomposition of Ben-Eliezer et al. Empirically, the preprocessing time of WormHole improves upon index-based solutions by orders of magnitude, and individual inquiries are consistently much faster than in BiBFS. The acceleration comes at the cost of a minor accuracy trade-off. Nonetheless, our empirical evidence demonstrates that WormHole accurately answers essentially all inquiries within a maximum additive error of 2. We complement these empirical results with provable theoretical guarantees, showing that WormHole requires n^{o(1)} node queries per distance inquiry in random power-law networks. In contrast, any approach without a preprocessing step requires n^{Ω(1)} queries for the same task. WormHole does not require reading the whole graph. Unlike the vast majority of index-based algorithms, it returns paths, not just distances. For faster inquiry times, it can be combined effectively with other index-based solutions, by running them only on the sublinear core.

The privacy concerns of providing deep learning inference as a service have underscored the need for private inference (PI) protocols that protect users' data and the service provider's model using cryptographic methods. Recently proposed PI protocols have achieved significant reductions in PI latency by moving the computationally heavy homomorphic encryption (HE) parts to an offline/pre-compute phase. Paired with recent optimizations that tailor networks for PI, these protocols have achieved performance levels that are tantalizingly close to being practical. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous end-to-end characterization of PI protocols and optimization techniques and find that the current understanding of PI performance is overly optimistic. Specifically, we find that offline storage costs of garbled circuits (GC), a key cryptographic protocol used in PI, on user/client devices are prohibitively high and force much of the expensive offline HE computation to the online phase, resulting in a 10-1000times increase to PI latency. We propose a modified PI protocol that significantly reduces client-side storage costs for a small increase in online latency. Evaluated end-to-end, the modified protocol outperforms current protocols by reducing the mean PI latency by 4times for ResNet18 on TinyImageNet. We conclude with a discussion of several recently proposed PI optimizations in light of the findings and note many actually increase PI latency when evaluated from an end-to-end perspective.

The number of publicly available models is rapidly increasing, yet most remain undocumented. Users looking for suitable models for their tasks must first determine what each model does. Training machine learning models to infer missing documentation directly from model weights is challenging, as these weights often contain significant variation unrelated to model functionality (denoted nuisance). Here, we identify a key property of real-world models: most public models belong to a small set of Model Trees, where all models within a tree are fine-tuned from a common ancestor (e.g., a foundation model). Importantly, we find that within each tree there is less nuisance variation between models. Concretely, while learning across Model Trees requires complex architectures, even a linear classifier trained on a single model layer often works within trees. While effective, these linear classifiers are computationally expensive, especially when dealing with larger models that have many parameters. To address this, we introduce Probing Experts (ProbeX), a theoretically motivated and lightweight method. Notably, ProbeX is the first probing method specifically designed to learn from the weights of a single hidden model layer. We demonstrate the effectiveness of ProbeX by predicting the categories in a model's training dataset based only on its weights. Excitingly, ProbeX can map the weights of Stable Diffusion into a weight-language embedding space, enabling model search via text, i.e., zero-shot model classification.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

Previous work has showcased the intriguing capability of large language models (LLMs) in retrieving facts and processing context knowledge. However, only limited research exists on the layer-wise capability of LLMs to encode knowledge, which challenges our understanding of their internal mechanisms. In this paper, we devote the first attempt to investigate the layer-wise capability of LLMs through probing tasks. We leverage the powerful generative capability of ChatGPT to construct probing datasets, providing diverse and coherent evidence corresponding to various facts. We employ mathcal V-usable information as the validation metric to better reflect the capability in encoding context knowledge across different layers. Our experiments on conflicting and newly acquired knowledge show that LLMs: (1) prefer to encode more context knowledge in the upper layers; (2) primarily encode context knowledge within knowledge-related entity tokens at lower layers while progressively expanding more knowledge within other tokens at upper layers; and (3) gradually forget the earlier context knowledge retained within the intermediate layers when provided with irrelevant evidence. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/Jometeorie/probing_llama.

Prior work uses linear probes on benchmark prompts as evidence of evaluation awareness in large language models. Because evaluation context is typically entangled with benchmark format and genre, it is unclear whether probe-based signals reflect context or surface structure. We test whether these signals persist under partial control of prompt format using a controlled 2x2 dataset and diagnostic rewrites. We find that probes primarily track benchmark-canonical structure and fail to generalize to free-form prompts independent of linguistic style. Thus, standard probe-based methodologies do not reliably disentangle evaluation context from structural artifacts, limiting the evidential strength of existing results.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has led to the widespread deployment of LLM agents across diverse industries, including customer service, content generation, data analysis, and even healthcare. However, as more LLM agents are deployed, a major issue has emerged: there is no standard way for these agents to communicate with external tools or data sources. This lack of standardized protocols makes it difficult for agents to work together or scale effectively, and it limits their ability to tackle complex, real-world tasks. A unified communication protocol for LLM agents could change this. It would allow agents and tools to interact more smoothly, encourage collaboration, and triggering the formation of collective intelligence. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of existing agent protocols, proposing a systematic two-dimensional classification that differentiates context-oriented versus inter-agent protocols and general-purpose versus domain-specific protocols. Additionally, we conduct a comparative performance analysis of these protocols across key dimensions such as security, scalability, and latency. Finally, we explore the future landscape of agent protocols by identifying critical research directions and characteristics necessary for next-generation protocols. These characteristics include adaptability, privacy preservation, and group-based interaction, as well as trends toward layered architectures and collective intelligence infrastructures. We expect this work to serve as a practical reference for both researchers and engineers seeking to design, evaluate, or integrate robust communication infrastructures for intelligent agents.

GossipSub is a new peer-to-peer communication protocol designed to counter attacks from misbehaving peers by controlling what information is sent and to whom, via a score function computed by each peer that captures positive and negative behaviors of its neighbors. The score function depends on several parameters (weights, caps, thresholds) that can be configured by applications using GossipSub. The specification for GossipSub is written in English and its resilience to attacks from misbehaving peers is supported empirically by emulation testing using an implementation in Golang. In this work we take a foundational approach to understanding the resilience of GossipSub to attacks from misbehaving peers. We build the first formal model of GossipSub, using the ACL2s theorem prover. Our model is officially endorsed by the GossipSub developers. It can simulate GossipSub networks of arbitrary size and topology, with arbitrarily configured peers, and can be used to prove and disprove theorems about the protocol. We formalize fundamental security properties stating that the score function is fair, penalizes bad behavior, and rewards good behavior. We prove that the score function is always fair, but can be configured in ways that either penalize good behavior or ignore bad behavior. Using our model, we run GossipSub with the specific configurations for two popular real-world applications: the FileCoin and Eth2.0 blockchains. We show that all properties hold for FileCoin. However, given any Eth2.0 network (of any topology and size) with any number of potentially misbehaving peers, we can synthesize attacks where these peers are able to continuously misbehave by never forwarding topic messages, while maintaining positive scores so that they are never pruned from the network by GossipSub.

Recent attacks show that behavioural unlearning of large language models leaves internal traces recoverable by adversarial probes. We characterise where this retention lives and show it can be surgically removed without measurable capability cost. Our central protocol is a leave-one-out cross-sequence probe that tests whether a memorisation signature generalises across held-out sequences. The signature is real and consistent across scale: memorisation-specific gaps of +0.32, +0.19, +0.30 on Pythia-70M, GPT-2 medium, and Mistral-7B; on Pythia-70M, the random-initialisation control collapses to -0.04 at the deepest layer where the pretrained signature peaks. The probe direction is causally separable from recall -- projecting it out collapses the signature locally (+0.44 -> -0.19) while behavioural recall barely changes -- and a probe trained on naturally memorised content does not classify fine-tuning-injected secrets, marking two representationally distinct regimes. We then introduce probe-geometry alignment (PGA), a surgical erasure that aligns activations along the probe's live readout direction at each depth. PGA drives the cross-sequence probe below random chance at all four scales tested (toy depth-4: 0.17; Pythia-70M: 0.07; Mistral-7B: 0.45; GPT-2 medium: 0.06 via MD-PGA k=2) and remains robust to six adversarial probe variants. Against a re-fitting attacker who trains a fresh probe on PGA-treated activations, we extend PGA adversarially, defeating the re-fit probe at every memorisation-relevant depth while preserving five zero-shot capability benchmarks within 2.8 percentage points per task (mean Δacc = +0.2pp). The cross-sequence signature is a real, causally separable, regime-specific property of pretrained representations -- removable below chance with a single rank-one intervention per depth at no measurable capability cost.

Knowledge probing evaluates the extent to which a language model (LM) has acquired relational knowledge during its pre-training phase. It provides a cost-effective means of comparing LMs of different sizes and training setups and is useful for monitoring knowledge gained or lost during continual learning (CL). In prior work, we presented an improved knowledge probe called BEAR (Wiland et al., 2024), which enables the comparison of LMs trained with different pre-training objectives (causal and masked LMs) and addresses issues of skewed distributions in previous probes to deliver a more unbiased reading of LM knowledge. With this paper, we present LM-PUB- QUIZ, a Python framework and leaderboard built around the BEAR probing mechanism that enables researchers and practitioners to apply it in their work. It provides options for standalone evaluation and direct integration into the widely-used training pipeline of the Hugging Face TRANSFORMERS library. Further, it provides a fine-grained analysis of different knowledge types to assist users in better understanding the knowledge in each evaluated LM. We publicly release LM-PUB-QUIZ as an open-source project.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized interface enabling seamless integration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and external data sources and tools. While MCP significantly reduces development complexity and enhances agent capabilities, its openness and extensibility introduce critical security vulnerabilities that threaten system trustworthiness and user data protection. This paper systematically analyzes the security landscape of MCP-based systems, identifying three principal threat categories: (1) agent hijacking attacks stemming from protocol design deficiencies; (2) traditional web vulnerabilities in MCP servers; and (3) supply chain security. To address these challenges, we comprehensively survey existing defense strategies, examining both proactive server-side scanning approaches, ranging from layered detection pipelines and agentic auditing frameworks to zero-trust registry systems, and runtime interaction monitoring solutions that provide continuous oversight and policy enforcement. Our analysis reveals that MCP security fundamentally represents a paradigm shift where the attack surface extends from traditional code execution to semantic interpretation of natural language metadata, necessitating novel defense mechanisms tailored to this unique threat model.

The rapid expansion of interconnected devices, autonomous systems, and AI applications has created severe fragmentation in adaptive transport systems, where diverse protocols and context sources remain isolated. This survey provides the first systematic investigation of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as a unifying paradigm, highlighting its ability to bridge protocol-level adaptation with context-aware decision making. Analyzing established literature, we show that existing efforts have implicitly converged toward MCP-like architectures, signaling a natural evolution from fragmented solutions to standardized integration frameworks. We propose a five-category taxonomy covering adaptive mechanisms, context-aware frameworks, unification models, integration strategies, and MCP-enabled architectures. Our findings reveal three key insights: traditional transport protocols have reached the limits of isolated adaptation, MCP's client-server and JSON-RPC structure enables semantic interoperability, and AI-driven transport demands integration paradigms uniquely suited to MCP. Finally, we present a research roadmap positioning MCP as a foundation for next-generation adaptive, context-aware, and intelligent transport infrastructures.

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

Routing has emerged as a promising strategy for balancing performance and cost in large language model (LLM) systems that combine lightweight models with powerful but expensive large models. Recent studies show that probe routing, which predicts the correctness of a small model using its hidden states, provides an effective solution in text-only LLMs. However, we observe that these probes degrade substantially when applied to multimodal LLMs (MLLMs). Through empirical analysis, we find that the presence of visual inputs weakens the separability of correctness signals in hidden states, making them harder to extract using standard probe designs. To address this challenge, we introduce two complementary approaches for improving probe routing in MLLMs. First, we propose the Attention Probe, which aggregates hidden states from the preceding layer based on attention scores to recover distributed correctness signals. Second, we present the KL-Regularized LoRA Probe (ReLope), which inserts a lightweight LoRA adapter and applies a KL regularizer to learn routing-aware representations. Comprehensive experiments show that our methods consistently outperform baselines, suggesting that improving the quality of hidden states is key to effective routing in MLLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/Spinozaaa/ReLope.

Network protocols are programs with inputs and outputs that follow predefined communication patterns to synchronize and exchange information. There are many protocols and each serves a different purpose, e.g., routing, transport, secure communication, etc. The functional and performance requirements for a protocol can be expressed using a formal specification, such as, a set of logical predicates over its traces. A protocol could be prevented from achieving its requirements due to a bug in its design or implementation, a component failure (e.g., a crash), or an attack. This dissertation shows that formal methods can feasibly characterize the functionality and performance of network protocols under normal conditions as well as when subjected to attacks.

Automated attack discovery techniques, such as attacker synthesis or model-based fuzzing, provide powerful ways to ensure network protocols operate correctly and securely. Such techniques, in general, require a formal representation of the protocol, often in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). Unfortunately, many protocols are only described in English prose, and implementing even a simple network protocol as an FSM is time-consuming and prone to subtle logical errors. Automatically extracting protocol FSMs from documentation can significantly contribute to increased use of these techniques and result in more robust and secure protocol implementations. In this work we focus on attacker synthesis as a representative technique for protocol security, and on RFCs as a representative format for protocol prose description. Unlike other works that rely on rule-based approaches or use off-the-shelf NLP tools directly, we suggest a data-driven approach for extracting FSMs from RFC documents. Specifically, we use a hybrid approach consisting of three key steps: (1) large-scale word-representation learning for technical language, (2) focused zero-shot learning for mapping protocol text to a protocol-independent information language, and (3) rule-based mapping from protocol-independent information to a specific protocol FSM. We show the generalizability of our FSM extraction by using the RFCs for six different protocols: BGPv4, DCCP, LTP, PPTP, SCTP and TCP. We demonstrate how automated extraction of an FSM from an RFC can be applied to the synthesis of attacks, with TCP and DCCP as case-studies. Our approach shows that it is possible to automate attacker synthesis against protocols by using textual specifications such as RFCs.

The rapid evolution of autonomous, agentic artificial intelligence within financial services has introduced an existential architectural crisis: large language models (LLMs) are probabilistic, non-deterministic systems operating in domains that demand absolute, mathematically verifiable compliance guarantees. Existing guardrail solutions -- including NVIDIA NeMo Guardrails and Guardrails AI -- rely on probabilistic classifiers and syntactic validators that are fundamentally inadequate for enforcing complex multi-variable regulatory constraints mandated by the SEC, FINRA, and OCC. This paper presents the Lean-Agent Protocol, a formal-verification-based AI guardrail platform that leverages the Aristotle neural-symbolic model developed by Harmonic AI to auto-formalize institutional policies into Lean 4 code. Every proposed agentic action is treated as a mathematical conjecture: execution is permitted if and only if the Lean 4 kernel proves that the action satisfies pre-compiled regulatory axioms. This architecture provides cryptographic-level compliance certainty at microsecond latency, directly satisfying SEC Rule 15c3-5, OCC Bulletin 2011-12, FINRA Rule 3110, and CFPB explainability mandates. A three-phase implementation roadmap from shadow verification through enterprise-scale deployment is provided.

Foundation models succeed when they learn in the native structure of a modality, whether morphology-respecting tokens in language or pixels in vision. Wireless packet traces deserve the same treatment: meaning emerges from layered headers, typed fields, timing gaps, and cross-packet state machines, not flat strings. We present Plume (Protocol Language Understanding Model for Exchanges), a compact 140M-parameter foundation model for 802.11 traces that learns from structured PDML dissections. A protocol-aware tokenizer splits along the dissector field tree, emits gap tokens for timing, and normalizes identifiers, yielding 6.2x shorter sequences than BPE with higher per token information density. Trained on a curated corpus, Plume achieves 74-97% next-packet token accuracy across five real-world failure categories and AUROC >= 0.99 for zero-shot anomaly detection. On the same prediction task, frontier LLMs (Claude Opus 4.6, GPT-5.4) score comparably despite receiving identical protocol context, yet Plume does so with > 600x fewer parameters, fitting on a single GPU at effectively zero marginal cost vs. cloud API pricing, enabling on-prem, privacy-preserving root cause analysis.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

We show that LoRA adapters, the dominant distribution format for fine-tuned LLMs, can be reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy-preserving backdoor to saturation. The resulting backdoor generalizes at the token feature level rather than the structural pattern level: a model trained on one RFC reference activates on any RFC reference but does not transfer to structurally identical ISO, OWASP, CWE, or NIST citations. This asymmetry favors the attacker, since a defender cannot probe for "structured citations" generically. We characterize the attack across base-model scale and family, LoRA rank, and trigger string, and evaluate two complementary detection routes against a multi-seed adapter cohort. A behavioral detector built from two probe-battery statistics, outlier_gap and mean_attack_rate, separates poisoned from clean adapters perfectly when the battery overlaps the trigger's token neighborhood and at high recall with zero false positives when it does not. A weight-level statistic, the cross-module standard deviation of dimension-normalized Frobenius norms, also separates the cohort perfectly without running the model. Combined, the two routes are robust to probe composition. Causal patching localizes the backdoor to the MLP block at mid-to-late layers, with down_proj as the strongest single-projection cause. Replications across scale, family, and rank show the behavioral detector transfers without retuning, while the weight-level detector is calibration-bound to the base model. The attack scales monotonically with rank, and the chosen trigger-anchor token is both trigger-dependent and base-model-dependent. Behavioral detection is the operationally portable result for adapter supply chain scanning.

We revisit Wald's celebrated Sequential Probability Ratio Test for sequential tests of two simple hypotheses, under privacy constraints. We propose DP-SPRT, a wrapper that can be calibrated to achieve desired error probabilities and privacy constraints, addressing a significant gap in previous work. DP-SPRT relies on a private mechanism that processes a sequence of queries and stops after privately determining when the query results fall outside a predefined interval. This OutsideInterval mechanism improves upon naive composition of existing techniques like AboveThreshold, potentially benefiting other sequential algorithms. We prove generic upper bounds on the error and sample complexity of DP-SPRT that can accommodate various noise distributions based on the practitioner's privacy needs. We exemplify them in two settings: Laplace noise (pure Differential Privacy) and Gaussian noise (R\'enyi differential privacy). In the former setting, by providing a lower bound on the sample complexity of any epsilon-DP test with prescribed type I and type II errors, we show that DP-SPRT is near optimal when both errors are small and the two hypotheses are close. Moreover, we conduct an experimental study revealing its good practical performance.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has recently emerged as a standardized interface for connecting language models with external tools and data. As the ecosystem rapidly expands, the lack of a structured, comprehensive view of existing MCP artifacts presents challenges for research. To bridge this gap, we introduce MCPCorpus, a large-scale dataset containing around 14K MCP servers and 300 MCP clients. Each artifact is annotated with 20+ normalized attributes capturing its identity, interface configuration, GitHub activity, and metadata. MCPCorpus provides a reproducible snapshot of the real-world MCP ecosystem, enabling studies of adoption trends, ecosystem health, and implementation diversity. To keep pace with the rapid evolution of the MCP ecosystem, we provide utility tools for automated data synchronization, normalization, and inspection. Furthermore, to support efficient exploration and exploitation, we release a lightweight web-based search interface. MCPCorpus is publicly available at: https://github.com/Snakinya/MCPCorpus.

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

Programmable switches are driving a massive increase in fine-grained measurements. This puts significant pressure on telemetry collectors that have to process reports from many switches. Past research acknowledged this problem by either improving collectors' stack performance or by limiting the amount of data sent from switches. In this paper, we take a different and radical approach: switches are responsible for directly inserting queryable telemetry data into the collectors' memory, bypassing their CPU, and thereby improving their collection scalability. We propose to use a method we call direct telemetry access, where switches jointly write telemetry reports directly into the same collector's memory region, without coordination. Our solution, DART, is probabilistic, trading memory redundancy and query success probability for CPU resources at collectors. We prototype DART using commodity hardware such as P4 switches and RDMA NICs and show that we get high query success rates with a reasonable memory overhead. For example, we can collect INT path tracing information on a fat tree topology without a collector's CPU involvement while achieving 99.9\% query success probability and using just 300 bytes per flow.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

Our interest is in the design of software systems involving a human-expert interacting -- using natural language -- with a large language model (LLM) on data analysis tasks. For complex problems, it is possible that LLMs can harness human expertise and creativity to find solutions that were otherwise elusive. On one level, this interaction takes place through multiple turns of prompts from the human and responses from the LLM. Here we investigate a more structured approach based on an abstract protocol described in [3] for interaction between agents. The protocol is motivated by a notion of "two-way intelligibility" and is modelled by a pair of communicating finite-state machines. We provide an implementation of the protocol, and provide empirical evidence of using the implementation to mediate interactions between an LLM and a human-agent in two areas of scientific interest (radiology and drug design). We conduct controlled experiments with a human proxy (a database), and uncontrolled experiments with human subjects. The results provide evidence in support of the protocol's capability of capturing one- and two-way intelligibility in human-LLM interaction; and for the utility of two-way intelligibility in the design of human-machine systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/karannb/interact.

Large language model (LLM)-powered agents are increasingly used to plan and execute scientific workflows, yet most research cyberinfrastructure (CI) exposes heterogeneous APIs and implements security models that present barriers for use by agents. We report on our experience using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as a unifying interface that makes research capabilities discoverable, invokable, and composable. Our approach is pragmatic: we implement thin MCP servers over mature services, including Globus Transfer, Compute, and Search; status APIs exposed by computing facilities; Octopus event fabric; and domain-specific tools such as Garden and Galaxy. We use case studies in computational chemistry, bioinformatics, quantum chemistry, and filesystem monitoring to illustrate how this MCP-oriented architecture can be used in practice. We distill lessons learned and outline open challenges in evaluation and trust for agent-led science.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

Most of the recent works on probing representations have focused on BERT, with the presumption that the findings might be similar to the other models. In this work, we extend the probing studies to two other models in the family, namely ELECTRA and XLNet, showing that variations in the pre-training objectives or architectural choices can result in different behaviors in encoding linguistic information in the representations. Most notably, we observe that ELECTRA tends to encode linguistic knowledge in the deeper layers, whereas XLNet instead concentrates that in the earlier layers. Also, the former model undergoes a slight change during fine-tuning, whereas the latter experiences significant adjustments. Moreover, we show that drawing conclusions based on the weight mixing evaluation strategy -- which is widely used in the context of layer-wise probing -- can be misleading given the norm disparity of the representations across different layers. Instead, we adopt an alternative information-theoretic probing with minimum description length, which has recently been proven to provide more reliable and informative results.

Security of model parameters and user data is critical for Transformer-based services, such as ChatGPT. While recent strides in secure two-party protocols have successfully addressed security concerns in serving Transformer models, their adoption is practically infeasible due to the prohibitive cryptographic overheads involved. Drawing insights from our hands-on experience in developing two real-world Transformer-based services, we identify the inherent efficiency bottleneck in the two-party assumption. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel three-party threat model. Within this framework, we design a semi-symmetric permutation-based protection scheme and present STIP, the first secure Transformer inference protocol without any inference accuracy loss. Experiments on representative Transformer models in real systems show that STIP has practical security and outperforms state-of-the-art secure two-party protocols in efficiency by millions of times.

Traditional protocol fuzzing techniques, such as those employed by AFL-based systems, often lack effectiveness due to a limited semantic understanding of complex protocol grammars and rigid seed mutation strategies. Recent works, such as ChatAFL, have integrated Large Language Models (LLMs) to guide protocol fuzzing and address these limitations, pushing protocol fuzzers to wider exploration of the protocol state space. But ChatAFL still faces issues like unreliable output, LLM hallucinations, and assumptions of LLM knowledge about protocol specifications. This paper introduces MultiFuzz, a novel dense retrieval-based multi-agent system designed to overcome these limitations by integrating semantic-aware context retrieval, specialized agents, and structured tool-assisted reasoning. MultiFuzz utilizes agentic chunks of protocol documentation (RFC Documents) to build embeddings in a vector database for a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipeline, enabling agents to generate more reliable and structured outputs, enhancing the fuzzer in mutating protocol messages with enhanced state coverage and adherence to syntactic constraints. The framework decomposes the fuzzing process into modular groups of agents that collaborate through chain-of-thought reasoning to dynamically adapt fuzzing strategies based on the retrieved contextual knowledge. Experimental evaluations on the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) demonstrate that MultiFuzz significantly improves branch coverage and explores deeper protocol states and transitions over state-of-the-art (SOTA) fuzzers such as NSFuzz, AFLNet, and ChatAFL. By combining dense retrieval, agentic coordination, and language model reasoning, MultiFuzz establishes a new paradigm in autonomous protocol fuzzing, offering a scalable and extensible foundation for future research in intelligent agentic-based fuzzing systems.

Large language model (LLM) routing has emerged as a crucial strategy for balancing computational costs with performance by dynamically assigning queries to the most appropriate model based on query complexity. Despite recent advances showing that preference-data-based routers can outperform traditional methods, current evaluation benchmarks remain limited. They largely focus on general model capabilities while overlooking task-specific behaviors and critical concerns such as privacy, safety, and potential backdoor vulnerabilities introduced through preference data. In response, we propose the DSC benchmark: Diverse, Simple, and Categorized, an evaluation framework that categorizes router performance across a broad spectrum of query types, including coding, translation, mathematics, human instructions, general knowledge, and LLM jailbreaking. Additionally, it integrates privacy and safety assessments to reveal hidden risks. Our experiments on three preference-based routers and two commercial counterparts demonstrate that while these systems improve efficiency, they often make suboptimal, category-driven decisions. For instance, a BERT-based router directs all coding and mathematics queries to the most powerful LLM even when simpler models would suffice, while routing jailbreaking attempts to weaker models, thereby elevating safety risks.

Quantum networks are complex systems formed by the interaction among quantum processors through quantum channels. Analogous to classical computer networks, quantum networks allow for the distribution of quantum computation among quantum computers. In this work, we describe a quantum walk protocol to perform distributed quantum computing in a quantum network. The protocol uses a quantum walk as a quantum control signal to perform distributed quantum operations. We consider a generalization of the discrete-time coined quantum walk model that accounts for the interaction between a quantum walker system in the network graph with quantum registers inside the network nodes. The protocol logically captures distributed quantum computing, abstracting hardware implementation and the transmission of quantum information through channels. Control signal transmission is mapped to the propagation of the walker system across the network, while interactions between the control layer and the quantum registers are embedded into the application of coin operators. We demonstrate how to use the quantum walker system to perform a distributed CNOT operation, which shows the universality of the protocol for distributed quantum computing. Furthermore, we apply the protocol to the task of entanglement distribution in a quantum network.

Quantum cryptography is arguably the fastest growing area in quantum information science. Novel theoretical protocols are designed on a regular basis, security proofs are constantly improving, and experiments are gradually moving from proof-of-principle lab demonstrations to in-field implementations and technological prototypes. In this review, we provide both a general introduction and a state of the art description of the recent advances in the field, both theoretically and experimentally. We start by reviewing protocols of quantum key distribution based on discrete variable systems. Next we consider aspects of device independence, satellite challenges, and high rate protocols based on continuous variable systems. We will then discuss the ultimate limits of point-to-point private communications and how quantum repeaters and networks may overcome these restrictions. Finally, we will discuss some aspects of quantum cryptography beyond standard quantum key distribution, including quantum data locking and quantum digital signatures.

Prompt-based probing has been widely used in evaluating the abilities of pretrained language models (PLMs). Unfortunately, recent studies have discovered such an evaluation may be inaccurate, inconsistent and unreliable. Furthermore, the lack of understanding its inner workings, combined with its wide applicability, has the potential to lead to unforeseen risks for evaluating and applying PLMs in real-world applications. To discover, understand and quantify the risks, this paper investigates the prompt-based probing from a causal view, highlights three critical biases which could induce biased results and conclusions, and proposes to conduct debiasing via causal intervention. This paper provides valuable insights for the design of unbiased datasets, better probing frameworks and more reliable evaluations of pretrained language models. Furthermore, our conclusions also echo that we need to rethink the criteria for identifying better pretrained language models. We openly released the source code and data at https://github.com/c-box/causalEval.

Orchestrated multi-agent systems represent the next stage in the evolution of artificial intelligence, where autonomous agents collaborate through structured coordination and communication to achieve complex, shared objectives. This paper consolidates and formalizes the technical composition of such systems, presenting a unified architectural framework that integrates planning, policy enforcement, state management, and quality operations into a coherent orchestration layer. Another primary contribution of this work is the in-depth technical delineation of two complementary communication protocols - the Model Context Protocol, which standardizes how agents access external tools and contextual data, and the Agent2Agent protocol, which governs peer coordination, negotiation, and delegation. Together, these protocols establish an interoperable communication substrate that enables scalable, auditable, and policy-compliant reasoning across distributed agent collectives. Beyond protocol design, the paper details how orchestration logic, governance frameworks, and observability mechanisms collectively sustain system coherence, transparency, and accountability. By synthesizing these elements into a cohesive technical blueprint, this paper provides comprehensive treatments of orchestrated multi-agent systems - bridging conceptual architectures with implementation-ready design principles for enterprise-scale AI ecosystems.

The deployment of modern network applications is increasing the network size and traffic volumes at an unprecedented pace. Storing network-related information (e.g., traffic traces) is key to enable efficient network management. However, this task is becoming more challenging due to the ever-increasing data transmission rates and traffic volumes. In this paper, we present a novel method for network traffic compression that exploits spatial and temporal patterns naturally present in network traffic. We consider a realistic scenario where traffic measurements are performed at multiple links of a network topology using tools like SNMP or NetFlow. Such measurements can be seen as multiple time series that exhibit spatial and temporal correlations induced by the network topology, routing or user behavior. Our method leverages graph learning methods to effectively exploit both types of correlations for traffic compression. The experimental results show that our solution is able to outperform GZIP, the de facto traffic compression method, improving by 50\%-65\% the compression ratio on three real-world networks.

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

Standard LLM benchmarks evaluate the assistant turn: the model generates a response to an input, a verifier scores correctness, and the analysis ends. This paradigm leaves unmeasured whether the LLM encodes any awareness of what follows the assistant response. We propose user-turn generation as a probe of this gap: given a conversation context of user query and assistant response, we let a model generate under the user role. If the model's weights encode interaction awareness, the generated user turn will be a grounded follow-up that reacts to the preceding context. Through experiments across 11 open-weight LLMs (Qwen3.5, gpt-oss, GLM) and 5 datasets (math reasoning, instruction following, conversation), we show that interaction awareness is decoupled from task accuracy. In particular, within the Qwen3.5 family, GSM8K accuracy scales from 41% (0.8B) to 96.8% (397B-A17B), yet genuine follow-up rates under deterministic generation remain near zero. In contrast, higher temperature sampling reveals interaction awareness is latent with follow up rates reaching 22%. Controlled perturbations validate that the proposed probe measures a real property of the model, and collaboration-oriented post-training on Qwen3.5-2B demonstrates an increase in follow-up rates. Our results show that user-turn generation captures a dimension of LLM behavior, interaction awareness, that is unexplored and invisible with current assistant-only benchmarks.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

Linear probes are a promising approach for monitoring AI systems for deceptive behaviour. Previous work has shown that a linear classifier trained on a contrastive instruction pair and a simple dataset can achieve good performance. However, these probes exhibit notable failures even in straightforward scenarios, including spurious correlations and false positives on non-deceptive responses. In this paper, we identify the importance of the instruction pair used during training. Furthermore, we show that targeting specific deceptive behaviors through a human-interpretable taxonomy of deception leads to improved results on evaluation datasets. Our findings reveal that instruction pairs capture deceptive intent rather than content-specific patterns, explaining why prompt choice dominates probe performance (70.6% of variance). Given the heterogeneity of deception types across datasets, we conclude that organizations should design specialized probes targeting their specific threat models rather than seeking a universal deception detector.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

Data aggregation in intermediate nodes (called aggregator nodes) is an effective approach for optimizing consumption of scarce resources like bandwidth and energy in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). However, in-network processing poses a problem for the privacy of the sensor data since individual data of sensor nodes need to be known to the aggregator node before the aggregation process can be carried out. In applications of WSNs, privacy-preserving data aggregation has become an important requirement due to sensitive nature of the sensor data. Researchers have proposed a number of protocols and schemes for this purpose. He et al. (INFOCOM 2007) have proposed a protocol - called CPDA - for carrying out additive data aggregation in a privacy-preserving manner for application in WSNs. The scheme has been quite popular and well-known. In spite of the popularity of this protocol, it has been found that the protocol is vulnerable to attack and it is also not energy-efficient. In this paper, we first present a brief state of the art survey on the current privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols for WSNS. Then we describe the CPDA protocol and identify its security vulnerability. Finally, we demonstrate how the protocol can be made secure and energy efficient.

As more devices connect to the internet, it becomes crucial to address their limitations and basic security needs. While much research focuses on utilizing ML and DL to tackle security challenges, there is often a tendency to overlook the practicality and feasibility of implementing these methods in real-time settings. This oversight stems from the constrained processing power and memory of certain devices (IoT devices), as well as concerns about the generalizability of these approaches. Focusing on the detection of DNS-tunneling attacks in a router as a case study, we present an end-to-end process designed to effectively address these challenges. The process spans from developing a lightweight DNS-tunneling detection model to integrating it into a resource-constrained device for real-time detection. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that utilizing stateless features for training the ML model, along with features chosen to be independent of the network configuration, leads to highly accurate results. The deployment of this carefully crafted model, optimized for embedded devices across diverse environments, resulted in high DNS-tunneling attack detection with minimal latency. With this work, we aim to encourage solutions that strike a balance between theoretical advancements and the practical applicability of ML approaches in the ever-evolving landscape of device security.

Generating entanglement between distant quantum systems is at the core of quantum networking. In recent years, numerous theoretical protocols for remote entanglement generation have been proposed, of which many have been experimentally realized. Here, we provide a modular theoretical framework to elucidate the general mechanisms of photon-mediated entanglement generation between single spins in atomic or solid-state systems. Our framework categorizes existing protocols at various levels of abstraction and allows for combining the elements of different schemes in new ways. These abstraction layers make it possible to readily compare protocols for different quantum hardware. To enable the practical evaluation of protocols tailored to specific experimental parameters, we have devised numerical simulations based on the framework with our codes available online.

We present ModularSubsetSelection (MSS), a new algorithm for locally differentially private (LDP) frequency estimation. Given a universe of size k and n users, our varepsilon-LDP mechanism encodes each input via a Residue Number System (RNS) over ell pairwise-coprime moduli m_0, ldots, m_{ell-1}, and reports a randomly chosen index j in [ell] along with the perturbed residue using the statistically optimal SubsetSelection (SS) (Wang et al. 2016). This design reduces the user communication cost from Θbigl(ωlog_2(k/ω)bigr) bits required by standard SS (with ωapprox k/(e^varepsilon+1)) down to lceil log_2 ell rceil + lceil log_2 m_j rceil bits, where m_j < k. Server-side decoding runs in Θ(n + r k ell) time, where r is the number of LSMR (Fong and Saunders 2011) iterations. In practice, with well-conditioned moduli (i.e., constant r and ell = Θ(log k)), this becomes Θ(n + k log k). We prove that MSS achieves worst-case MSE within a constant factor of state-of-the-art protocols such as SS and ProjectiveGeometryResponse (PGR) (Feldman et al. 2022) while avoiding the algebraic prerequisites and dynamic-programming decoder required by PGR. Empirically, MSS matches the estimation accuracy of SS, PGR, and RAPPOR (Erlingsson, Pihur, and Korolova 2014) across realistic (k, varepsilon) settings, while offering faster decoding than PGR and shorter user messages than SS. Lastly, by sampling from multiple moduli and reporting only a single perturbed residue, MSS achieves the lowest reconstruction-attack success rate among all evaluated LDP protocols.

Information seeking is a fundamental requirement for humans. However, existing LLM agents rely heavily on open-web search, which exposes two fundamental weaknesses: online content is noisy and unreliable, and many real-world tasks require precise, domain-specific knowledge unavailable from the web. The emergence of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) now allows agents to interface with thousands of specialized tools, seemingly resolving this limitation. Yet it remains unclear whether agents can effectively leverage such tools -- and more importantly, whether they can integrate them with general-purpose search to solve complex tasks. Therefore, we introduce InfoMosaic-Bench, the first benchmark dedicated to multi-source information seeking in tool-augmented agents. Covering six representative domains (medicine, finance, maps, video, web, and multi-domain integration), InfoMosaic-Bench requires agents to combine general-purpose search with domain-specific tools. Tasks are synthesized with InfoMosaic-Flow, a scalable pipeline that grounds task conditions in verified tool outputs, enforces cross-source dependencies, and filters out shortcut cases solvable by trivial lookup. This design guarantees both reliability and non-triviality. Experiments with 14 state-of-the-art LLM agents reveal three findings: (i) web information alone is insufficient, with GPT-5 achieving only 38.2% accuracy and 67.5% pass rate; (ii) domain tools provide selective but inconsistent benefits, improving some domains while degrading others; and (iii) 22.4% of failures arise from incorrect tool usage or selection, highlighting that current LLMs still struggle with even basic tool handling.

Fragmentation is a routine part of communication in 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks, designed to accommodate small frame sizes on constrained wireless links. However, this process introduces a critical vulnerability fragments are typically stored and processed before their legitimacy is confirmed, allowing attackers to exploit this gap with minimal effort. In this work, we explore a defense strategy that takes a more adaptive, behavior-aware approach to this problem. Our system, called Predictive-CSM, introduces a combination of two lightweight mechanisms. The first tracks how each node behaves over time, rewarding consistent and successful interactions while quickly penalizing suspicious or failing patterns. The second checks the integrity of packet fragments using a chained hash, allowing incomplete or manipulated sequences to be caught early, before they can occupy memory or waste processing time. We put this system to the test using a set of targeted attack simulations, including early fragment injection, replayed headers, and flooding with fake data. Across all scenarios, Predictive CSM preserved network delivery and maintained energy efficiency, even under pressure. Rather than relying on heavyweight cryptography or rigid filters, this approach allows constrained de vices to adapt their defenses in real time based on what they observe, not just what they're told. In that way, it offers a step forward for securing fragmented communication in real world IoT systems

Classical Internet evolved exceptionally during the last five decades, from a network comprising a few static nodes in the early days to a leviathan interconnecting billions of devices. This has been possible by the separation of concern principle, for which the network functionalities are organized as a stack of layers, each providing some communication functionalities through specific network protocols. In this survey, we aim at highlighting the impossibility of adapting the classical Internet protocol stack to the Quantum Internet, due to the marvels of quantum mechanics. Indeed, the design of the Quantum Internet requires a major paradigm shift of the whole protocol stack for harnessing the peculiarities of quantum entanglement and quantum information. In this context, we first overview the relevant literature about Quantum Internet protocol stack. Then, stemming from this, we sheds the light on the open problems and required efforts toward the design of an effective and complete Quantum Internet protocol stack. To the best of authors' knowledge, a survey of this type is the first of its own. What emerges from this analysis is that the Quantum Internet, though still in its infancy, is a disruptive technology whose design requires an inter-disciplinary effort at the border between quantum physics, computer and telecommunications engineering.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

The rapid expansion of distributed Artificial Intelligence (AI) workloads beyond centralized data centers creates a demand for new communication substrates. These substrates must operate reliably in heterogeneous and permissionless environments, where Network Address Translators (NATs) and firewalls impose significant constraints. Existing solutions, however, are either designed for controlled data center deployments or implemented as monolithic systems that tightly couple machine learning logic with networking code. To address these limitations, we present Lattica, a decentralized cross-NAT communication framework designed to support distributed AI systems. Lattica integrates three core components. First, it employs a robust suite of NAT traversal mechanisms to establish a globally addressable peer-to-peer mesh. Second, it provides a decentralized data store based on Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs), ensuring verifiable and eventually consistent state replication. Third, it incorporates a content discovery layer that leverages distributed hash tables (DHTs) together with an optimized RPC protocol for efficient model synchronization. By integrating these components, Lattica delivers a complete protocol stack for sovereign, resilient, and scalable AI systems that operate independently of centralized intermediaries. It is directly applicable to edge intelligence, collaborative reinforcement learning, and other large-scale distributed machine learning scenarios.

Probing classifiers have emerged as one of the prominent methodologies for interpreting and analyzing deep neural network models of natural language processing. The basic idea is simple -- a classifier is trained to predict some linguistic property from a model's representations -- and has been used to examine a wide variety of models and properties. However, recent studies have demonstrated various methodological limitations of this approach. This article critically reviews the probing classifiers framework, highlighting their promises, shortcomings, and advances.

Standard transport protocols like TCP operate as a blind, FIFO conveyor belt for data, a model that is increasingly suboptimal for latency-sensitive and interactive applications. This paper challenges this model by introducing CATS (Conductor-driven Asymmetric Transport Scheme), a framework that provides TCP with the semantic awareness necessary to prioritize critical content. By centralizing scheduling intelligence in a transport-native "Conductor", CATS significantly improves user-perceived performance by delivering essential data first. This architecture directly confronts a cascade of historical performance workarounds and their limitations, including the high overhead of parallel connections in HTTP/1.1, the transport-layer Head-of-Line blocking in HTTP/2, and the observed implementation heterogeneity of prioritization in HTTP/3 over QUIC. Built upon TCP BBR, our ns-3 implementation demonstrates this principle by reducing the First Contentful Paint by over 78% in a representative webpage download configured as a deliberate worst-case scenario, with no penalty to total page load time compared to the baseline.

We investigate an emerging setup in which a small, on-device language model (LM) with access to local data communicates with a frontier, cloud-hosted LM to solve real-world tasks involving financial, medical, and scientific reasoning over long documents. Can a local-remote collaboration reduce cloud inference costs while preserving quality? First, we consider a naive collaboration protocol where the local and remote models simply chat back and forth. Because only the local model reads the full context, this protocol achieves a 30.4x reduction in remote costs, but recovers only 87% of the performance of the frontier model. We identify two key limitations of this protocol: the local model struggles to (1) follow the remote model's multi-step instructions and (2) reason over long contexts. Motivated by these observations, we study an extension of this protocol, coined MinionS, in which the remote model decomposes the task into easier subtasks over shorter chunks of the document, that are executed locally in parallel. MinionS reduces costs by 5.7x on average while recovering 97.9% of the performance of the remote model alone. Our analysis reveals several key design choices that influence the trade-off between cost and performance in local-remote systems.

Large language models(LLMs) excel at text generation and knowledge question-answering tasks, but they are prone to generating hallucinated content, severely limiting their application in high-risk domains. Current hallucination detection methods based on uncertainty estimation and external knowledge retrieval suffer from the limitation that they still produce erroneous content at high confidence levels and rely heavily on retrieval efficiency and knowledge coverage. In contrast, probe methods that leverage the model's hidden-layer states offer real-time and lightweight advantages. However, traditional linear probes struggle to capture nonlinear structures in deep semantic spaces.To overcome these limitations, we propose a neural network-based framework for token-level hallucination detection. By freezing language model parameters, we employ lightweight MLP probes to perform nonlinear modeling of high-level hidden states. A multi-objective joint loss function is designed to enhance detection stability and semantic disambiguity. Additionally, we establish a layer position-probe performance response model, using Bayesian optimization to automatically search for optimal probe insertion layers and achieve superior training results.Experimental results on LongFact, HealthBench, and TriviaQA demonstrate that MLP probes significantly outperform state-of-the-art methods in accuracy, recall, and detection capability under low false-positive conditions.

Googles A2A protocol provides a secure communication framework for AI agents but demonstrates critical limitations when handling highly sensitive information such as payment credentials and identity documents. These gaps increase the risk of unintended harms, including unauthorized disclosure, privilege escalation, and misuse of private data in generative multi-agent environments. In this paper, we identify key weaknesses of A2A: insufficient token lifetime control, lack of strong customer authentication, overbroad access scopes, and missing consent flows. We propose protocol-level enhancements grounded in a structured threat model for semi-trusted multi-agent systems. Our refinements introduce explicit consent orchestration, ephemeral scoped tokens, and direct user-to-service data channels to minimize exposure across time, context, and topology. Empirical evaluation using adversarial prompt injection tests shows that the enhanced protocol substantially reduces sensitive data leakage while maintaining low communication latency. Comparative analysis highlights the advantages of our approach over both the original A2A specification and related academic proposals. These contributions establish a practical path for evolving A2A into a privacy-preserving framework that mitigates unintended harms in multi-agent generative AI systems.

Large language model powered autonomous agents demand robust, standardized protocols to integrate tools, share contextual data, and coordinate tasks across heterogeneous systems. Ad-hoc integrations are difficult to scale, secure, and generalize across domains. This survey examines four emerging agent communication protocols: Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), each addressing interoperability in deployment contexts. MCP provides a JSON-RPC client-server interface for secure tool invocation and typed data exchange. ACP defines a general-purpose communication protocol over RESTful HTTP, supporting MIME-typed multipart messages and synchronous and asynchronous interactions. Its lightweight and runtime-independent design enables scalable agent invocation, while features like session management, message routing, and integration with role-based and decentralized identifiers (DIDs). A2A enables peer-to-peer task delegation using capability-based Agent Cards, supporting secure and scalable collaboration across enterprise agent workflows. ANP supports open network agent discovery and secure collaboration using W3C decentralized identifiers DIDs and JSON-LD graphs. The protocols are compared across multiple dimensions, including interaction modes, discovery mechanisms, communication patterns, and security models. Based on the comparative analysis, a phased adoption roadmap is proposed: beginning with MCP for tool access, followed by ACP for structured, multimodal messaging session-aware interaction and both online and offline agent discovery across scalable, HTTP-based deployments A2A for collaborative task execution, and extending to ANP for decentralized agent marketplaces. This work provides a comprehensive foundation for designing secure, interoperable, and scalable ecosystems of LLM-powered agents.

Ensuring the reliability of agent architectures and effectively identifying problematic agents when failures occur are crucial challenges in multi-agent systems (MAS). Advances in large language models (LLMs) have established LLM-based agents as a major branch of MAS, enabling major breakthroughs in complex problem solving and world modeling. However, the reliability implications of this shift remain largely unexplored. i.e., whether substituting traditional agents with LLM-based agents can effectively enhance the reliability of MAS. In this work, we investigate and quantify the reliability of LLM-based agents from the perspective of Byzantine fault tolerance. We observe that LLM-based agents demonstrate stronger skepticism when processing erroneous message flows, a characteristic that enables them to outperform traditional agents across different topological structures. Motivated by the results of the pilot experiment, we design CP-WBFT, a confidence probe-based weighted Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus mechanism to enhance the stability of MAS with different topologies. It capitalizes on the intrinsic reflective and discriminative capabilities of LLMs by employing a probe-based, weighted information flow transmission method to improve the reliability of LLM-based agents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CP-WBFT achieves superior performance across diverse network topologies under extreme Byzantine conditions (85.7\% fault rate). Notably, our approach surpasses traditional methods by attaining remarkable accuracy on various topologies and maintaining strong reliability in both mathematical reasoning and safety assessment tasks.

The open radio access network (O-RAN), with its disaggregated and open architecture, is poised to meet the demands of the next generation of wireless communication. However, to unlock the full potentials of O-RAN, real-time network modeling and optimization are essential. A promising solution for such requirement is the use of network digital twin (NDT). NDT provides a comprehensive view of a network, covering both physical and logical components, including infrastructure, protocols, and algorithms. NDT, as a real-time virtual representation of O-RAN facilitates a variety of operations, such as emulations, test, optimization, monitoring, and analysis of a new configuration in a risk-free environment, without requiring them to be implemented in real network. Such capability enables the vendors and network operators for a faster adoption of new solutions with frequent updates, while ensuring the resiliency of the existing services via planning ahead under various "what-if" scenarios. In this paper, we first describe what exactly NDT means in the context of O-RAN, as well as its key enablers. We then describe the NDT application within the O-RAN in both prior and post-deployment. Finally, we provide two practical uses cases, namely network energy efficiency and traffic steering, where the NDT can be leveraged effectively.

We propose a learning algorithm for local routing policies that needs only a few data samples obtained from a single graph while generalizing to all random graphs in a standard model of wireless networks. We thus solve the all-pairs near-shortest path problem by training deep neural networks (DNNs) that efficiently and scalably learn routing policies that are local, i.e., they only consider node states and the states of neighboring nodes. Remarkably, one of these DNNs we train learns a policy that exactly matches the performance of greedy forwarding; another generally outperforms greedy forwarding. Our algorithm design exploits network domain knowledge in several ways: First, in the selection of input features and, second, in the selection of a ``seed graph'' and subsamples from its shortest paths. The leverage of domain knowledge provides theoretical explainability of why the seed graph and node subsampling suffice for learning that is efficient, scalable, and generalizable. Simulation-based results on uniform random graphs with diverse sizes and densities empirically corroborate that using samples generated from a few routing paths in a modest-sized seed graph quickly learns a model that is generalizable across (almost) all random graphs in the wireless network model.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has ushered in a transformative paradigm in artificial intelligence, Agentic AI, where intelligent agents exhibit goal-directed autonomy, contextual reasoning, and dynamic multi-agent coordination. This paper provides a systematic review and comparative analysis of leading Agentic AI frameworks, including CrewAI, LangGraph, AutoGen, Semantic Kernel, Agno, Google ADK, and MetaGPT, evaluating their architectural principles, communication mechanisms, memory management, safety guardrails, and alignment with service-oriented computing paradigms. Furthermore, we identify key limitations, emerging trends, and open challenges in the field. To address the issue of agent communication, we conduct an in-depth analysis of protocols such as the Contract Net Protocol (CNP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agora. Our findings not only establish a foundational taxonomy for Agentic AI systems but also propose future research directions to enhance scalability, robustness, and interoperability. This work serves as a comprehensive reference for researchers and practitioners working to advance the next generation of autonomous AI systems.

We study the behavior of an algorithm derived from the cavity method for the Prize-Collecting Steiner Tree (PCST) problem on graphs. The algorithm is based on the zero temperature limit of the cavity equations and as such is formally simple (a fixed point equation resolved by iteration) and distributed (parallelizable). We provide a detailed comparison with state-of-the-art algorithms on a wide range of existing benchmarks networks and random graphs. Specifically, we consider an enhanced derivative of the Goemans-Williamson heuristics and the DHEA solver, a Branch and Cut Linear/Integer Programming based approach. The comparison shows that the cavity algorithm outperforms the two algorithms in most large instances both in running time and quality of the solution. Finally we prove a few optimality properties of the solutions provided by our algorithm, including optimality under the two post-processing procedures defined in the Goemans-Williamson derivative and global optimality in some limit cases.

To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) was proposed and has since been widely adopted. However, integrating external tools expands the attack surface, exposing agents to tool poisoning attacks. In such attacks, malicious instructions embedded in tool metadata are injected into the agent context during MCP registration phase, thereby manipulating agent behavior. Prior work primarily focuses on explicit tool poisoning or relied on manually crafted poisoned tools. In contrast, we focus on a particularly stealthy variant: implicit tool poisoning, where the poisoned tool itself remains uninvoked. Instead, the instructions embedded in the tool metadata induce the agent to invoke a legitimate but high-privilege tool to perform malicious operations. We propose MCP-ITP, the first automated and adaptive framework for implicit tool poisoning within the MCP ecosystem. MCP-ITP formulates poisoned tool generation as a black-box optimization problem and employs an iterative optimization strategy that leverages feedback from both an evaluation LLM and a detection LLM to maximize Attack Success Rate (ASR) while evading current detection mechanisms. Experimental results on the MCPTox dataset across 12 LLM agents demonstrate that MCP-ITP consistently outperforms the manually crafted baseline, achieving up to 84.2% ASR while suppressing the Malicious Tool Detection Rate (MDR) to as low as 0.3%.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

Running LLMs with extended reasoning on every problem is expensive, but determining which inputs actually require additional compute remains challenging. We investigate whether their own likelihood of success is recoverable from their internal representations before generation, and if this signal can guide more efficient inference. We train linear probes on pre-generation activations to predict policy-specific success on math and coding tasks, substantially outperforming surface features such as question length and TF-IDF. Using E2H-AMC, which provides both human and model performance on identical problems, we show that models encode a model-specific notion of difficulty that is distinct from human difficulty, and that this distinction increases with extended reasoning. Leveraging these probes, we demonstrate that routing queries across a pool of models can exceed the best-performing model whilst reducing inference cost by up to 70\% on MATH, showing that internal representations enable practical efficiency gains even when they diverge from human intuitions about difficulty. Our code is available at: https://github.com/KabakaWilliam/llms_know_difficulty

Tool-augmented LLM agents tend to call tools indiscriminately, even when the model can answer directly. Each unnecessary call wastes API fees and latency, yet no existing benchmark systematically studies when a tool call is actually needed. We propose When2Tool, a benchmark of 18 environments (15 single-hop, 3 multi-hop) spanning three categories of tool necessity -- computational scale, knowledge boundaries, and execution reliability -- each with controlled difficulty levels that create a clear decision boundary between tool-necessary and tool-unnecessary tasks. We evaluate two families of training-free baselines: Prompt-only (varying the prompt to discourage unnecessary calls) and Reason-then-Act (requiring the model to reason about tool necessity before acting). Both provide limited control: Prompt-only suppresses necessary calls alongside unnecessary ones, and Reason-then-Act still incurs a disproportionate accuracy cost on hard tasks. To understand why these baselines fail, we probe the models' hidden states and find that tool necessity is linearly decodable from the pre-generation representation with AUROC 0.89--0.96 across six models, substantially exceeding the model's own verbalized reasoning. This reveals that models already know when tools are needed, but fail to act on this knowledge during generation. Building on this finding, we propose Probe&Prefill, which uses a lightweight linear probe to read the hidden-state signal and prefills the model's response with a steering sentence. Across all models tested, Probe&Prefill reduces tool calls by 48% with only 1.7% accuracy loss, while the best baseline at comparable accuracy only reduces 6% of tool calls, or achieves a similar tool call reduction but incurs a 5times higher accuracy loss. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/when2tool

Standard representation probing for visual models relies on mathematically permutation-invariant operations like Global Average Pooling (GAP) or CLS tokens, treating patch representations as an unstructured bag-of-words. We challenge this paradigm by demonstrating that token order is a critical, exploitable dimension in frozen visual representations (e.g., MAE, BEiT, DINOv2, and ViT as CLS-ablation extreme). We propose SSMProbe, a probing framework driven by a State Space Model (SSM). Operating as discrete Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) dynamical systems, SSMs act as permutation-sensitive probes where sequence order strictly dictates the final state due to inherent memory decay. Formulating token ordering as an information scheduling problem, we compare fixed scan heuristics against a differentiable soft permutation (Sinkhorn-based) learned from downstream supervision. Evaluations on standard and fine-grained classification benchmarks reveal a striking order gap: while fixed scans fail dramatically on highly localized patch features, our learned soft permutation successfully extracts highly competitive performance from otherwise heavily localized patch sequences. We find that pre-training objectives fundamentally shape token structure: DINOv2 concentrates global semantics in optimized CLS tokens leaving patches hyperspecialized, pure MAE preserves distributed representations with heterogeneous patch informativeness, and ViT represents a supervised CLS-dominated extreme. BEiT occupies middle ground. This heterogeneity is order-dependent -- meaning the SSM probe's performance depends critically on which tokens are placed at which temporal positions -- and is not merely a topological property of the spatial grid. SSMProbe's learned routing effectively discovers and exploits this heterogeneity, offering a powerful new diagnostic lens for visual representation analysis.

In most Vision-Language models (VL), the understanding of the image structure is enabled by injecting the position information (PI) about objects in the image. In our case study of LXMERT, a state-of-the-art VL model, we probe the use of the PI in the representation and study its effect on Visual Question Answering. We show that the model is not capable of leveraging the PI for the image-text matching task on a challenge set where only position differs. Yet, our experiments with probing confirm that the PI is indeed present in the representation. We introduce two strategies to tackle this: (i) Positional Information Pre-training and (ii) Contrastive Learning on PI using Cross-Modality Matching. Doing so, the model can correctly classify if images with detailed PI statements match. Additionally to the 2D information from bounding boxes, we introduce the object's depth as new feature for a better object localization in the space. Even though we were able to improve the model properties as defined by our probes, it only has a negligible effect on the downstream performance. Our results thus highlight an important issue of multimodal modeling: the mere presence of information detectable by a probing classifier is not a guarantee that the information is available in a cross-modal setup.

The drive toward automating cellular network operations has grown with the increasing complexity of these systems. Despite advancements, full autonomy currently remains out of reach due to reliance on human intervention for modeling network behaviors and defining policies to meet target requirements. Network Digital Twins (NDTs) have shown promise in enhancing network intelligence, but the successful implementation of this technology is constrained by use case-specific architectures, limiting its role in advancing network autonomy. A more capable network intelligence, or "telecommunications brain", is needed to enable seamless, autonomous management of cellular network. Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as potential enablers for this vision but face challenges in network modeling, especially in reasoning and handling diverse data types. To address these gaps, we introduce Hermes, a chain of LLM agents that uses "blueprints" for constructing NDT instances through structured and explainable logical steps. Hermes allows automatic, reliable, and accurate network modeling of diverse use cases and configurations, thus marking progress toward fully autonomous network operations.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a standardized interface designed to enable seamless interaction between AI models and external tools and resources, breaking down data silos and facilitating interoperability across diverse systems. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of MCP, focusing on its core components, workflow, and the lifecycle of MCP servers, which consists of three key phases: creation, operation, and update. We analyze the security and privacy risks associated with each phase and propose strategies to mitigate potential threats. The paper also examines the current MCP landscape, including its adoption by industry leaders and various use cases, as well as the tools and platforms supporting its integration. We explore future directions for MCP, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that will influence its adoption and evolution within the broader AI ecosystem. Finally, we offer recommendations for MCP stakeholders to ensure its secure and sustainable development as the AI landscape continues to evolve.

Current alignment evaluation mostly measures whether models encode dangerous concepts and whether they refuse harmful requests. Both miss the layer where alignment often operates: routing from concept detection to behavioral policy. We study political censorship in Chinese-origin language models as a natural experiment, using probes, surgical ablations, and behavioral tests across nine open-weight models from five labs. Three findings follow. First, probe accuracy alone is non-diagnostic: political probes, null controls, and permutation baselines can all reach 100%, so held-out category generalization is the informative test. Second, surgical ablation reveals lab-specific routing. Removing the political-sensitivity direction eliminates censorship and restores accurate factual output in most models tested, while one model confabulates because its architecture entangles factual knowledge with the censorship mechanism. Cross-model transfer fails, indicating that routing geometry is model- and lab-specific. Third, refusal is no longer the dominant censorship mechanism. Within one model family, hard refusal falls to zero while narrative steering rises to the maximum, making censorship invisible to refusal-only benchmarks. These results support a three-stage descriptive framework: detect, route, generate. Models often retain the relevant knowledge; alignment changes how that knowledge is expressed. Evaluations that audit only detection or refusal therefore miss the routing mechanism that most directly determines behavior.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP Attack Library (MCPLIB), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework MCPLIB, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems.

We present DAG-Rider, the first asynchronous Byzantine Atomic Broadcast protocol that achieves optimal resilience, optimal amortized communication complexity, and optimal time complexity. DAG-Rider is post-quantum safe and ensures that all messages proposed by correct processes eventually get decided. We construct DAG-Rider in two layers: In the first layer, processes reliably broadcast their proposals and build a structured Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of the communication among them. In the second layer, processes locally observe their DAGs and totally order all proposals with no extra communication.

The increasing complexity and scale of modern telecommunications networks demand intelligent automation to enhance efficiency, adaptability, and resilience. Agentic AI has emerged as a key paradigm for intelligent communications and networking, enabling AI-driven agents to perceive, reason, decide, and act within dynamic networking environments. However, effective decision-making in telecom applications, such as network planning, management, and resource allocation, requires integrating retrieval mechanisms that support multi-hop reasoning, historical cross-referencing, and compliance with evolving 3GPP standards. This article presents a forward-looking perspective on generative information retrieval-inspired intelligent communications and networking, emphasizing the role of knowledge acquisition, processing, and retrieval in agentic AI for telecom systems. We first provide a comprehensive review of generative information retrieval strategies, including traditional retrieval, hybrid retrieval, semantic retrieval, knowledge-based retrieval, and agentic contextual retrieval. We then analyze their advantages, limitations, and suitability for various networking scenarios. Next, we present a survey about their applications in communications and networking. Additionally, we introduce an agentic contextual retrieval framework to enhance telecom-specific planning by integrating multi-source retrieval, structured reasoning, and self-reflective validation. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework significantly improves answer accuracy, explanation consistency, and retrieval efficiency compared to traditional and semantic retrieval methods. Finally, we outline future research directions.

Probing studies what information is encoded in a frozen LLM's layer representations by training a lightweight predictor on top of them. Beyond analysis, probes are often used operationally in probe-then-steer pipelines: a learned concept vector is extracted from a probe and injected via additive activation steering by adding it to a layer representation during the forward pass. The effectiveness of this pipeline hinges on estimating concept vectors that are accurate, directionally stable under ablation, and inexpensive to obtain. Motivated by these desiderata, we propose RAPTOR (Ridge-Adaptive Logistic Probe), a simple L2-regularized logistic probe whose validation-tuned ridge strength yields concept vectors from normalized weights. Across extensive experiments on instruction-tuned LLMs and human-written concept datasets, RAPTOR matches or exceeds strong baselines in accuracy while achieving competitive directional stability and substantially lower training cost; these quantitative results are supported by qualitative downstream steering demonstrations. Finally, using the Convex Gaussian Min-max Theorem (CGMT), we provide a mechanistic characterization of ridge logistic regression in an idealized Gaussian teacher-student model in the high-dimensional few-shot regime, explaining how penalty strength mediates probe accuracy and concept-vector stability and yielding structural predictions that qualitatively align with trends observed on real LLM embeddings.

Large-scale distributed training in production datacenters constitutes a challenging workload bottlenecked by network communication. In response, both major industry players (e.g., Ultra Ethernet Consortium) and parts of academia have surprisingly, and almost unanimously, agreed that packet spraying is necessary to improve the performance of large-scale distributed training workloads. In this paper, we challenge this prevailing belief and pose the question: How close can a singlepath transport approach an optimal multipath transport? We demonstrate that singlepath transport (from a NIC's perspective) is sufficient and can perform nearly as well as an ideal multipath transport with packet spraying, particularly in the context of distributed training in leaf-spine topologies. Our assertion is based on four key observations about workloads driven by collective communication patterns: (i) flows within a collective start almost simultaneously, (ii) flow sizes are nearly equal, (iii) the completion time of a collective is more crucial than individual flow completion times, and (iv) flows can be split upon arrival. We analytically prove that singlepath transport, using minimal flow splitting (at the application layer), is equivalent to an ideal multipath transport with packet spraying in terms of maximum congestion. Our preliminary evaluations support our claims. This paper suggests an alternative agenda for developing next-generation transport protocols tailored for large-scale distributed training.

Multi-agent LLM committees replicate the same model under different role prompts and aggregate outputs by majority vote, implicitly assuming that agents contribute complementary evidence. We embed each agent's chain-of-thought rationale and measure pairwise similarity: across 100 GSM8K questions with three Qwen2.5-14B agents, mean cosine similarity is 0.888 and effective rank is 2.17 out of 3.0, a failure mode we term representational collapse. DALC, a training-free consensus protocol that computes diversity weights from embedding geometry, reaches 87% on GSM8K versus 84% for self-consistency at 26% lower token cost. Ablation experiments reveal 1-3 point per-protocol run-to-run variance, confirm that hint sharing contributes more than diversity weighting alone, and show that encoder choice strongly modulates collapse severity (cosine 0.908 with mxbai versus 0.888 with nomic) and downstream accuracy. The more robust finding is that collapse is measurable, worsens on harder tasks, and that the choice of embedding proxy is a first-order design decision for any latent communication protocol.

This chapter discusses the need of security and privacy protection mechanisms in aggregation protocols used in wireless sensor networks (WSN). It presents a comprehensive state of the art discussion on the various privacy protection mechanisms used in WSNs and particularly focuses on the CPDA protocols proposed by He et al. (INFOCOM 2007). It identifies a security vulnerability in the CPDA protocol and proposes a mechanism to plug that vulnerability. To demonstrate the need of security in aggregation process, the chapter further presents various threats in WSN aggregation mechanisms. A large number of existing protocols for secure aggregation in WSN are discussed briefly and a protocol is proposed for secure aggregation which can detect false data injected by malicious nodes in a WSN. The performance of the protocol is also presented. The chapter concludes while highlighting some future directions of research in secure data aggregation in WSNs.

Model fingerprinting has emerged as a powerful tool for model owners to identify their shared model given API access. However, to lower false discovery rate, fight fingerprint leakage, and defend against coalitions of model users attempting to bypass detection, we argue that {\em scalability} is critical, i.e., scaling up the number of fingerprints one can embed into a model. Hence, we pose scalability as a crucial requirement for fingerprinting schemes. We experiment with fingerprint design at a scale significantly larger than previously considered, and introduce a new method, dubbed Perinucleus sampling, to generate scalable, persistent, and harmless fingerprints. We demonstrate that this scheme can add 24,576 fingerprints to a Llama-3.1-8B model -- two orders of magnitude more than existing schemes -- without degrading the model's utility. Our inserted fingerprints persist even after supervised fine-tuning on standard post-training data. We further address security risks for fingerprinting, and theoretically and empirically show how a scalable fingerprinting scheme like ours can mitigate these risks.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into our daily lives, the potential harms from deceptive behavior underlie the need for faithfully interpreting their decision-making. While traditional probing methods have shown some effectiveness, they remain best for narrowly scoped tasks while more comprehensive explanations are still necessary. To this end, we investigate meta-models-an architecture using a "meta-model" that takes activations from an "input-model" and answers natural language questions about the input-model's behaviors. We evaluate the meta-model's ability to generalize by training them on selected task types and assessing their out-of-distribution performance in deceptive scenarios. Our findings show that meta-models generalize well to out-of-distribution tasks and point towards opportunities for future research in this area. Our code is available at https://github.com/acostarelli/meta-models-public .

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a common interface for connecting large language model (LLM) agents to external tools, but its reliance on stateless, eager schema injection imposes a hidden per-turn overhead the MCP Tax or Tools Tax that practitioner reports place between roughly 10k and 60k tokens in typical multi-server deployments. This payload inflates the key-value cache, is associated with reasoning degradation as context utilization approaches published fracture points around 70%, and turns token budgets into a recurring operational cost. We introduce Tool Attention, a middleware-layer mechanism that generalizes the "Attention Is All You Need" paradigm from self-attention over tokens to gated attention over tools. Tool Attention combines (i) an Intent Schema Overlap (ISO) score from sentence embeddings, (ii) a state-aware gating function enforcing preconditions and access scopes, and (iii) a two-phase lazy schema loader that keeps a compact summary pool in context and promotes full JSON schemas only for top-k gated tools. We evaluate on a simulated 120-tool, six-server benchmark whose per-server token counts are calibrated to public audits of real MCP deployments. In this simulation, Tool Attention directly reduces measured per-turn tool tokens by 95.0% (47.3k -> 2.4k) and raises effective context utilization (a token-ratio quantity) from 24% to 91%. End-to-end figures for task success, latency, cost, and reasoning quality are reported as projections derived from the measured token counts combined with published deployment telemetry; they are not measured on live LLM agents, and we mark projected values explicitly throughout. Taken together, the results support a simple thesis: protocol-level efficiency, not raw context length, is a binding constraint on scalable gentic systems. The code for this work is accessible at https://github.com/asadani/tool-attention

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

Models of language trained on very large corpora have been demonstrated useful for NLP. As fixed artifacts, they have become the object of intense study, with many researchers "probing" the extent to which linguistic abstractions, factual and commonsense knowledge, and reasoning abilities they acquire and readily demonstrate. Building on this line of work, we consider a new question: for types of knowledge a language model learns, when during (pre)training are they acquired? We plot probing performance across iterations, using RoBERTa as a case study. Among our findings: linguistic knowledge is acquired fast, stably, and robustly across domains. Facts and commonsense are slower and more domain-sensitive. Reasoning abilities are, in general, not stably acquired. As new datasets, pretraining protocols, and probes emerge, we believe that probing-across-time analyses can help researchers understand the complex, intermingled learning that these models undergo and guide us toward more efficient approaches that accomplish necessary learning faster.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) pose a critical privacy threat to fine-tuned large language models (LLMs), especially when models are adapted to domain-specific tasks using sensitive data. While prior black-box MIA techniques rely on confidence scores or token likelihoods, these signals are often entangled with a sample's intrinsic properties - such as content difficulty or rarity - leading to poor generalization and low signal-to-noise ratios. In this paper, we propose ICP-MIA, a novel MIA framework grounded in the theory of training dynamics, particularly the phenomenon of diminishing returns during optimization. We introduce the Optimization Gap as a fundamental signal of membership: at convergence, member samples exhibit minimal remaining loss-reduction potential, while non-members retain significant potential for further optimization. To estimate this gap in a black-box setting, we propose In-Context Probing (ICP), a training-free method that simulates fine-tuning-like behavior via strategically constructed input contexts. We propose two probing strategies: reference-data-based (using semantically similar public samples) and self-perturbation (via masking or generation). Experiments on three tasks and multiple LLMs show that ICP-MIA significantly outperforms prior black-box MIAs, particularly at low false positive rates. We further analyze how reference data alignment, model type, PEFT configurations, and training schedules affect attack effectiveness. Our findings establish ICP-MIA as a practical and theoretically grounded framework for auditing privacy risks in deployed LLMs.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

Recently, efficient fine-tuning of large-scale pre-trained models has attracted increasing research interests, where linear probing (LP) as a fundamental module is involved in exploiting the final representations for task-dependent classification. However, most of the existing methods focus on how to effectively introduce a few of learnable parameters, and little work pays attention to the commonly used LP module. In this paper, we propose a novel Moment Probing (MP) method to further explore the potential of LP. Distinguished from LP which builds a linear classification head based on the mean of final features (e.g., word tokens for ViT) or classification tokens, our MP performs a linear classifier on feature distribution, which provides the stronger representation ability by exploiting richer statistical information inherent in features. Specifically, we represent feature distribution by its characteristic function, which is efficiently approximated by using first- and second-order moments of features. Furthermore, we propose a multi-head convolutional cross-covariance (MHC^3) to compute second-order moments in an efficient and effective manner. By considering that MP could affect feature learning, we introduce a partially shared module to learn two recalibrating parameters (PSRP) for backbones based on MP, namely MP_{+}. Extensive experiments on ten benchmarks using various models show that our MP significantly outperforms LP and is competitive with counterparts at less training cost, while our MP_{+} achieves state-of-the-art performance.

This work examines whether activating latent subspaces in language models (LLMs) can steer scientific code generation toward a specific programming language. Five causal LLMs were first evaluated on scientific coding prompts to quantify their baseline bias among four programming languages. A static neuron-attribution method, perturbing the highest activated MLP weight for a C++ or CPP token, proved brittle and exhibited limited generalization across prompt styles and model scales. To address these limitations, a gradient-refined adaptive activation steering framework (G-ACT) was developed: per-prompt activation differences are clustered into a small set of steering directions, and lightweight per-layer probes are trained and refined online to select the appropriate steering vector. In LLaMA-3.2 3B, this approach reliably biases generation towards the CPP language by increasing the average probe classification accuracy by 15% and the early layers (0-6) improving the probe classification accuracy by 61.5% compared to the standard ACT framework. For LLaMA-3.3 70B, where attention-head signals become more diffuse, targeted injections at key layers still improve language selection. Although per-layer probing introduces a modest inference overhead, it remains practical by steering only a subset of layers and enables reproducible model behavior. These results demonstrate a scalable, interpretable and efficient mechanism for concept-level control for practical agentic systems.